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A b s t r a c t
Canada’s health system is based on the firmly-held belief that the receipt of care should 
be based on need and not ability to pay. This thesis examines three aspects of this 
equity goal: provincial variations in equity in the receipt of care; the role of private 
prescription drug insurance in explaining inequity in the use of physician services; and 
the equity implications of subjective unmet need. Canada’s provinces are responsible 
for planning and funding most publicly insured health services, hence there is variation 
in health system characteristics across the country. In the context of such variation, the 
first empirical analysis examines equity in the use of health services across the 
provinces. The analysis reveals some evidence of inequity in the likelihood of a GP 
visit, and the likelihood and number of specialist and dentist visits; some variations can 
also be found across the provinces. The second empirical analysis investigates the role 
of complementary insurance for prescription drugs in explaining inequity in the use of 
publicly-fimded physician services. Due to the complementary relationship between 
prescription drugs and physician services, and the unequal distribution of private 
insurance coverage across income groups, inequity in physician utilisation partly can be 
explained by the interaction with insurance. The third empirical analysis assesses the 
equity implications of subjective unmet need. It finds that there are different utilisation 
patterns among the different types of unmet need, which raises methodological and 
conceptual challenges. The concluding chapter positions the three empirical studies 
within the broader policy context, offers an in-depth discussion of their methodological 
and policy implications, and proposes areas for future research.
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C h a p t e r  1: In t r o d u c t io n
1.1 Thesis objective
The set of values that underlie a health system gives rise to the objectives with which to 
evaluate the system. Canadians have a long-held belief that health care is a social good 
that should be distributed equally across the population (Canada, 1964, 1997, 2002a). 
Achievement of this equity goal should therefore be monitored. The specific equity 
objective that should be empirically assessed is not clearly defined, although in research 
and policy discussions, the prevailing definition is that individuals should receive health 
care on the basis of their need (Canada, 2002a; Evans, 1983; Mendelsohn, 2004; Wilson 
& Rosenberg, 2004).
The primary objective of this thesis is to employ quantitative empirical methods to 
examine some key aspects of equity in the receipt of health care in Canada. Studies 
from high-income countries consistently demonstrate that a system of financing health 
care that separates the payment of health care from the receipt of health care (such as 
through a pre-payment tax-based system) is not sufficient to ensure the attainment of 
this equity objective. Therefore, this thesis examines three aspects of equity that 
address some of the gaps in the literature to develop our understanding of some of the 
challenges and policy options to achieve this equity goal. This thesis also aims to place 
the empirical analyses into the Canadian policy context to highlight the implications of 
observed inequity, and to further the research agenda to address the policy and 
methodological issues that relate to equity. This chapter briefly introduces the Canadian 
health system and then outlines the background and objectives for the three empirical 
research questions.
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1.2 The Canadian health system: an overview
The Canadian health system can be viewed from the perspective of its broad functions. 
Health systems have four main functions: financing (including collecting and pooling 
resources and purchasing services), resource generation (including investment and 
training), delivering services (on an individual and population level) and providing 
oversight or ‘stewardship’ (World Health Organization, 2000).
The foundation of the insurance system in Canada took place through a succession of 
province-led reforms following the Second World War (Evans, 1983). Saskatchewan 
first implemented universal hospital insurance (in 1947), followed by the federal 
government’s formal agreement to contribute to funding provincial hospital insurance 
plans with the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostics Act of 1957. By 1961 all provinces 
had a universal hospital insurance plan. The extension to physician services again was 
initiated in Saskatchewan, with the introduction of the universal medial (physician) care 
insurance in 1962 by the then premier, Tommy Douglas. The Royal Commission on 
Health Services (the “Hall Commission”) recommended federal support of provincial 
physician insurance plans (Canada, 1964), and in 1966 the federal government passed 
the Medical Care Act. By 1972, all provinces and territories had implemented public 
insurance for physician services (Marchildon, 2005).
Canada’s health system can be described as predominantly publicly financed through 
taxation. Taxation by the provincial, territorial and federal governments accounts for 
about 70% of total health expenditure, the majority comes from individual income 
taxes, consumption taxes and corporate taxes. Most of the revenue that is raised by the 
federal government for health expenditure is transferred to the provinces, although some
13
is spent directly by the federal government on public health programmes, 
pharmaceutical regulation, drug product safety, as well as Aboriginal (First Nations and 
Inuit) health care services (constituting 3.7% of total health expenditure). Out-of- 
pocket payments make up almost 15% of total health expenditure. Since hospital and 
physician services are, almost wholly, free at the point of use, out-of-pocket payments 
fund the large part of vision care, over-the-counter medications, complementary and 
alternative medicines and therapies, and about 20% of prescription drugs. The majority 
of private health insurance (constituting about 13% of total health expenditure) is 
employment-based insurance. It is supported through substantial tax expenditure 
subsidies and is designed to provide coverage for health goods and services that are not 
covered by the public insurance system (termed Medicare), such as dental care, 
ambulatory prescription drugs and hospital amenities. Thus, private insurance for the 
publicly insured physician and hospital services is either prohibited or restrictions on 
physicians’ ability to provide services in both the public and private sectors and that 
limit the fees they can charge for private services have deterred the development of a 
private sector and consequently private insurance (Flood & Archibald, 2001). The 
regulation and coverage of prescription drugs are discussed in more detail below.
Services are provided through private (a mix of for-profit and not-for-profit) and public 
(both arm’s-length and direct) bodies (Evans, 2000; Marchildon, 2005). Hospitals are 
paid mostly through global budgets, physicians mainly by fee-for-service (accounting 
for over 80% of total remuneration), and other health care personnel such as nurses by 
salary within hierarchically directed health organisations (Marchildon, 2005). 
Physicians include general practitioners (GPs) and specialists, the former who work 
mostly in solo private practice, the latter in hospitals. Patients require a referral from
14
their GP in order for them to consult a specialist, thus they serve a gate-keeping 
function in the system.
Oversight of the system takes place at the three levels at which health care is organised: 
federal, provincial/territorial, and inter-governmental levels. The federal government, 
through the ministry, Health Canada, is responsible for protecting the health and 
security of Canadians. It sets the standards for the national Medicare system and it has 
responsibilities for public health, drug and food safety regulation, data collection and 
health research, as outlined in the Canadian constitution. The provinces and territories 
govern the administration of their single-payer systems for universal hospital and 
medical services, including paying for hospitals, negotiating and setting remuneration 
rates for physicians, providing public health services, and funding research. 
Intergovernmental not-for-profit corporations, as well as some nongovernmental not- 
for-profit agencies funded by the sponsoring governments, facilitate and coordinate 
policy and programme areas, notably the advisory committees to the Conference of 
Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers of Health (Marchildon, 2005).
With regards to pharmaceuticals, the federal government is responsible for regulating 
the safety, efficacy and quality of drug products both prior to determining market 
authorisation, and once they reach the market (Paris & Docteur, 2007). Also the federal 
government regulates the prices of patented medicines through the Patented Medicine 
Prices Review Board. The Board’s objective is to ensure that the patented drug prices 
are not “excessive” on the basis of its “degree of innovation” and through a comparison 
with the prices of existing medicines in Canada and with the prices in seven comparator 
countries including the United States and the United Kingdom (Paris & Docteur, 2007). 
Price variations across provinces may result, however, from the differential levels of
15
wholesalers’ and pharmacists’ margins, and differential pricing policies by provincial 
governments.
Pharmaceutical price regulation takes place at the federal level, although the provinces 
are principally responsible for decisions related to prescription drug coverage.
Therefore there are variations across the provinces in the design of the provincial 
programmes that subsidise the costs of the services. Provincial prescription drug 
insurance plans generally cover vulnerable population subgroups such as those 
receiving social assistance, older people, individuals with specific diseases, and families 
with high prescription drug expenditures (Demers, Melo, Jackevicius, Cox, 
Kalavrouziotis, Rinffet et al., 2008; Grootendorst, 2002). The majority of individuals 
who are not covered in a provincial prescription drug insurance plan are privately 
insured through employer-sponsored insurance. In three provinces -  British Columbia, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan -  there are income-based, as opposed to the above group- 
based, public insurance plans; and in Quebec there is mandatory public insurance for all 
resident who do not have private prescription drug insurance (Section 6.2 2 offers an in- 
depth discussion of these programmes). Moreover, variations across provinces can arise 
due to different eligibility requirements and levels of cost sharing in the public plans 
(Fraser Group/ Tristat Resources, 2002; Grootendorst & Veall, 2005), and differences in 
the formularies used by the provincial drug plans (Paris & Docteur, 2007). Differences 
across provinces are also seen in other services outside of the hospital and physician 
services, such as arrangements for funding long-term care services, dental services, and 
allied medical services; these differences are explored in greater detail in Section 3.2.
An important feature of the Canadian health system is its system of rationing health 
services with waiting lists in the context of scarce public resources. Waiting times for
16
elective surgery and diagnostic procedures are long in Canada; international evidence 
suggests that Canada fares particularly poorly in terms of waiting times relative to other 
OECD countries (Siciliani & Hurst, 2004). As a result of the lengthy waiting times in 
the province of Quebec along with the prohibition of private insurance for services 
provided in hospital, in 2005 there was a Supreme Court challenge by a Quebec 
resident, who had waited for 12 months for a hip replacement, and his physician, Dr 
Jacques Chaoulli. The Supreme Court ruled (by a four-to-three majority) that the 
Quebec government’s ban on private health insurance for hospital and physician 
services with long waiting times violated individuals’ rights to life and security of 
person under the province’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. This decision 
highlights the conflict that policy makers face between the equity objective of ensuring 
equality in access by prohibiting a ‘two-tier’ system and restrictions on personal liberty.
The Canada Health Act serves as the legislative underpinning of the health system; it 
outlines the conditions for which the federal government assists in the funding of 
provincial health programmes. The federal cash transfer flows to the provinces and 
territories on a per capita basis. The Act states that: “the primary objective of Canadian 
health policy is to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of 
residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without 
financial or other barriers” (Canada House of Commons, 1984). The federal 
government further states that the goal of reasonable access should be applied to 
necessary hospital and physician services (Health and Welfare Canada, 1989). The 
federal ministry of health, Health Canada, distinguishes between economic and physical 
accessibility, the former refers to the provision of health services without financial 
charges (either direct or indirect), which implies that individuals’ ability to pay should 
not determine access to care. Thus, under the Canada Health Act, all residents of a
17
province or territory are eligible to receive medically necessary services free at the point 
of use. This includes landed immigrants after an initial residency period (but not 
foreign visitors), serving members of the Canadian military or Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, and inmates of federal penitentiaries.
Reasonable access has been interpreted to mean access in accordance with need, or 
medical necessity, where need is determined on the basis of the expectation of 
protecting, promoting or restoring health (Birch & Abelson, 1993; Evans, 1983; Evans, 
1992; Giacomini, Hurley, Gold, Smith, & Abelson, 2004; Law, 1986; Manga, 1987). 
Whether the concern is with the actual use of services or the opportunity to use the 
services is less clear, although it has been argued that “reasonable access” should be 
interpreted as equitable utilisation. This interpretation would be consistent with the 
objectives of the Canada Health Act and it would facilitate empirical measurement 
(Birch & Abelson, 1993).
1.3 Research questions
The aims of this thesis are to measure equity in health care utilisation in Canada, to 
explain some of the contributors to observed inequity, to examine the equity 
implications of subjective unmet need, and to discuss the policy and methodological 
implications of these analyses. To achieve these objectives, I will address three specific 
research questions, and then review these empirical findings, highlight areas for future 
research, and examine their implications. There are many possible questions that could 
be raised with regards to the broader issue of equity in the Canadian health system; 
however, these three questions were chosen because they build on the existing literature,
18
they address current policy relevant issues, they go beyond conventional analyses, and 
they serve as catalysts for further research. (Box 1 below summarises some of the key 
terms that are used in this thesis).
1. What is the extent of inequity in the Canadian system? How do the level and 
contributors to inequity vary across the Canadian provinces? (Chapter 3)
2. In the province of Ontario, does the exclusion of prescription drugs from the 
universal public insurance plan, and reliance on private insurance, contribute to 
inequity in physician service utilisation? (Chapter 4)
3. To what extent can subjective unmet need inform our understanding of equity in 
the Canadian health system? (Chapter 5)
1.3.1 Research Question 1
The equity principle that I introduced above is institutionalised at the national level and 
appears to be valued by citizens across Canada (Canada, 2002a). However, the 
interpretation and importance of equity as a goal in policy making may vary across the 
provinces; characteristics of the provincial health systems that impact patterns of 
utilisation may also vary. Some commentators have argued that there is not one single 
Canadian system, but thirteen separate, universal, single-payer systems of hospital and 
physician care for the ten provinces and three territories (Marchildon, 2005). Previous 
studies have found some variations in patterns of utilisation across the provincial 
systems (Birch, Eyles, & Newbold, 1993; Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000; Newbold, 
Birch, & Eyles, 1994). To understand equity in the Canadian context, an approach that 
considers the separate provincial health systems is needed.
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The first empirical chapter, therefore, systematically investigates equity in the different 
health care sectors across Canada’s provinces. For this analysis, the definition of 
equity is informed by the interpretations of Canadian policy documents and previous 
empirical research: individuals with equal need for health care should have similar 
utilisation patterns. This analysis focuses on inequity due to income, consistent with 
policy statements of the importance of ensuring access or utilisation is based on need 
for health care, and not ability to pay. Building on a previous study that included 
Canada in the analysis of equity in 21 countries (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD 
Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004), I calculate income-related inequity for 
the ten provinces, across primary and secondary care, investigating separately the initial 
contact with the health system and the volume of services consumed. The factors 
contributing to inequity are also examined in order to assess not only whether the level 
of inequity varies across the county, but also whether the sources of inequity differ.
National-level analyses confirm previous studies by showing a statistically significant, 
but modest, concentration of the probability of a GP visit among the rich, though the 
total number of GP visits and the number of visits conditional on having made one visit 
is concentrated among the poor. The distributions of specialist and dental visits are 
significantly pro-rich, and hospital admissions are more concentrated in the lower end 
of the income distribution. Variations across the provinces in the level of income- 
related inequity can be seen, and, to some extent, these differences relate to the funding 
of non-Medicare services such as dental care and prescription drugs.
1.3.2 Research Question 2
In the literature on equity in the use of health services in Canada, little is known about 
the reasons for observed inequity. There has been a removal of direct barriers to access
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alongside consistent policy commitments to ensuring equity. Higher utilisation rates 
among individuals in higher socioeconomic groups may be driven by preferences for 
higher levels of health (Grossman, 1972), alternatively, these patterns may be attributed 
to factors that are mutable by policy (Aday & Andersen, 1981; Gulliford, Figueroa- 
Minoz, & Morgan, 2002).
The results of the first empirical chapter point to the role of prescription drug insurance 
as a mechanism through which inequity in physician care may arise. Therefore, the 
second empirical chapter of this thesis tackles this issue explicitly. It provides an in- 
depth analysis of the role of complementary insurance for prescription drugs in 
explaining patterns of utilisation and inequity in the receipt of physician services. This 
analysis explores an interesting interaction between public and privately funded services 
that are complementary. Almost 100% of physician costs are funded publicly compared 
to about half of the cost of prescription drugs. Moreover, a physician’s prescription is 
legally required in order for patients to access prescription drugs. One previous study 
has shown a positive impact of holding any form of complementary insurance for 
prescription drugs on the likelihood of a GP visit (Stabile, 2001). Building on this 
study, I examine the impact of public and private insurance for prescription drugs on the 
use of GPs and specialists, and on income-related inequity in these services. This 
analysis raises important policy implications of the current mixed model of financing 
for certain health services.
1.3.3 Research Question 3
In the first two empirical chapters, self-assessed health is conceptually and empirically 
understood as approximating need for health care; hence it is used to standardise
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utilisation in order to observe any remaining variations that are not explained by need.
In the literature that measures equity in access to health care, most studies employ 
regression techniques to determine if factors other than need, such as income and 
socioeconomic status, are significantly associated with utilisation. These conventional 
methods may be complemented by the direct measurement of unmet need.
The third empirical chapter seeks to develop our understanding of the concept of unmet 
need by outlining the different types of unmet need that can arise and discussing these 
different equity implications. It empirically assesses the systematic association between 
subjective unmet need and actual health care utilisation by calculating the extent to 
which individuals with different types of subjective unmet need use fewer or more 
health services than expected based on the empirical norm. The analysis links unmet 
need to conventional methods of equity measurement in order to gain an understanding 
of the policy relevance of subjective unmet need and to highlight limitations with the 
conventional methods.
1.4 Structure and contribution of the thesis
The following chapter (Chapter 2) provides an overview of the conceptual issues 
underlying this area of equity research as applied to health care, first exploring the 
ideological bases of current equity definitions, then discussing the translation of these 
definitions to measurable and policy relevant metrics of equity. Chapter 2 then reviews 
the literature on equity in the Canadian context, and finally outlines the methodological 
tools that are used to address the research questions. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 constitute the 
original empirical analyses for this thesis that address the three research questions 
outlined above. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the results of the empirical analyses,
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discusses some of the key policy and methodological implications, and develops an 
agenda for future research.
How will this thesis contribute to the literature? In this thesis, I apply methodological 
techniques to a number of policy-relevant empirical questions in order to generate new 
evidence to inform policy development, highlight limitations and methodological 
challenges with this type of research, and raise new questions for further research. To 
address the first two research questions, I will calculate concentration indices to 
quantify and decompose income-related inequity in health care utilisation. First, I will 
investigate provincial variations in levels and contributors to inequity, and second, I will 
assess the equity impact of the interactions between publicly-funded physician services 
and private insurance for prescription drugs. The third research question addresses the 
equity implications of subjective unmet need and offers an exploratory analysis that, for 
the first time, attempts to link, both conceptually and empirically, conventional 
approaches to equity measurement with reported unmet need. In addition to these three 
empirical chapters, this thesis offers an in-depth discussion of how to take this research 
forward. It will provide suggestions for the design of surveys, and will raise new 
research questions that address the challenges in measuring equity and that guide the 
development of policies to achieve equity goals.
Overall, there are three ways in which this thesis is innovative. First, it builds on the 
empirical literature that measures equity in the receipt of health care by confirming 
previous findings with more in-depth analyses and discussions, and by developing new 
techniques to empirically assess equity. Second, it goes further than existing empirical 
studies of equity by linking the empirical analyses to policy debates and attempting to 
understand the policy context in which equity arises, and can be addressed. Third, it
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critically assesses the findings from both methodological and policy perspectives 
order to further the research agenda in a meaningful way.
C h a p t e r  2: C o n c e p t u a l  o v e r v ie w , l it e r a t u r e  r e v ie w  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g y
2.1 Understanding equity: why is this topic important for policy?
One of the fundamental goals of developed countries’ health systems is to achieve an 
equitable distribution of health care resources. In other words, health systems, such as 
Canada’s, aim to ensure that health services are provided on the basis of need and not 
other factors, such as socioeconomic status (Evans, 1983). There is a vast literature on 
the subject of defining and understanding equity from the perspectives of political 
philosophy, public policy, psychology, economics and political science1. In the 
following section, I provide an overview of the dominant ideological positions on equity 
to set the context for investigating equity in health care. Discussions of equity are 
complex; the underlying philosophical views are often conflicting and there is no 
agreement on how to define equity more generally, let alone in the health care sector. 
The aim of this overview is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ideological 
debates surrounding equity; rather, it aims to trace some of the policy statements on 
equity and empirical definitions of equity to some of the more prominent philosophical 
positions.
Debates surrounding the definition of equity date back to the Aristotelian principles of 
justice that equals should be treated equally, or horizontal equity, and that unequals 
should be treated unequally in proportion to the relevant inequalities, or vertical equity
1 Some reviews of this literature have been drawn upon for this section (Gillon, 1985; Le Grand, 1991; 
Olsen, 1997; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000; Williams, 1993).
25
(Gillon, 1985; Williams, 1993). This principle, in both its horizontal and vertical forms, 
underlies most current definitions of equity in the context of health care.
Among the numerous theories of justice, there are five commonly referenced in current 
debates about equity in health care: the libertarian theory of personal liberty, the 
utilitarian theory of maximum total utility, Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, and 
Sen’s theory of equality of capabilities. Each of these is reviewed briefly below and the 
implications for health policy follow.
Personal liberty is the most important goal according to libertarian theories stemming 
from the work of John Locke’s on man’s natural rights to life, health, liberty and 
possessions. Libertarians argue that fairness (or equity) is determined by the process in 
which exchanges are made and not the resultant distribution, and thus they are 
concerned with process (deontological) as opposed to end-state (or consequentialist) 
ethics. Nozick’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ presumes that the most important right is that of 
self-ownership (including one’s talents and anything produced with those talents), 
suggesting that the government has no right to tax the fruits of individuals’ labour in 
order to redistribute resources to others. Moreover, a distribution can be considered to 
be just if everyone is entitled to what it is they possess, whether through an original 
acquisition of holdings, the just transfer of holdings, or rectification of historical 
injustice in holdings (Nozick, 1974). Nozick has been criticized by selecting only part 
of the spectrum of Lockean rights, and thus his arguments against taxation to help the 
sick, poor and disadvantaged are not well supported (Gillon, 1985).
Utilitarian theories, in contrast, are consequentialist and emphasise the maximisation of 
total happiness or welfare (utility) in the population. Utility maximisation seeks to
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achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. Libertarians would argue that this 
approach sacrifices personal rights or liberty at the expense of maximising overall 
welfare, while egalitarians (see more below) would criticise this theory for its lack of 
concern with the distribution of utility in the population (equal weight is given to the 
everyone’s interests), and that some actions that increase total utility may involve 
sacrifices by others (Olsen, 1997). To the extent that inequalities in utility in a 
population produce disutility, however, coupled with diminishing marginal utility of 
commodities and money, utilitarians argue that approaches that increase equality would 
also increase total utility (Hare, 1982).
Rawls’ theory of justice states that a just society is one where principles or rules of 
social justice are agreed by impartial individuals in the ‘original position’ (Rawls,
1971). In this original position, individuals are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
where they would neither have knowledge of their place (social standing) in society nor 
their level of natural assets and abilities. The principle of justice that Rawls argues 
would be accepted through this process is that “all social values -  liberty, opportunity, 
income and wealth and the bases of self-respect -  are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls, 
1971, p.62). These social values, or social primary goods, are those that are important 
to people, but that are created, shaped, and affected by social structures and political 
institutions. In other words, knowing that natural primary goods (intelligence, strength, 
imagination, talent and good health) will be unequally distributed in society, rational, 
self-interested individuals behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would want social primary goods 
to be distributed equally. They would also support the ‘difference principle’, which 
ensures that any existing inequalities work to everyone’s advantage (Stone, 2002).
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Critiques of Rawlsian justice often centre on the relationship between natural and social 
primary goods. The argument of equal claim to social primary goods, for example, that 
individuals with worse health do not deserve less income or opportunity, may not go far 
enough, because they may need more income or opportunity in order to be compensated 
for their relative disadvantage. Also in relation to health care, it can be argued that 
health should be considered a social primary good because of the importance of health 
care, a social institution, in preserving and protecting health (Olsen, 1997).
Sen builds on the above theories by asking the question for ethical analysis: equality of 
what? (Sen, 1992). While Rawls is concerned with equalising primary goods, Sen 
argues for the importance of considering differences in individuals’ abilities to convert 
those primary goods into ‘functionings’ (such as nourishment, good health, happiness 
and self-respect) that contribute to their well-being (Olsen, 1997; Sen, 1992).
Therefore, the answer to his question of what space should be the focus of attention for 
equality is in the capabilities or freedoms to achieve, as opposed to Rawls’ means to 
achieve (social primary goods), or utilitarians’ achievements themselves (utility) (Sen, 
1992). In response, Rawls argued that primary goods do account for individuals’ basic 
capabilities, and, moreover, the primary goods are those that are required for individuals 
to be fully functioning members of society (Rawls, 2001).
It has been suggested that, with regards to health care, the two ideological perspectives 
that can be broadly referred to as libertarianism and egalitarianism dominate current 
ethical debates (Donabedian, 1971; Williams, 1993; Williams, 2005)2. These 
viewpoints would support two distinctive health care systems. Libertarians are 
concerned with preserving personal liberty and ensuring minimum health care standards
2 From a political science or public policy perspective these two viewpoints can alternatively be termed 
‘social conservativism’ and ‘social liberalism’ (Stone, 2002)
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are achieved. Moreover, access to health care can be seen as a privilege and not a right: 
people who can afford to should be able to pay for better or more health care than their 
fellow citizens (Williams, 1993). Egalitarians seek to ensure that health care is financed 
according to ability to pay, and that health care should be allocated on the basis of need 
and not ability to pay, with a view of promoting equality in health (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2000). The egalitarian viewpoint supports the belief that access to health 
care is a fundamental human right, one that can be viewed as a prerequisite for personal 
achievement and critical to life itself, and, thus, access should not be influenced by 
income or wealth (Evans, 1983; Williams, 1993). Moreover, Hurley argues that 
equality of access is based on the ethical notion of equal opportunity or a fair chance, 
and not necessarily on the consequences of such access, such as utilization or health 
outcomes (Hurley, 2000). (Appendix A1 summarises these two viewpoints).
While the Rawlsian perspective has been interpreted to suggest that equity is satisfied if 
the most disadvantaged in society have a decent minimum level of health care 
(Williams, 1993), if health care can be considered one of Rawls’ social primary goods, 
an equitable society depends on the equal distribution of health care, thus in line with 
egalitarian goals. Although Rawls states that government-provided health care could be 
included in the index of primary goods since it is an extension of the primary goods of 
income and wealth, he argues that health care policies should be made at the legislative 
stage and not in the original position or constitutional convention (Rawls, 2001). 
Moreover it has been argued that health care ought not to be considered as a primary 
good because of the societal costs in maximising the benefit to the least advantaged in 
terms of health, and in order to avoid the potential trade-offs between health care and 
income (McGuire, Henderson, & Mooney, 1988). To the extent that health care can be
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considered essential for individuals’ capability to function, then the above egalitarian 
perspective could also be consistent with Sen’s theory of equality.
Although no perfectly libertarian or egalitarian health care system exists, egalitarian 
viewpoints are in large part supported by both the policy community and society. This 
support is evidenced by the predominance of publicly funded health systems with strong 
government oversight that separate payment of health care from receipt of health care, 
and the numerous programmes that are in place to support the most vulnerable groups. 
On an international level, the view that access to health care is a right is illustrated by, 
among other things, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The debate 
between libertarian and egalitarian perspectives, however, is not resolved in practice: 
policies of redistribution exist alongside policies preserving individual autonomy and 
freedom of choice, as evidenced by the existence of a private sector in health care that 
allows those able or willing to pay to purchase additional health services. Moreover the 
view that health care is a right suggests that health care resources are infinite; therefore, 
in the context of scarce resources, a limit to access through rationing by price, or other 
tools such as waiting lists, is inevitable. The conflict between equity and efficiency is 
discussed further in Sections 2.1.3 and 6.2.
2.1.1 What objective o f equity do we want to evaluate?
It is widely supported that health systems should pursue equity goals. However the 
operationalisation of equity in the context of health care is not straightforward. In the 
economics literature, Mooney identified seven possible definitions of equity that would 
oftentimes conflict and thus lead to different policy considerations (Mooney, 1983, 
1986): (1) equality of expenditure per capita; (2) equality of inputs (taking into
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consideration differing average prices across regions); (3) equality of input for equal 
need (with need defined for example by age/sex structure, morbidity, marital status, 
patient flow in and out of region, etc); (4) equality of (opportunity of) access for equal 
need; (5) equality of utilisation for equal need; (6) equality of marginal met need; and 
(7) equality of health.
The first two -  equality of expenditure per capita and equality of inputs across regions - 
are unlikely to be equitable since they do not allow for variations in levels of need for 
care across the regions. While the third -  equality of input for equal need -  does 
account for need, it does not consider factors beyond the size of the health care budget 
that may give rise to inequity. The third and fourth are the most commonly cited 
definitions -  equality of access for equal need (individuals should face equal costs of 
accessing care) and equality of utilisation for equal need (individuals in equal need 
should not only face equal costs but also demand the same amount of services). If 
everyone’s information, preferences and tastes for health and health care were the same, 
then the goal of equality of access should yield the same outcome as equality of 
utilisation. The sixth suggests that if  needs are prioritised/ranked in the same way 
across regions, then equity is achieved when each region was able to meet the same 
‘last’ or ‘marginal’ need. The seventh argues that we should not be concerned with the 
distribution of health care according to need but with the distribution of health care in 
order to ensure equality in health, which raises concerns as to the role of health care in 
reducing inequalities, and the conflict with this equity goal and efficiency (Mooney, 
1983); this is discussed further below.
In addition to the above goals -  all concerned with health care delivery - equity in 
health care can be defined in terms of health care financing, whereby individuals’
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payments for health care should be based on their ability to pay, and therefore should be 
proportional to their income. Individuals with higher income should pay proportionally 
more and individuals with lower income should pay less, regardless of their risk of 
illness and receipt of care. This concept is based on the vertical equity principle of 
unequal payment for unequals, where unequals are defined in terms of their level of 
income (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000), and has direct implications for access to care 
since financial barriers to access may arise from inequitable (or regressive) systems of 
health care finance.
From a policy perspective, a working definition of equity is needed that is both realistic 
(i.e. within the scope of health policy) and that makes intuitive sense (Le Grand, 1991; 
Whitehead, 1991). In an attempt to clarify the principles of equity for policy makers, 
Whitehead builds on the principles proposed by Mooney to develop an operational 
definition that encompasses three dimensions: accessibility, acceptability and quality 
(Whitehead, 1991). Equity in the health care context thus requires the fulfilment of all 
three of the following goals:
1. Equal access to available care for equal need. This implies that all people have 
equal entitlements (i.e. universal coverage), that there is a fair distribution of 
resources throughout the country (i.e. allocations on the basis of need), and that 
geographical and other barriers to access are removed.
2. Equal utilisation for equal need. The aim is to ensure that the use of services is not 
restricted by social or economic disadvantage (and to ensure the appropriate use of 
essential services), though accepting those differences in utilisation that may arise 
from individuals exercising their right to use, or not to use, services according to 
their preferences. This recognition of the acceptable role of preferences in affecting 
utilisation is consistent with the definition of equity that is linked to personal choice,
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such that an outcome is equitable if it arose in a state in which all people had equal 
choice sets (Le Grand, 1991)3.
3. Equal quality of care for all. This implies an absence of preferential treatments that 
are not based on need, that the same professional standards apply to everyone (e.g. 
consultation time, referral patterns), and that health care is acceptable for everyone.
The last of Mooney’s goals - equal (or less unequal) health outcomes -  is another 
important policy objective (Whitehead, 1991). However, there are two factors that 
complicate the adoption of the goal of equality in health for policy makers: first, the 
multiple and varied social and economic determinants of health that fall outside of the 
health system make its attainment possible only with efforts beyond the scope of health 
care, and second, the fact that it might require restrictions on the ways in which people 
may choose to live their lives (Mooney, 1983). In fact, the policy support for 
improving equity in access or receipt of care appears to be more evident than the 
commitment to reduce inequalities in health (Gulliford, 2002); although in the United 
Kingdom the reduction of avoidable health inequalities is a priority government 
objective (Department of Health, 2002, 2003) and the formula that is used to allocate 
resources to the regions seeks to improve both equity in access to services and also to 
reduce health inequalities (Bevan, 2008).
These two principles are clearly linked; policy support for an equity objective based on 
access or utilisation derives from its potential to achieve equality in health. Health care
Critics of this choice-based equity definition question the autonomy in making choices that affect 
health, arguing that many choices are in fact out of individuals’ control. Le Grand counters that denying 
individual autonomy denies the existence of free will (Le Grand, 1991). Also, critics point out a 
contradiction in Le Grand’s theory that states that health differences owing to individual choice are not 
inequitable, although differential rights to health care on the basis of these choices would constitute 
inequity (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993).
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is instrumental in the improvement of health. Few people would like to consume health 
care in a normal situation; however, at the time of illness, health care becomes essential 
to restore health. Demand for health care is thus derived from the demand for health 
itself (Grossman, 1972; World Health Organization, 2000). Therefore, in ensuring an 
equitable distribution of health care resources, there is a broader aim of health 
improvement and reduction of health inequalities. It is often argued that, from the 
egalitarian viewpoint, ensuring equal access by allocating health care resources 
according to need will promote equality in health (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000); 
however, if access is defined in terms of cost of utilisation or maximum attainable 
consumption of health care, equality in access may not give rise to equal health (Culyer 
& Wagstaff, 1993).
Further complications arise from the argument that, although a greater consensus exists 
from policy and research communities on the horizontal principle of equity, this goal 
may not be as effective a route to reducing inequalities in health as its vertical 
counterpart that seeks to ensure that people with different needs are receiving 
appropriately differentiated treatment (Mooney, 2000). The empirical literature, to date, 
has almost exclusively focused on horizontal equity (with some exceptions; (Sutton,
2002)). This focus is mainly due to the value judgements that would be required for, 
and the difficulties associated with, measuring differences in need and assessing what is 
an appropriately greater or lesser amount of health care to receive.
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2.1.2 How do we measure access and utilisation?
In Canada the stated objective of the health system is to ensure reasonable access to care 
by removing direct and indirect barriers. This has been interpreted to mean that the 
receipt of health care should be based on need and not ability to pay (Evans, 1983).
This interpretation is consistent with the international policy community’s recognition 
of the importance of not only ensuring that individuals have the opportunity to use 
services, but that they are availing themselves of these services (Whitehead, 1991). 
Equitable access is a commonly stated objective in policy documents; therefore, this 
section discusses how access can be understood and defined, and then considers the 
benefits and limits to the reliance on utilisation to approximate access.
Access can be defined in numerous and competing ways. Narrowly defined, access 
pertains to the money and time costs people incur in obtaining care: how accessible a 
service is can then be understood as the opportunity cost to individuals of seeking that 
service (Le Grand, 1982; Mooney, 1983). But if two people face the same time and 
money costs they are said to have the same access irrespective of their income (Le 
Grand, 1991). Olson and Rogers therefore develop the definition of access to mean the 
maximum attainable level of consumption of medical care given individuals’ income, 
time and money costs: “people have equal access to a good if and only if they are able 
to consume the same quantity of that good” (Olsen & Rogers, 1991, p.93). A definition 
of access that incorporates further conditions is “the ability to secure a specified set of 
health care services, at a specified level of quality, subject to a specified maximum level 
of personal inconvenience and cost, whilst in possession of a specified amount of 
information” (Goddard & Smith, 2001, p.l 151). The authors stress the importance of a
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multi-dimensional approach to defining access and extending, for instance, its 
considerations to quality of care.
Accessing health care thus depends on an array of supply and demand-side factors. 
Supply-side factors affecting access to and receipt of care include the volume and 
distribution of human resources and capital, waiting times, referral patterns, booking 
systems, how individuals are treated within the system (continuity of care), and quality 
of care (Aday & Andersen, 1974; Gulliford, Figueroa-Munoz, Morgan, Hughes,
Gibson, Beech et al., 2002; Starfield, 1993; Whitehead, 1991). On the demand-side 
there are predisposing, enabling and needs factors, including socio-demographics, past 
experiences with health care, perceived quality of care, perceived barriers, health 
literacy, beliefs and expectations regarding health and illness, income levels (ability to 
pay), scope and depth of insurance coverage, and educational attainment (Aday & 
Andersen, 1974; Dixon, Le Grand, Henderson, Murray, & Poteliakhoff, 2007; Goddard 
& Smith, 2001).
Clearly there is a multitude of factors that affect access and there are many potential 
indicators of access. Lacking information on access, many researchers use the term 
“access” as synonymous with “utilisation”, implying that an individual’s use of health 
services is proof that he/she can access these services (Evans, 1983). However, 
utilisation is not equivalent to access (Le Grand, 1982; Mooney, 1983); as noted above, 
access can be viewed as opportunities being open for people, while receipt of treatment 
depends both on the existence of these opportunities and whether an individual has 
actually made use of them (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000). Aday and Andersen 
suggested that a distinction ought to be made between having access -  the possibility of 
using a service if required, and gaining access -  actually using a service (Aday &
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Andersen, 1974, 1981). Likewise, Donabedian asserted that “the proof of access is use 
of service, not simply the presence of a facility”, thus he argued that utilisation 
represented realised access (Donabedian, 1972, p. 111). Thus, in order to evaluate 
whether an individual has gained access, one must measure actual utilisation of health 
care, and if possible also the level of satisfaction with that contact and ultimately, health 
improvement.
A consensus about the most appropriate metric of access remains to be found. Many 
different elements or indicators of access can be measured, such as waiting times, 
availability of resources and access costs, while utilisation can be directly observed. 
Indeed empirical research has centred on the measurement of equity by observing the 
distribution of utilisation across income and other population groups (Evans, 1983). In 
this way, inequity is assumed to arise when individuals in higher socioeconomic groups 
are more likely to use, or are using a greater quantity of, health services after controlling 
for their level of need. If we rely on utilisation to measure equity, however, we must 
keep in mind that differences in (needs-adjusted) utilisation levels by socioeconomic 
status may be driven in part by individuals’ informed choices or preferences (Le Grand, 
1991; Oliver & Mossialos, 2004). Also an apparently equal or pro-poor distribution of 
needs-adjusted utilisation by socioeconomic status may not imply equity or pro-poor 
inequity if the services being used by those at the lower end of the socioeconomic 
distribution are of low quality, or are inappropriate (Thiede, Akweongo, & McIntyre,
2007). This limitation should be acknowledged and complementary analyses could be 
undertaken to measure the dimensions of access not captured by utilisation.
A potential complementary approach would be to measure equity in access to health 
care as the extent to which individuals did not receive needed health care (Aday &
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Andersen, 1981). ‘Unmet need’ could be measured with clinical information, such as 
medical records or clinical assessments, or by self-report. Subjective unmet need is 
easily measurable and is included in national health surveys. Moreover, individuals 
may have better information about their health care needs, as suggested by the stronger 
predictive power of subjective ratings of health on future mortality and health care use 
than clinical assessments (see below). Therefore levels of subjective unmet need and 
the stated reasons for unmet need could provide further insight into the extent of 
inequity in the system, in particular if they are complemented by measures of equity 
based on health care utilisation. This form of metric will be explored in Chapter 5.
2.1.3 How can we define needfor health care?
Whether one relies on utilisation (receipt of health care) or access (opportunities to 
receive health care) to assess equity, an operational definition of ‘need’ has to be 
determined since utilisation or access that varies in proportion to need would be unequal 
but not necessarily inequitable. This section begins with a conceptual discussion of 
need measurement, and then goes on to the practical measurement of need for empirical 
research.
In the economics literature, four possible definitions of need have been proposed 
(Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993):
1. Need for health care is defined in terms of an individual’s current health status;
2. Need is measured by capacity to benefit from health care;
3. Need represents the expenditure a person ought to have; i.e. the amount of health 
care required to attain health; or
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4. Need is indicated by the minimum amount of resources required to exhaust 
capacity to benefit.
The authors argue that the first definition is too narrow since it may miss the value of 
preventive care, and certain health conditions may not be treatable (Culyer & Wagstaff,
1993). The second does not take into account the amount of resources spent, leaving 
unanswered the question of how much health care a person needs. The third concept 
takes into consideration this issue since need is defined as the amount of health care 
required to attain equality of health. The fourth definition implies that when capacity to 
benefit is, at the margin, zero, need is zero; but when capacity to benefit is positive, 
need is assessed by considering the amount of expenditure required to reduce capacity 
to benefit to zero (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993). By combining the level of need with the 
level of required resources, however, this last definition implies that an individual who 
requires more expensive intervention has greater need than someone with a potentially 
more urgent need but for a less expensive treatment (Hurley, 2000).
Although the fourth definition commands the widest approval in the economics 
literature (Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 2004), empirical studies measure need by level 
of ill-health (and risk of ill-health) partly because of data availability and relative ease 
of measurement. Also, the assumption that current health status reflects needs is 
generally considered to be a reasonable one: an individual in poor general health with a 
chronic condition clearly needs more health care than an individual in good health with 
no chronic condition. Moreover, since individuals with higher socioeconomic status 
have been shown generally to have more favourable prospects for health and thus 
greater capacity to benefit (Evans, 1994), then allocation according to needs as defined 
by capacity to benefit may distort the allocation of resources away from the most
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vulnerable population groups. These latter groups would have worse ill health, so 
allocating resources according to this principle would exacerbate socioeconomic 
inequalities in health (Culyer, 1995). Utilitarians are not concerned with the 
distribution of utility in the population but instead seek its maximisation; in the context 
of health care, health would be maximised when resources are distributed according to 
capacity to benefit. The Rawls’ difference principle that inequalities should be to 
everyone’s advantage, in particular the most disadvantaged, suggests that we should be 
concerned with the health of the worst-off in society and therefore ensure the 
distribution of health care is directed towards those in worse health. An egalitarian 
perspective that supports equality of access for equal need would conflict with the 
definition of need as capacity to benefit because of the potential unintended implications 
for health inequality.
Measuring need as ill-health
To measure need for health care, an individual’s level of ill health is most commonly 
captured by a subjective measure of self-assessed health (SAH). This provides an 
ordinal ranking of perceived health status and it is often included in general 
socioeconomic and health surveys, both at international (for example, the Joint Canada- 
US Survey of Health) and national level (for example, the Canadian Community Health 
Survey). The usual health question asks the respondent to rate their general health, 
sometimes including a time reference (individuals are asked to rate their health in their 
last twelve months) or an age benchmark (respondents are asked their current health 
compared to individuals of their own age). Five categories are usually available for the 
respondent, ranging from very good or excellent to poor or very poor. SAH has been 
used extensively in the literature, and it has been applied to measure the relationship
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between health and socioeconomic status (Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, & Ribeiro,
2003), the relationship between health and lifestyles (Kenkel, 1995) and the 
measurement of socioeconomic inequalities in health (van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, 
Bleichrodt, Calonge, Gerdtham, Gerfin et al., 1997).
There are numerous potential methodological problems associated with relying on SAH 
as a measure of need. An obvious worry relates to the reliability of SAH as a predictor 
of objective health status. But this concern may be misplaced. An early study from 
Canada found SAH to be a stronger predictor of seven-year survival among older 
people than their medical records or self-reports of medical conditions (Mossey & 
Shapiro, 1982). This finding has been replicated in many studies and countries since 
then (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Idler & Kasl, 1995). In their review, the authors argued 
that self-rated health represents an invaluable source of health status information, and 
suggested several possible interpretations for its strong predictive effect on mortality 
(Idler & Benyamini, 1997).
• SAH more accurately measures health because it captures all illnesses a person 
has and possibly as yet undiagnosed symptoms. It reflects judgements of 
severity of illness, and it could reflect an individual’s estimate of longevity 
based on family history.
• SAH not only assesses current health, but it is a dynamic evaluation that 
represents a decline or improvement in health. Poor assessments of health may 
lessen an individuals’ engagement with preventive or self care, or non-adherence 
to screening recommendations, medications or treatments.
• SAH reflects social or individual resources that can affect health or it could 
reflect an individual’s ability to cope with illness.
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Since this review, mounting evidence has shown SAH to be a valid summary measure 
of health, one that relates to other health-related indicators such as mortality (Bailis, 
Segall, & Chipperfield, 2003; Mackenbach, Simon, Looman, & Joung, 2002; McGee, 
Liao, Cao, & Cooper, 1999; Singh-Manoux, Martikainen, Ferrie, Zins, Marmot, & 
Goldberg, 2006; Sundquist & Johansson, 1997; van Doorslaer & Gerdtham, 2003) and 
health care use (van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, van der Burg, Christiansen, De Graeve, 
Duchesne et al., 2000).
Self-assessed measures of health include subjective and quasi-objective indictors 
(Jurges, 2007), with the latter being based on respondents’ reporting on more factual 
items, such as specific conditions or symptoms. Examples of these quasi-objective 
indicators include the presence of chronic conditions (where specific chronic conditions 
are listed), specific types of cancer, limitations in activities of daily living (ADL) such 
as walking, climbing the stairs, etc, or in instrumental activities of daily living (LADL), 
such as eating or having a bath.
There is strong evidence that SAH is not only predictive of mortality and other 
objective measures of health but may be a more comprehensive measure of health status 
than other measures. However, bias is possible whereby different population groups 
may systematically under- or over-report their health status relative to other groups 
(Sen, 2002). Due to its subjective nature, SAH can be influenced by a variety of factors 
that impact perceptions of health. That is, the mapping of “true” or objective health into 
SAH categories may vary according to respondent characteristics. Indeed subgroups of 
the population appear to use systematically different cut-point levels when reporting 
SAH, despite having equal levels of “true” health (Hemandez-Quevedo, Jones, & Rice, 
2008). Moreover, the rating of health status appears to be influenced by culture and
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language (Angel & Thoits, 1987; Zimmer, Natividad, Lin, & Chayovan, 2000), social 
context (Sen, 2002), gender and age (Groot, 2000; Lindeboom & van Doorslaer, 2004), 
fears and beliefs about disease (Barsky, Cleary, & Klerman, 1992), in addition to the 
way a question is asked such as the ordering of the question with other health-related 
questions, and form-based versus face-to-face elicitation (Crossley & Kennedy, 2002). 
Among the potential biases with SAH include state-dependence reporting bias 
(Kerkhofs & Lindeboom, 1995), scale of reference bias (Groot, 2000) and response 
category cut-point shift (Sadana, Mathers, Lopez, Murray, & Iburg, 2000).
Various approaches have been developed to correct for reporting bias in the literature. 
The first is to condition on a set of objective indicators of health and argue that any 
remaining variation in SAH reflects reporting bias. For example, Lindeboom and van 
Doorslaer (2004) used Canadian data and the McMaster Health Utility Index as their 
quasi-objective measure of health, and found some evidence of reporting bias by age 
and gender, but not for income. However, this approach relies on having a sufficiently 
comprehensive set of objective indicators to capture all the variation in true health. The 
second is to use health vignettes such as those currently included in the World Health 
Survey (Bago d'Uva, Van Doorslaer, Lindeboom, & O'Donnell, 2008) and the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (Bago d'Uva, O'Donnell, & van Doorslaer, 
2008). The third is the use of biological markers of disease risk. Some studies 
combined self-reported data with biological data, which could improve the accuracy of 
the results (Banks, Marmot, Oldfield, & Smith, 2006). Also Johnston et al (2007) 
reported that an income gradient appeared to be significant when using an objective 
measure of hypertension measured by a nurse rather than the self-reported measure of 
hypertension included in the Household Survey of England (Johnston, Propper, & 
Shields, 2007).
However, the availability of objective measures of health, such as biomarkers, is 
limited. Some examples of European surveys that include objective measures (such as 
walking speed, grip strength) include the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe, in addition to national surveys from Finland (blood tests and anthropometric 
tests -  FINRISK), Germany (anthropometric measures -  National Health Interview and 
Examination Survey; urine and blood samples -  German Health Survey for Children 
and Adolescents) and the United Kingdom -  English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA) and Health Survey of England (HSE).
Together with the limited availability, biomarkers may still be subject to bias due to 
variations in methods of collection. For example, a person’s blood pressure may vary 
according to the time of day it is taken. This measurement error is particularly 
problematic if it is correlated with socio-demographic characteristics, hence biasing 
estimates of social inequalities. Collecting biological data also tends to reduce survey 
response rates, which limits the sample size and their ability to represent the whole 
population (Masseria, Allin, Sorenson, Papanicolas, & Mossialos, 2007).
Overall there is widespread support for equity goals in health care, though there is no 
single operational definition of equity that can capture the multiple supply- and 
demand-side factors affecting the allocation of effective, high quality health care on the 
basis of need. This complexity necessitates not only a comprehensive set of 
information on individuals, their contacts with health care and system characteristics, 
but also strong methodological techniques to assess these relationships empirically. 
After Section 2.2 reviews the empirical literature of equity in the Canadian context, 
Section 2.3 will address the issues of measurement methodology.
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2.2 Evidence of equity in the Canadian context: what is known on this topic?
Given the value placed on equity goals in most developed countries, including Canada, 
equity-related empirical research has been quite extensive. There is considerable 
emphasis on equity in health care in official policy statements in Canada, although there 
is no clear stated definition of equity. Moreover, the stated goal of the health system is 
to provide reasonable access to medically necessary health care. These concepts remain 
undefined although medically necessary services are generally accepted to be what the 
hospitals and physicians provide (Charles, Lomas, Giacomini, Bhatia, & Vincent, 1997; 
Evans, 1983). Thus the definition of equity most studied to date in the Canadian 
context, and commonly interpreted by federal and provincial governments, is the 
egalitarian viewpoint that individuals in equal need be treated equally, and that receipt 
of care should not be based on ability to pay, with need, measured by self-reported 
health status (Birch & Abelson, 1993; Birch, Eyles, & Newbold, 1993; Hurley, Birch, 
Stoddart, & Torrance, 1997; McGrail, 2008). Thus medical necessity can be understood 
as an individual’s level of health, or level of risk to ill-health: those with poorer health 
or greater risk have greater needs for services that can be expected to improve their 
health.
Early studies of equity compared use of health care with health care need in the United 
Kingdom (Collins & Klein, 1980; Le Grand, 1978). Since then a wide literature has 
developed. Several national and international studies have analysed equity in health 
care service use using the empirical technique of calculating the degree to which 
utilisation is related to income after standardising for differences in needs across the 
income distribution, for example in Australia (van Doorslaer, Clarke, Savage, & Hall,
2008), the United Kingdom (Bago d'Uva, 2005; Morris, Sutton, & Gravelle, 2005;
O'Donnell & Propper, 1991; Propper, 1998; Propper & Upward, 1992), Finland 
(Hakkinen & Luoma, 2002), Belgium (Van Der Heyden, Demarest, Tafforeau, & Van 
Oyen, 2003), Spain (Abasolo, Manning, & Jones, 2001; Garcia-Gomez & Lopez- 
Nicolas, 2007), Italy (Atella, Brindisi, Deb, & Rosati, 2004), the United States (Chen & 
Escarce, 2004), Europe (Bago d'Uva, Jones, & van Doorslaer, 2007; van Doorslaer, 
Koolman, & Jones, 2004; van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, van der Burg et al., 2000), member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (van 
Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004) and 
Asia (Lu, Leung, Kwon, Tin, van Doorslaer, & O'Donnell, 2007). These studies 
highlight the persistence of systematic disparities in health care utilisation across 
socioeconomic and income groups and across a wide range of jurisdictions with 
comprehensive health and welfare systems.
The study of equity in Canada’s health system dates back to the introduction of 
Medicare, the insurance system that was founded on the principles of universality and 
solidarity that sought a more equitable sharing of the burden of illness (Evans, 1983). 
Research from that time points to significant improvements in the accessibility of health 
services, demonstrated by an increased rate of utilisation among lower income groups, 
following the introduction of universal coverage for hospital and physician care in some 
Canadian provinces such as Quebec (Enterline, Salter, McDonald, & McDonald, 1973; 
McDonald, McDonald, Salter, & Enterline, 1974; Siemiatycki, Richardson, & Pless, 
1980), Alberta (Greenhill & Hawthorne, 1972), Ontario (Barer, Manga, & Shillington, 
1982; Manga, 1978) and Saskatchewan (Beck, 1974; Beck & Home, 1976).
Later studies of equity in utilisation, which are discussed in detail below, found 
variations in utilisation were in part explained by variations in health care need.
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However these studies revealed that socioeconomic factors were also important.
Overall, there is evidence of inequity in health care utilisation in some sectors and 
provinces favouring the higher income and educational groups (“pro-rich” distribution), 
and the lower utilisation than needed among poorer populations despite the removal of 
direct cost barriers for the large part of services. Most studies separately examined GP, 
specialist, hospital and, sometimes, dental services. Initial contacts with health care 
professionals are commonly modelled separately from the volume of services 
consumed. This two-stage approach derives from the conceptualisation of utilisation 
whereby an initial contact is driven much more by the patient, whereas future contacts 
with the health system are determined in large part by the provider (whether for follow- 
up or through a system of referral) (Evans, 1984). Some studies have measured equity 
by directly asking individuals in general population surveys to describe barriers to care 
or unmet medical needs; this literature is described in detail in Section 5.4.
The sections that follow begin with a presentation of early national studies that 
measured socioeconomic effects on utilisation, followed by a discussion of province- 
level, then service-specific, studies, and then reviews the results of some recent national 
studies including the international study of income-related inequity in utilisation based 
on the ECuity method. It ends with a discussion of the remaining gaps in our 
understanding of equity in the Canadian context. In addition to the literature that 
investigates the role of socioeconomic status in explaining variations in treatment 
patterns across individuals or population subgroups, which is detailed below, there is a 
vast literature that seeks to explain ‘small-area’ treatment variations in terms of 
differences in medical practice (Bevan, 1995), the so-called ‘practice-style factor’ 
(Wennberg, 1984). These studies are discussed in Section 6.3.5 in reference to the 
consideration of supply in efforts to understand utilisation patterns.
47
2.2.1 Early national studies
Numerous studies have investigated the role of socioeconomic factors in influencing the 
use of physician and hospital services: in the absence of direct financial barriers to 
access, is utilisation based on need and not ability to pay? For instance, studies using 
data from the Canada Health Survey and the General Social Survey assessed the extent 
to which hospital and physician utilisation was influenced by economic factors. These 
studies largely followed the model of health care utilisation that separates the 
explanatory factors of utilisation into three categories: 1) predisposing factors such as 
family composition and social structure; 2) enabling factors such as income, insurance 
status, and education; and 3) need factors (Aday & Andersen, 1974).
Early studies found negligible income effects on health care utilisation. Using 1978-79 
data from the Canada Health Survey, a series of studies have evaluated the relative 
importance of health needs and socioeconomic variables on hospital and physician 
service utilisation (Broyles, Manga, Binder, Angus, & Charette, 1983; Manga, Broyles, 
& Angus, 1987). The 1983 study found that with respect to any physician visit, health 
care need (measured by a comprehensive set of health status indicators including 
previous prescription drug use) appeared to be the most significant determinant of both 
the decision to seek care and the volume of services consumed, and income was not 
significant in the model of use/non-use but lower income was associated with a greater 
number of physician visits (Broyles, Manga, Binder et al., 1983). Although they found 
employed people had a greater likelihood of visiting a physician than the unemployed, 
the authors concluded that national health insurance had reduced, or even eliminated, 
financial impediments to health care and resulted in “a more equitable distribution of 
physician care” (Broyles, Manga, Binder et al., 1983, p. 1050). However, the inclusion
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of previous prescription drug use, which is conditional upon having seen a physician to 
receive the prescription, may have masked some of the socioeconomic effects in the 
model. In the 1987 study, the authors found that, controlling for need (using the same 
measures as above), occupational status and income were not significantly associated 
with the probability of a hospital utilisation, although they did find that poor and middle 
income groups consumed more inpatient care (spend more days in hospital) than their 
wealthier counterparts (Manga, Broyles, & Angus, 1987). Overall there appeared to be 
little evidence of inequity in physician and hospital care in the late 1970s.
A later study of physician utilisation based on the 1985 General Social Survey yielded 
similar findings (Birch, Eyles, & Newbold, 1993). The authors found that controlling 
for health status and demographics, neither income nor education was associated with 
the probability of a family physician visit or with the volume of services used 
conditional upon use. However they also found that analysing utilisation separately for 
each level of need (by category of self-reported health), income remained non­
significant, but higher educated individuals in “excellent” health were using more 
physician services, which the authors suggested was due to a greater tendency to seek 
preventive care among the better educated. In addition, residents of Ontario and British 
Columbia had significantly greater likelihood of a family physician visit and were 
making more visits than in the Atlantic provinces. The authors concluded that while 
income did not appear to affect physician service utilisation, other barriers may have 
existed, such as education and region of residence (Birch, Eyles, & Newbold, 1993). 
Drawing on this same survey, a comparison of factors affecting utilisation in two 
provinces -  Ontario and Quebec -  revealed some provincial differences. For instance 
higher income was significantly associated with the likelihood of a family physician 
visit in Quebec but not Ontario, both in the total sample and in the subset analyses of
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only those reporting “excellent” and “good” health status (Newbold, Birch, & Eyles,
1994). Comparing patterns of use in 1991 and 1985 revealed little difference in the 
magnitude of the effect of income on utilisation: no income gradient was seen in family 
physician visits in both years, and a positive income gradient in dental care utilisation 
was found in both years (Eyles, Birch, & Newbold, 1995). These studies again showed 
little inequity in family physician used, though they identified other socioeconomic and 
provincial effects and found dental care to be inequitable.
Later studies analysed use of GP and specialist physicians separately, controlling for 
underlying needs indicators, and found income effects in specialised but not in primary 
care4. An analysis of 1994 National Population Health Survey of the relationship 
between socioeconomic status and utilisation of GPs and specialists found evidence of 
inequity in specialist services (Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000). Specifically, 
Canadians with lower incomes and fewer years of schooling visited specialists at a 
lower rate than those with higher incomes and higher education (controlling for need: 
self-assessed health status and number of chronic health problems). However, with 
regards to primary care, the likelihood of a GP visit was found to be independent of 
income, and the frequency (having at least 6 visits) was greater among lower income 
individuals. Higher educated individuals were more likely to make use of GP and 
specialist services than those without post-secondary education. The authors reported 
significant differences between geographies: Quebec residents were less likely to visit a 
GP but more likely to make at least one specialist visit; and urban residents were more 
likely than rural ones to visit a GP and specialist (for women but not men). They 
concluded that access to primary health care was independent of income, confirming
4 Remember that in order for a patient to access a specialist, a referral from a GP is needed. However after 
the initial referral, patients are able to contact the specialist directly for follow-up consultations.
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previous studies, however they also found that the likelihood of a specialist physician 
visit was greater for higher socioeconomic groups (Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000).
Other studies have analysed the determinants of utilisation using NPHS data. One 
examined the role of social networks in facilitating access to health care among 
immigrants (Deri, 2005); the other investigated the impact of income and 
‘supplemental’ insurance coverage on utilisation (Stabile, 2001). Including only those 
individuals with first languages other than English or French, Deri analysed the NPHS 
from 1994-1999 (cross-sectional files) and found an income effect on utilisation.
Among this immigrant population, higher income (and not stating income) was 
associated with a greater likelihood of a dentist, GP, specialist or any health care 
professional visit, though fewer GP visits (Deri, 2005). Stabile (2001) analysed 1994 
and 1996 data of the NPHS for the working-age population and found that higher 
income increased the probability of a GP visit but the income effect on the conditional 
number of GP visits was negative and significant, and negative but not significant for 
the likelihood of hospital admission and number of days spent in hospital. He also 
found that ‘supplemental insurance’ for prescription drugs (including private and public 
insurance) increased GP utilisation, although it was not significantly associated with 
hospital use (Stabile, 2001).
2.2.2 Province-level studies
Some province-level studies have been conducted to examine utilisation patterns by 
socioeconomic status. To a large extent these confirm earlier national studies in spite of 
their use of administrative, as opposed to survey, data sources in some cases.
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An analysis of the 1990 Ontario Health Survey of hospital utilisation patterns by gender 
revealed that socioeconomic factors were more important for women than for men (Iron 
& Goel, 1998). Younger women on low income and older women not in the work force 
were more likely to be admitted to hospital, after controlling for need (as measured by 
the number of health problems and self-assessed health). This finding of “pro-poor” 
distribution of hospital care supports earlier evidence at the national level. Also using 
the 1990 Ontario Health Survey, Katz et al showed that lower-income earners had more 
physician contacts than middle or higher-income earners (not adjusting for health 
status). This pattern was especially pronounced for those reporting fair or poor health 
status, but also seen to a lesser extent among those with good or excellent/very good 
health status (Katz, Hofer, & Manning, 1996). Further analyses of the 1990 Ontario 
Health Survey revealed that GP visits were equitably distributed across socioeconomic 
groups, whereas use of specialist services favoured the higher educated and higher 
income groups (Mclsaac, Goel, & Naylor, 1997) as found in national studies (Dunlop, 
Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000).
Using Ontario data from the 1994/1995 National Population Health Survey (NPHS) 
linked to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan providers’ database, however, Finkelstein 
found that income did not influence physician service use. Physician utilisation was 
measured by the total expenditure incurred for any physician, including out-of-hospital 
physicians and specialists. The author concluded that physician service use was based 
on need in this province (Finkelstein, 2001). However, higher education was 
significantly associated with the likelihood of specialist physician visit. Compared to 
those with no high school education, those who graduated had a higher likelihood of 
specialist service use (and they spent on average $21 more, though this was not
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significant). The finding that income was non-significant may be due to the relatively 
small sample size (2170 observations) that only included the 40-79 year olds and those 
who approved of data linkages. The finding could also relate to the different measure of 
utilisation in this study (expenditure) compared to previous studies that measured self- 
reported visits.
An analysis of physician service utilisation in Nova Scotia using the 1990 Nova Scotia 
Nutrition Survey linked with 1990-1994 data from the Medical Services Insurance 
Physicians’ Services database showed that controlling for age, sex and region, lower 
income and lower educated individuals used more physician services (Kephart, Thomas, 
& MacLean, 1998). This observed inverse relationship between socioeconomic status 
and service use may have been due to unobserved need that was correlated with income 
and education. Others analysed survey data from Nova Scotia and found that 
individuals on lower incomes and less education used more GP services but less 
specialist services than wealthier and more educated comparison groups (Veugelers & 
Yip, 2003).
In Quebec using administrative data from the Quebec Health Insurance Board from 
1991, Rivest and colleagues found that income was not significantly associated with the 
volume of physician care, including GPs and specialists, as found in Ontario, 
(Finkelstein, 2001). They measured the costs incurred based on the physician fee 
schedule. They found regional inequalities were significant (Rivest, Bosse, Nedelca, & 
Simard, 1999). Here, need was measured by the extent of previous hospitalisation, 
therefore, restricting the analyses to those individuals who had accessed the system.
53
Several other studies have demonstrated that factors other than need influence health 
care utilisation. Numerous studies based in Winnipeg, Manitoba made use of 
administrative data and income divisions based on neighbourhood statistics. One 
investigated inequalities in hospital and physician services and demonstrated that lower 
income groups had higher health care needs as measured by mortality rates (Roos & 
Mustard, 1997). The authors found that poorer income groups used significantly more 
GP and hospital inpatient care, whereas surgery and specialist physician consultation 
rates did not vary across income groups. The authors therefore concluded that the 
distribution of surgical and specialist care was inequitable favouring the richer 
populations. In another analysis, Roos et al found a pro-rich inequality in physician 
services: residents of low-income neighbourhoods incurred comparable physician 
expenditures as those from wealthier neighbourhoods (though greater hospital 
expenditures) despite their greater health care needs as measured by population 
mortality and morbidity (measured by premature -before age 75- mortality rate, hip 
fractures and acute myocardial infarctions and diabetes prevalence) (Roos, Forget, 
Walld, & MacWilliam, 2004). A further analysis compared rates of physician and 
hospital utilisation for ambulatory care sensitive conditions by income quintile; it 
revealed significantly higher utilisation rates for both in the lower income 
neighbourhoods (Roos, Walld, Uhanova, & Bond, 2005). The above studies relied on 
administrative data, which, despite the advantages of being able to accurately measure 
expenditure, does not link individual-level health care needs and socioeconomic status 
with utilisation. In spite of this limitation the studies’ results are not inconsistent with 
previous research.
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2.2.3 Service-specific studies
Utilisation of more specific services, whether among the population or among 
individuals with specific diseases, has also been studied in relation to socioeconomic 
status5. While focussing on specific conditions may have the advantage of offering a 
targeted approach to investigate a specific sub-population, and restricts consideration to 
those who by definition have very similar needs, the findings cannot be generalised to 
the general population.
Alter et al linked Ontario hospital and physician administrative data from 1994-1997 
with neighbourhood statistics to impute income and to assess the rates of use and 
waiting times for coronary angiography and revascularisation procedures (Alter, Naylor, 
Austin, & Tu, 1999). They found that socioeconomic status significantly influenced 
access: there was a significant positive association between income and rate of use of 
the two cardiac surgeries, and waiting times were inversely correlated with 
neighbourhood income quintiles (waiting times for procedures were 45% lower and use 
of procedures 23% higher for patients from the highest-income neighbourhoods than for 
patients from lowest-income neighbourhoods). Furthermore, mortality rates 
demonstrated a similar socioeconomic gradient in favour of higher income individuals: 
a between-neighbourhood difference of $10,000 was associated with a 10% difference 
in one-year mortality favouring the higher income neighbourhood. A survey of 
physicians and hospital administrators also showed that access to specialised cardiac
5 Systematic differences in health care utilisation by other factors such as gender and age has also been 
seen among individuals with specific diseases such as cancer and heart disease (Jackevicius, Alter, Cox, 
Daly, Goodman, Filate et al., 2005; Sheppard, Behlouli, Richard, & Pilote, 2005; Townsley, Pond, 
Peloza, Kok, Naidoo, Dale et al., 2005).
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care was influenced by factors other than clinical need such as the patient’s type of 
employment (Alter, Bassinki, & Naylor, 1998).
Preventive services, such as screening and diagnostics, have also been investigated.
The use of diagnostics has been shown to be related to income in Winnipeg, Manitoba. 
Administrative data for a 12-month period between 2001 and 2002 revealed that for six 
different diagnostic imaging categories, higher income was associated with higher 
uptake after controlling for morbidity level (based on three grouping using the ICD-9) 
and age (Demeter, Reed, Lix, MacWilliam, & Leslie, 2005). Patterns of preventive 
service use also demonstrated income-based differences favouring the rich in national 
analyses (Snider, Beauvais, Levy, Villeneuve, & Pennock, 1997) and in Ontario 
(Glazier, Creatore, Gozdyra, Matheson, Steele, Boyle et al., 2004; Katz & Hofer, 1994).
The findings of the studies on equity of health care use in Canada suggest that hospital 
services may be equitable (found in 1 out of 4 studies) or “pro-poor” (i.e. more 
concentrated among lower income groups; 3 out of 4 studies), general physician 
services may be equitable (7 out of 14 studies), “pro-poor” (4 studies) or “pro-rich” (3 
studies, all measuring the likelihood of contacting a GP), and specialist services were 
“pro-rich” in 3 out of 5 studies. However this literature exhibits three major limitations: 
(1) most recent studies rely on provincial, rather than national datasets; therefore they 
do not permit comparisons across provinces; (2) they employ simplistic statistical 
models that do not control adequately (if at all) for need variables, and individual 
characteristics; (3) they provide little evidence for the underlying contributors to 
inequity; and (4) there is little or no discussion of the policy context in which inequity 
arose and could, therefore, be reduced.
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2.2.4 Recent national studies
The above studies were followed by an international study of income-related inequity 
that addressed some of the limitations of previous research (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & 
Koolman, 2006; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group 
Members, 2004). More specifically, this study controlled for systematic variations in 
health care need by income in order to better evaluate the extent to which equal 
utilisation for equal need is achieved, and compared levels of inequity across countries 
(this methodology is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2).
Van Doorslaer and colleagues calculated inequity among the 15 years and older 
population based on the 2001 Canadian Community Health Survey (the sample included 
107,613 individuals) (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & Koolman, 2006; van Doorslaer, 
Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004). Income- 
related inequity in total doctor visits, after standardising for need, was non-significant; 
therefore, doctor visits appeared to be distributed according to need. However, when 
they examined the probability of any use, the rich were significantly more likely to visit 
any doctor than the poor. Also the rich were slightly, but significantly, more likely to 
visit a GP, after standardising for need. However conditional upon having visited the 
GP, the poor were making more visits than their richer counterparts. For specialist 
visits, after standardising for need, the rich were significantly more likely to visit a 
specialist and were also doing so more frequently than the poor. Similar to specialist 
visits, the probability and frequency of dental care appeared considerably “pro-rich”, in 
other words the distribution of dental utilisation was heavily concentrated among the 
upper end of the income distribution. On the contrary, hospital care appeared to be 
concentrated among the poor, both for the probability of admission, and total number of
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nights spent in hospital. These results are mostly consistent with the literature; 
however, this methodological approach (the ECuity method) not only measured the 
existence of inequity, but quantified its extent and identified some of the contributors. 
Inequity appeared to have been driven by the effect of income itself, education and 
province effects (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group 
Members, 2004).
Since this study, there have been additional analyses conducted with the following 
objectives:
• to measure the effect of income on health care utilisation after controlling for a 
greater number of needs indicators (Asada & Kephart, 2007),
• to estimate the between-province and within-province contributions to estimates 
of income-related inequity in both health and health care use using the ECuity 
methods (Jimenez-Rubio, Smith, & van Doorslaer, 2008),
• to examine any changes in the effect of income on health care utilisation 
between the years 1978 and 2003 (Curtis & MacMinn, 2007),
• to measure distance-related inequity in the use of hospital services in Ontario 
(Hurley, Grignon, Wang, & McGrath, 2008), and
• to undertake more in-depth analyses of inequity in the dental sector drawing on a 
supplementary module to the Canadian Community Household Survey 
(Grignon, Hurley, Wang, & Allin, 2008).
With regards the first, using the same dataset as van Doorslaer et al 2004, the authors 
confirm their findings that higher income increased the probability of a GP and 
specialist visit. However, they found that income had no effect on the likelihood of an
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inpatient stay, unlike the previous finding of a pro-poor inequity, which the authors 
attribute to a more complete needs-adjustment (Asada & Kephart, 2007).
With regards the second study, the authors also used the same dataset as the van 
Doorslaer et al 2004 study to examine differences in inequity across provinces. They 
confirm previous findings at national level but add to the existing knowledge; they 
found that inequity in health care use in Canada was driven more by between-province 
effects (i.e. people in wealthier provinces using more services than those in poorer 
provinces) than within-province effects (i.e. wealthier individuals within provinces 
using more services than poorer individuals controlling for need) (Jimenez-Rubio, 
Smith, & van Doorslaer, 2008).
The third study compiled four national surveys of six cross-sections covering a 25-year 
period and revealed relative stability in the independent positive income effect on 
specialist care utilisation (both the likelihood of a visit and the conditional number of 
visits). They found a slight increase in the income and education effects on the 
probability of a visit to a medical doctor over time (Curtis & MacMinn, 2007). The 
fourth and fifth studies investigated hospital and dental care; these are discussed in 
greater detail in Sections 3.6.2 and 6.3.5.
2.2.4 Gaps in the literature
Some recent additions to the literature have built upon the evidence of inequity in health 
care use in Canada and have addressed some of the limitations of previous studies. 
However there remain significant gaps that this thesis seeks to address.
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1. Most studies relied on provincial, rather than national datasets, and those that 
used national datasets did not examine levels of inequity separately for each 
province. This is a significant omission given that the health systems are 
provincially-administrated and governed by provincial policies. This will be 
addressed explicitly in Chapter 3.
2. The majority of previous studies have been concerned with testing for inequity 
(e.g. finding a non-zero effect of income or socioeconomic status on health care 
utilisation) as opposed to quantifying the level of inequity. Using the method 
developed by the ECuity project it is possible to estimate the level of inequity; 
this approach is applied to the Canadian context in Chapters 3 and 4.
3. Although recent studies consistently demonstrated a pro-rich inequity in the 
likelihood of a GP visit, and pro-rich inequity in the likelihood and number of 
specialist visits, no study has measured the role of private and public 
prescription drug insurance in explaining inequity in physician service use. This 
is addressed in Chapter 4.
4. Some studies have sought to examine the equity implications of perceived 
access problems, although none have explicitly investigated the relationship 
between subjective ‘unmet need’ and actual health care utilisation. Chapter 5 
therefore addresses this issue.
5. Few studies have examined the policy implications of any inequity that is 
observed, leaving many questions about the policy relevance of the findings 
unanswered; this is the subject of Chapter 6.
60
2.3 Methodology: how does this thesis address the research questions?
Methods of measuring equity in access to health care originated with comparisons of 
health care use with health care need (Collins & Klein, 1980; Le Grand, 1978), and 
since then have taken broadly two directions. The first is to measure the independent 
effect of some measure of socioeconomic status on the likelihood of contact with health 
services or the volume of health services used or expenditures incurred with regression 
models (the regression method). The second is to quantify inequity by comparing the 
cumulative distribution of utilisation with the cumulative distribution of needs-adjusted 
utilisation (the ECuity method). These two are the most common but are not the only 
metrics of equity. Some other approaches are listed in Appendix 2B and include 
approaches that draw on correlations and regressions, and those that are based on 
distributional measures.
2.3.1 Regression method
Measuring equity empirically on the basis of regression analyses is the most common 
approach in the literature, as shown in the previous section. These studies draw heavily 
on the behavioural model of health service use developed by Ronald Andersen and Lu 
Ann Aday over the past four decades. Initially, the behavioural model in the 1960s 
suggested health care service use (HC) was a function of an individual’s predisposition 
to use services (social structure, health beliefs), factors which enable or impede use on 
an individual level (income and education) and community level (availability of 
services), and their need for care (Andersen, 1995). The factors affecting utilisation can 
be separated into needs and non-need variables, denoted by vectors X  and Z 
respectively.
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HC = f ( X , Z )
Inequity thus is assumed to arise when factors other than needs significantly affect the 
receipt of health care. Regression models of utilisation address the question: holding 
need and demographic factors affecting utilisation constant, are individuals with 
socioeconomic advantage (e.g. in terms of income, education, employment status, 
availability of private insurance, etc.) more likely to access health care, and are they 
making more contacts, than their less advantaged counterparts? Making use of a 
comprehensive model of utilisation with multiple explanatory variables allows for 
policy-relevant interpretations, whereby one can identify the factors that affect 
utilisation and then, to the extent they are mutable, develop policies accordingly. This 
approach therefore is appealing to both researchers and policy-makers. However, while 
the findings may signal the existence of inequity, they do not quantify its extent.
Regressions can either assume linearity or non-linearity of the chosen dependent 
variable of utilisation. Health care utilisation is conceptually understood as a two-stage 
process, where the likelihood of a contact is usually considered separately from the 
number of contacts made thereafter. Moreover utilisation variables are often count 
variables (unless measured in expenditure) and highly skewed (many zeros and ones 
and a long right-hand tail). Appendix 2C offers a visual depiction of the distributions of 
physician and dentist visits by Canadian provinces; these distributions are characterised 
by a high proportion of zero and one values, with few that are greater than one.
Therefore these formally call for non-linear models, a binomial probit or logistic model 
for the initial contact (yes or no), and then a model based on the poisson distribution for 
the measure of the number of visits (a count variable) (Deb & Trivedi, 2006; Newhouse
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& the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). Probit models are based on a normal 
distribution and logit a logistic distribution; the results of these two models are usually 
equivalent unless the outcome is very rare and in this case a logit provides more 
accurate estimates of effects (Dougherty, 2002). The number of visits is also typically 
highly skewed, therefore empiricists have developed models accounting for both the 
count nature of the variables and its skewness (such as the negative binomial model) 
(Jones, Rice, Bago d'Uva, & Balia, 2007). The effects of different model specifications 
should be tested, therefore, to determine whether the results are sensitive to the choice 
of model and their underlying assumptions. As an alternative to the conventional two- 
part model of health care utilisation, some argue that instead of considering the use/non­
use separately from extent of use, the infrequent or low users should be compared to the 
frequent or high users based on a “latent class framework” (Deb & Trivedi, 2002); 
however this approach is uncommon.
2.3.2 The ECuity method: concentration index
The second approach also makes use of a regression model, but tests for the existence of 
inequity by creating a relative index that allows comparisons across jurisdictions, time 
or sectors (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, & Liondelow, 2008). This now widely 
recognised approach was developed by the European Community Health Services 
Research Programmes on Equity, known as the ECuity project. This project aims to 
measure and compare inequality in health and inequity in health care finance and 
delivery across countries. They define inequality in utilisation as any differences in 
actual, unadjusted utilisation across the income distribution, whereas horizontal inequity
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is defined as any differences in utilisation by income that remain after controlling 
statistically for differences in need for health care across the income distribution.
This method derives from the literature on income inequality based on the Lorenz curve 
and the Gini index of inequality. The concentration curve, similar to the Lorenz curve 
that describes the distribution of income in a population, describes the relationship 
between the cumulative proportion of the population ranked by income (on the x-axis) 
and the cumulative proportion of health care utilisation (on the y-axis). Like the Gini 
index that provides a measure of income inequality, the concentration index is a 
measure of income-related inequality in access to health care and it is estimated as twice 
the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality (the diagonal) 
(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, & Lindelow, 2008).6
Figure 2.1 shows the concentration curves for medical care (LM) and for need (LN), 
ranking individuals by a socioeconomic variable, such as income, from the lowest 
(poorest) to the highest (richest) individual. If both the cumulative proportion of health 
care utilisation and the cumulative proportion of needs-adjusted utilisation are equally 
distributed across income, the two curves would coincide with the diagonal (line of 
equality). To quantify the level of horizontal inequity in the receipt of health care the 
level of needs-adjusted utilisation (LN) is compared with the amount of health care 
received (LM) by ranking each individual according to their income level. When the
6 The concentration index approach has mainly been used for measuring horizontal inequity. Few studies 
have used the vertical equity principle of proportional unequal access for unequals in measuring access to 
health care. In contrast, the vertical equity principle has mainly been used for measuring income-related 
equity in health care finance ((O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2000). The Kakwani index measures the extent to which each source of finance separately 
(e.g. taxes, social insurance, private insurance and out of pocket payments) or the overall financing 
system (weighted average of each source of finance index) departs from proportionality.
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health care and needs-adjusted utilisation curves coincide, the horizontal inequity index 
equals zero and no inequity is detected (in other words, the utilisation of health services 
is proportional to needs). As shown in Figure 2.1, when the needs-adjusted utilisation 
concentration curve (LN) lies above the health care utilisation concentration curve (LM), 
there is horizontal inequity favouring the rich. This is described as “pro-rich inequity” 
in the literature. In this case, actual health care utilisation is more concentrated in the 
lower end of the income distribution; however, after accounting for higher levels of 
need among lower income groups, the level of utilisation is actually not concentrated 
enough among those with lower income, and income-related inequity is found. It is also 
possible for the level of needs-adjusted utilisation to be concentrated among the lower 
income groups; in the literature this is referred to as “pro-poor” inequity. Such “pro­
poor” inequity could be understood as an over-utilisation among the poorer groups 
(which could arise for reasons such as inappropriate or poor quality care that is being 
received by poorer groups or a need for more services to achieve health gain than higher 
income groups), or alternatively it could be understood as an appropriately higher 
utilisation due to the inability to accurately measure the greater health needs among 
these groups with the data available. The level of inequity can then be calculated as 
twice the area between the two curves (LN and LM) (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000).
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Figure 2.1 Concentration curves for utilisation (LM) and need (LN) compared to 
the line of equality (diagonal).
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When levels o f inequity are relatively small in magnitude then graphical depictions as in 
Figure 2.1 are not very informative and are difficult to interpret7. Therefore in this 
thesis I calculate the level o f inequity directly using the methods that are explained 
below.
Beginning with a health care demand model, as in the above regression approach, it is 
possible to calculate the index o f horizontal equity in five basic steps (O’Donnell, van 
Doorslaer, W agstaff et al., 2008). First, calculate the concentration index o f actual, 
unadjusted utilisation (Cl, unadjusted):
_ 2<j \
unadj .
(1) CIurtad. = —y ,
7 In Canada where levels o f  inequity are relatively modest, the concentration curves are not very 
informative. However inequity in the some areas, in particular for dental care, is more substantial, and for 
illustrative purposes a concentration curve for the use o f  dental check-ups in the province o f  Ontario is 
depicted in Appendix 3F.
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where o \  is the variance of the income rank (R) in the population (weighted to 
represent the reciprocals of selection probabilities normalized to the sample size), y  is 
the utilisation variable of interest, and y m is the weighted mean of utilisation.
Second, estimate a model of health care utilisation.
(2) y  = oc + X  P  + Z  8  + € ,
where a  , p , and 8  are regression coefficients, X  and Z are the vectors of need and 
non-need variables, respectively, and the error term is represented by s.
As the need for health care tends to be associated with income, one must adjust for 
differences in the distribution of need by income in order to determine the inequality in 
use that remains (and can then be interpreted as inequity). Using the indirect 
standardisation approach, it is possible to generate the predicted value of health care for 
each individual that depends only on need. The predicted value indicates the amount of 
health care that each individual would have received if she/he had been treated on 
average by the system the same as others with the same need characteristics. Therefore 
the third step predicts needs-adjusted utilisation for each individual by setting the value 
of all non-need variables at their sample mean during prediction:
(3) y  = a  + X ' p  + Z m8,
where all variables are defined as above, and Z”* refers to the sample means of the non­
need variables.
Fourth, calculate the concentration index of needs-adjusted utilisation (Cl, adjusted):
(4) CIadj= ^ y .
y m
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Finally, calculate horizontal inequity as the difference between the concentration indices 
of unadjusted and needs-adjusted utilisation:
(5) H I - C I ^ - C I ^ .
To test for statistical significance, confidence intervals and standard errors for the 
concentration indices (CIunadj, CIadj and HI) are generated by running a “convenient 
regression” (Kakwani, Wagstaff, & van Doorslaer, 1997) on relative income rank (R),
(6) Cl = ex,+pR  + € ,
where ft and its standard error would be the point estimate and standard error of the 
concentration index (CIunadj, CIadj and HI).
The above methods rely on linear models of utilisation (OLS) which may or may not be 
the most efficient model due to the skewed and count nature of most utilisation 
variables (Jones, Rice, Bago d'Uva et al., 2007). Therefore a ‘linear transformation’ has 
been proposed in order to calculate the index of inequity using an underlying utilisation 
model that is non-linear (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008). To model 
the probability of health care utilisation, a nonlinear functional form that constrains the 
estimated probability to lie in the (0,1) can be taken, such as the probit model, based on 
the cumulative standard normal distribution, or the logit model, based on the cumulative 
standard logistic distribution. (In the economics literature, analyses tend to rely on the 
probit model except for in cases with very rare probabilities.) For the number of visits, 
a skewed count variable could be modelled with a negative binomial specification that
Q
extends the Poisson approach (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008) . Based 
on non-linear utilisation models, instead of calculating H I by subtracting the needs-
8 If, instead of physician visits, expenditure on physician services is the dependent variable, then one 
possible approach to addressing its lognormal distribution would be to take the natural logarithm of 
expenditure and then use a linear specification (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008).
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standardised inequality index (CIadj) from the unadjusted inequality index (CIunadj), as 
outlined in equation 5 above, HI is estimated by first calculating needs-standardised 
utilisation,
(7) y , = y - y + y m,
where ys is the needs-standardised utilisation variable, y  is the utilisation variable, y  is
needs-predicted probability from equation 3 and y m is the weighted mean of needs-
predicted utilisation. Then HI is calculated directly based on the relationship between 
the variance of income rank and the needs-standardised probability of utilisation,
(8) HI = y s,
y  s
where y™ is the weighted mean of needs-standardised utilisation generated in (7).
The calculation of HI using either (5) or (8) would yield equivalent estimates if the 
underlying utilisation models were linear, and even if they were non-linear, these 
estimates would be similar (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008).
Standardising for need is crucial to the measurement of inequity. Nearly all empirical 
studies of horizontal inequity in health care utilisation have measured need using a 
combination of demographic indicators such as age and sex and health status indicators 
such as self-assessed health status, the presence of chronic conditions, and activity 
limitations (O’Donnell et al. 2008). Although there is some concern that current health 
status may not be the most appropriate measure of need for past health care use, given 
that the health services consumed may have improved health (in other words 
endogeneity that derives from a causal impact of health service use on current health
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status), there is evidence that this effect is minimal (Bago d'Uva, Jones, & van 
Doorslaer, 2007; Windmeijer & Santos Silva, 1997).
An advantage of the concentration index approach is that it enables the decomposition 
of the contribution of need (i.e. ill-health) and non-need (i.e. socioeconomic) variables 
to overall inequality in health care (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; 
Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Watanabe, 2003). The contribution of each determinant to 
total inequality in health care utilisation can be decomposed into three components: two 
deterministic components, equal to the weighted sum of the concentration indices of 
need and non-need regressors, where the weight is the health elasticity (evaluated at the 
sample mean in the case of non-linear models); and a residual component that reflects 
the inequality in health that cannot be explained by systematic variation across income 
groups.
Therefore, for a linear additive regression model of health care utilisation (y) on a set of 
need and non-need variables, such as in equation (2), the unadjusted concentration index 
( C Iunadj) alternatively can be calculated as the sum of the individual contributions of the 
need (C/„) and non-need explanatory variables (C/z),
where y m is the mean of the utilisation variable y , xm and zm are the mean of the need 
(X) and non-need (Z) variables, CI„ and CIZ are, respectively, the concentration indices 
for the need and non-need variables, and GCe is the generalised concentration index of
the error term (e). This error component measures the difference between the 
unadjusted inequality (CIunadj) calculated directly from equation (1). Therefore, if there 
are determinants of utilisation that are correlated with income but not included in the 
utilisation models, then the sum of the contributions of each of the variables in the
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model will not equal the actual, unobserved concentration index as found through 
equation (1).
The contribution of each non-need, z, variable, is calculated in terms of its concentration 
index (Clz) (based on the covariance between each variable, z, included in the regression 
(2) and the rank (r) in the income distribution), its prevalence (the sample mean), and 
the mean of needs-adjusted utilisation:
(10) Contributbnz — - CQV^ Z’ zm,
y m
where zm is the mean of the non-need variable and y m is the mean of needs-adjusted 
utilisation.
Based on the decomposition in (9), the contributors to inequality can be divided into 
inequalities in each of the need (X) and non-need (Z) variables (O’Donnell, van 
Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Watanabe, 2003). 
Income-related inequity may be due to a direct effect of income, or to an indirect effect 
of other factors. Because income may be correlated with other socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as education, place of residence, employment and immigration 
status, a finding of income-related inequity can represent a direct effect of income or the 
combined effect of other characteristics in their relationship with both income and 
utilisation.
The role of income itself in explaining inequity therefore depends on how unequal the 
income distribution is (measured by the concentration index of income) and how strong 
its marginal effect is (holding all other variables constant) on utilisation. The 
contribution of income and the index of income-related inequity may differ since the 
marginal contribution is based on all else being constant though the inequity index is
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based on holding only needs variables constant (i.e. needs-standardised utilisation). It is 
likely that the marginal income contribution will be smaller than the index of inequity 
(HI) because other variables also contribute.
If, for instance, higher income individuals also have higher educational attainment, and 
if higher education is associated with increased utilisation, this will result in a positive 
contribution of education to the income-based concentration of health care use. A 
higher contribution depends on a higher absolute value of the relationship between 
education and health care use and a greater concentration of education on income. A 
contribution can be either positive or negative. A negative contribution would arise if 
the effect of education on health care use and the income-based concentration index for 
education are of opposite signs. A variable that is included in the demand model may 
not contribute to inequity for three reasons: it may be strongly associated with health 
care utilisation but not correlated with income, it may be strongly correlated with 
income but with no significant effect on utilisation, or it may be both correlated with 
income and health care utilisation but have very low prevalence in the population. 
Though this approach offers a powerful tool to disentangle the contributors to inequity, 
it is inevitably limited to the consideration of factors that can be quantitatively measured 
at an individual level.
There are some limitations with this approach to measuring equity. For instance, when 
the demand for health care is not modelled using linear estimation techniques, the 
decomposition method is not easily applicable (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et 
al., 2008). However, analyses have consistently shown little difference in the results 
from linear and non-linear approaches (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; 
van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004).
72
In addition, jurisdictions with different mean levels of health care use may yield the 
same inequity index; the index does not impose any judgement about an appropriate 
level of utilisation in a population. Also a value of zero for the horizontal inequity 
index can be obtained if the two curves (utilisation and need) cross the diagonal (e.g. a 
pro-poor part in the distribution may compensate a pro-rich in another, or vice versa). 
The concentration index has also been criticised for being difficult to interpret since it is 
not expressed in natural units (Mackenbach & Kunst, 1997). In response to this 
critique, the concept of income redistribution from the literature on income inequality 
was applied to the concentration index to come up with an intuitive interpretation 
(Koolman & van Doorslaer, 2004). A concentration index of 0.10 implies that a lump­
sum redistribution of 10% of the total amount of utilisation would be required from the 
richest half to the poorest half of the population in order to equalise the distribution of 
services. Also, when the degree of inequality doubles, an index also doubles, for 
example from 0.10 to 0.20. If you suppose that the distribution of need is concentrated 
among the lower income groups, and the concentration index of needs is -0.05; then a 
10% redistribution of utilisation will not be sufficient to achieve equity. The horizontal 
inequity index is interpreted in the same way, such that the HI index of 0.15 implies a 
15% redistribution of utilisation is required to reduce inequity to zero. Overall, the 
concentration and horizontal inequity indices provide useful tools for measuring and 
understanding inequity in health care.
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Box 1. Defining key terms for analyses of equity
Utilisation
probability
The likelihood of reporting use of health care services in the past 
year. The variable would equal 1 if the individual reported any 
use in the past year, and a 0 if he or she reported no use.
GP probability The utilisation probability for the use of GP services. The 
variable would equal 1 if the individual reported 1 or more visits 
to the GP in the past year, and a 0 if he or she reported having 
no visits to the GP.
Conditional visits The number of visits that an individual has made to a health care 
provider (GP, specialist, dentist) in the past year conditional 
upon having made at least one visit. It is a count variable that 
includes all non-zero observations; the lowest value is 1.
Concentration index An index that ranges from -1 to 1 that measures the extent that 
health care utilisation is concentrated in the income distribution.
Horizontal inequity Any variation in utilisation by income (or socioeconomic status) 
that remains after statistically adjusting for differences in need 
by income.
Horizontal inequity 
index
The concentration index of horizontal inequity measures the 
concentration of health care utilisation after adjusting for need 
across the income distribution.
Pro-rich inequity Health care utilisation is concentrated in the upper end of the 
income distribution (after adjusting for need); the horizontal 
inequity index would be positive.
Pro-poor inequity Health care utilisation is concentrated in the lower end of the 
income distribution (after adjusting for need); the horizontal 
inequity index would be negative.
74
2.3.3 Data: the CCHS
This section describes the data that is used to address the three research questions of this 
thesis.
1. What is the extent of inequity in the Canadian system? How do the level and 
contributors to inequity vary across the provinces? (Chapter 3)
2. Does the exclusion of prescription drugs from the universal public insurance 
plan, and reliance on private insurance, contribute to inequity in physician 
service utilisation? (Chapter 4)
3. To what extent can subjective unmet need inform our understanding of equity? 
(Chapter 5)
To address these questions, recent nationally- and provincially-representative data are 
required that cover the set of individual-level variables of interest: health status, 
demographics, health care utilisation, income and other socioeconomic indicators, and 
complementary insurance. On the basis of these criteria, this thesis draws on the 
Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS), a nationally representative survey 
conducted by Statistics Canada. It is a cross-sectional, community-based population 
health survey based on a multi-stage clustered design with individual occupants of 
private occupied dwellings as the final sampling unit.
The level of information collected and the unit of observation is the individual: one 
individual per household is randomly selected using various selection probabilities 
based on age and household composition. All members of the household are listed and 
a person aged 12 years or over is automatically selected on the basis of weighted 
probabilities by age: the selection weight multiplicative factor is 5 for 12-19 year-olds,
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2 for 20-29 year-olds, 2 for 30-44 year-olds, 1 for 45-64 year-olds, and 1 for the 65+ 
age group. For a household with five or more members, however, each individual is 
given an equal probability of selection (to avoid extreme sampling weights). This was 
changed from the 2003 (CCHS 2.1) sampling method, which assigned a weight of 5.8 to 
the child (under age 20) in a single-child household for a household with one adult (20 
and over), 4.8 if two adults, 3.8 if three adults, 4.8 if four adults, and equivalent if five 
or more; if there are two children within the household the weight for selecting a child 
would be 2.9 if one adult, 2.4 if two adults and equivalent thereafter (Statistics Canada, 
2005).
The survey began collection in September 2000, and there have been data releases in 
2001, 2003, and 2005. The survey has a two-year collection cycle and covers the whole 
country. Since 2007, data collection takes place on an annual basis. Persons living on 
Indian Reserves or Crown lands, residents of institutions, full-time members of the 
Canadian Armed Forces and residents of certain remote regions are excluded from this 
survey. Applying sampling weights to the data, its coverage is around 98% in the 
provinces, while in the Territories it is about 90% and 71% in Nunavut, primarily due to 
the fact that some remote regions are excluded.
The following subjects are included in the survey:
• Disability
• Diseases and health conditions
• Factors influencing health
• Health status
• Health services performance and utilisation
• Injuries
• Mental health and well-being
• Prevention and detection of disease
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To complete the full interview takes approximately 45 minutes and it is administered 
using computer-assisted interviewing. The advantages o f computer-assisted 
interviewing include the following: the question text is customised to the respondent, 
including reference periods and pronouns (based on interviewee age and sex, interview 
date, and answers to preceding questions); it automatically checks for inconsistencies 
and out-of-range responses, therefore giving the respondent and interviewer chance for 
corrections; and it automatically skips inapplicable questions.
The CCHS includes both a mandatory core component that is completed by respondents 
in all provinces and optional components completed at the discretion o f individual 
provinces. Response rates are very high. In 2003 (wave 2.1), the overall Canadian 
response rate was 81%, and in 2005 (wave 3.1) it was 79%.
Table 2.1 Survey response rates for CCHS 2.1 and 3.1
Province C C H S 2.1 (2003) C C H S 3.1 (2005)
British Columbia 81.2 77.3
Alberta 82.7 81.5
Saskatchewan 84.3 84.1
Manitoba 85.3 83.3
Ontario 78.5 77.2
Quebec 78.0 76.4
Nova Scotia 84.1 83.8
New Brunswick 86.3 83.6
Prince Edward Island 83.4 83.4
Newfoundland and Labrador 87.0 85.7
CANADA 80.7 79.0
In cases where the respondent was, for reasons o f physical or mental health, incapable 
of completing an interview, another knowledgeable member o f the household supplied 
information about the selected respondent. Proxy respondents represented less than 2%
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of the total sample and were not included in the analyses of this thesis if  there were any 
missing data for the variables of interest.
The CCHS is available in two forms: a publicly available microdata file (or public use 
microdata file, PUMF) and a master data file available at Statistics Canada licensed 
research data centres. The PUMF differs in a number of important aspects from the 
master data files held by Statistics Canada because of efforts to protect the anonymity of 
individual survey respondents. For instance, variables that are deemed to be ‘sensitive’ 
are grouped, capped or completely removed from the files. Also, some health regions 
are collapsed with other regions due to their small population sizes.
The relevant differences for this thesis between the PUMF and master data files include 
utilisation and income. The PUMF truncates the right-hand tail of the health care 
utilisation distributions for the purpose of ensuring anonymity. While for the master 
data file there is no upper limit, in the PUMF the annual maximum for GP visits and 
hospital nights is 31, and for specialists and dentists the maximum is 12 visits.
Another ‘sensitive’ variable that is aggregated in the PUMF is reported income level. 
The CCHS is primarily a health survey and therefore the questions on socioeconomic 
status are not comprehensive; estimates of income are based on a single question. Since 
income is one of the primary variables of interest for this thesis, it is important to 
acknowledge the variations between the CCHS datasets. In both data files, income is 
measured based on the individual’s response to this question: “What is your best 
estimate of the total income, before taxes and deductions, of all household members 
from all sources in the past 12 months?” In the master data file, income is measured as 
a continuous variable. It is therefore possible to apply the OECD equivalence scale to
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generate individual income that is adjusted for household size and composition. This 
scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first adult household member, 0.5 to the second adult 
household member and 0.3 to children.
This same survey question is used to generate grouped variables for the PUMF. The 
categorical income variables available in the PUMF differ from 2003 (CCHS 2.1) and 
2005 (CCHS 3.1). In 2003, total household income is provided in quintiles that are 
adjusted for the number of people living in the household to represent individual 
income, according to the following classification:
1) <$10,000 if one to four people; <$15,000 if five or more people;
2) $10,000 to $14,999 if one or two; $10,000 to $19,999 if three or four; $15,000 to 
$29,999 if five or more;
3) $15,000 to $29,999 if one or two; $20,000 to $39,999 if three or four; $30,000 to 
$59,999 if five or more;
4) $30,000 to $59,999 if one or two; $40,000 to $79,999 if three or four; $60,000 to 
$79,999 if five or more;
5) >$60,000 if one or two; >$80,000 if three+.
The publicly available data set for the 2005 data release does not adjust household 
income for household composition. Instead, it includes total household income in six 
categories: 1) no income, 2) less than $15,000, 3) $15,000-$29,999, 4) $30,000- 
$49,999, 5) $50,000-$79,999, and 6) $80,000 or more. The 2005 PUMF is used in 
Chapter 5, and in the analyses I include information on the number of people in the 
household as a form of indirect equivalisation method.
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The CCHS does not include information on the availability of health care resources, or 
supply characteristics that may be affecting patterns of health care utilisation. At the 
level of the health region in which an individual resides, data are available on the 
numbers of GPs and specialists per capita from annual reports published by the 
Canadian Institute for Health Information. These data were included in preliminary 
analyses to test whether they significantly affect utilisation. In all cases, these, albeit 
crude, measures of supply did not significantly affect health service use and therefore 
were not included in the final empirical analyses. Instead, regional variables were 
included in order to capture differences in service availability, consistent with previous 
studies (Broyles, Manga, Binder et al., 1983; Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000).
Section 6.3.5 addresses the issues related to supply characteristics, geographical barriers 
and inequity in more detail. Details of the independent and dependent variables for the 
empirical analyses are provided in the individual chapters that follow, and the 
limitations stemming from this data source are discussed in Chapter 6.
Alternative health surveys
There are other health-related surveys in Canada that I chose not to use because 
although they may have some advantages, they do not cover all topics of interest for this 
thesis. These include the National Population Health Survey, the Survey of Household 
Spending, and supplemental surveys to the Canadian Community Health Survey.
The National Population Health Survey is a national survey that includes information on 
some but not all of the variables of interest for this thesis. The main advantage with this 
survey is that it includes a longitudinal component, which as discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 6, would strengthen analyses of health care utilisation by being able to
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control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This would be of particular 
importance in the analysis of unmet need (Chapter 5). However, the sample is much 
smaller, making province-level analyses more difficult. This presents a particular 
problem when modelling relatively rare events such as hospital admissions (which 
accounts for less than 10% of the sample). Also information on complementary 
insurance (for prescription drugs, dental care, hospital amenities) has not been available 
since the 2002 survey, and in the previous years that do include this information it does 
not differentiate between private and public insurance.
The Survey of Household Spending is a useful source of information on some health- 
related spending patterns of Canadians. It includes a comprehensive set of questions on 
socioeconomic variables such as detailed sources and level of income, and home 
ownership. Moreover it queries respondents about their health-related spending 
patterns, including information on money spent on public and private insurance 
premiums, prescription drugs, over-the-counter medicines, eye care, dental care, and 
any physician or hospital costs (excluding payments which have been or will be 
reimbursed). Although the survey contains data of considerable depth and detail, by 
necessity it excludes many of the variables of interest to this thesis, namely health status 
and health care utilisation. Two other surveys, the Labour Force Survey and the Survey 
of Labour and Income Dynamics, also have much more detailed questions on the 
components of working-aged individuals’ income and spending such as housing rent 
and specific characteristics of employment such as wages, components of salary 
(commission, tips, etc) and benefits received.
Several supplemental modules of the CCHS have been conducted on a small selection 
of respondents covering topics such as perceptions of access to health care, lifestyles
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and nutrition, and screening for diseases. In addition, a small sample of previous CCHS 
respondents was surveyed by telephone about their experiences with primary care 
(Canadian Survey of Experiences with Primary Health Care) in 2007. In some cases I 
have drawn on these supplements in this thesis when performing additional tests.
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C h a p t e r  3 : D o e s  e q u it y  in  h e a l t h  c a r e  u s e  v a r y  a c r o s s  C a n a d ia n  
p r o v in c e s ? 9
3.1 Introduction
The stated objective of Canadian health policy is to protect, promote and restore the 
physical and mental well-being of its residents and to facilitate access to health services. 
Equity in health care is a concept of vital importance to Canadians (Canada, 2002a) and 
‘reasonable’ access to health care is legislated in the Canada Health Act of 1984: 
“insured persons must have reasonable and uniform access to insured health services, 
free of financial or other barriers. No one may be discriminated against on the basis of 
such factors as income, age, and health status”.
While reasonable access to care is a major objective of the Canadian health system, this 
equity goal is also echoed at the provincial level. The actual enactment of policy takes 
place in the provincial ministries of health: provinces are responsible for planning and 
funding most public health care services (hospital and physician care) dating back to the 
1867 Constitution that granted them exclusive powers of “establishment, maintenance 
and management of hospitals”. Provincial policy documents and public consultations 
consistently state the importance of improving access to care and of achieving equity in 
the health system. Often these commitments to improving equity in health care exist 
alongside objectives of improving efficiency and ensuring sustainability; therefore 
provinces face a trade-off between these potentially conflicting objectives. There are 
likely to be differences across provinces in the weight that policy makers place on these
9 This chapter extends the following published peer-reviewed article: Allin, S (2008) Does Equity in 
Healthcare Use Vary Across Canadian Provinces? Healthcare Policy, 3 (4): 83-99.
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health policy objectives, and over time the priorities are likely to change with changes 
in political party representation. Appendix 3 A lists some of the recent provincial policy 
statements that relate to equity.
The provinces share a common set of historical, economic and institutional constraints, 
although there is a relatively high degree of variability in provincial health policy 
(Imbeau, Landry, Milner, Petry, Crete, Forest et al., 2000). Differences in provincial 
policy priorities that affect the level and sources of health care financing, the types of 
provider payment mechanisms, the generosity of the public benefits packages, the 
supply of health services, and the level of further decentralisation to regional and local 
level may, thus, lead to different degrees of inequity in health services use across the 
provinces.
As detailed in the previous chapter, studies of equity revealed that the introduction of 
universal coverage better aligned the distribution of health services according to need, 
although inequity persists. Research in this area approximates access to health care with 
utilisation (Evans, 1983), although the two concepts may bring along different sets of 
conditions (Donabedian, 1972; Oliver & Mossialos, 2004); the differences between 
access and utilisation are discussed in detail in Section 2.1. The goal of equal access for 
equal need presumes that individuals are given equal opportunities to access services; 
however, inequity in utilisation may not solely reflect inappropriate or unfair differences 
in service use, since utilisation is affected by personal characteristics such as individual 
preferences, expectations and beliefs. Therefore, observed inequity in utilisation may 
not necessarily be unfair. However, utilisation of services can be seen as proof of 
access such that an individual has availed himself of the opportunity to access the 
services. Examining equity in health care utilisation appears to be consistent with
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interpretations by federal and provincial governments (Birch & Abelson, 1993; Birch, 
Eyles, &Newbold, 1993; Evans, 1983).
An extensive literature reveals inequity in health care use in some sectors and provinces 
in Canada, as discussed in Chapter 2. There is relatively strong evidence that shows 
that individuals with socioeconomic advantage, in terms of having higher income and 
more years of education, make more visits to a specialist, but not to a GP. The less 
advantaged appear to make more use of hospital services but not necessarily surgical 
services when these were measured separately (Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000; 
Manga, Broyles, & Angus, 1987; Mclsaac, Goel, & Naylor, 1997; Roos, Forget, Walld 
et al., 2004; Roos & Mustard, 1997; Veugelers & Yip, 2003). However, some studies 
found that income did not influence physician visits, as measured by expenditure 
(Finkelstein, 2001) and it did not affect hospital admissions (Asada & Kephart, 2007). 
Finally, few studies investigated equity in specific procedures, demonstrating higher 
rates of diagnostic service utilisation and cardiac surgeries for higher income 
individuals (Alter, Naylor, Austin et al., 1999; Demeter, Reed, Lix et al., 2005).
Some evidence of province-level effects in utilisation has also been shown. A greater 
likelihood and number of visits to a family physician were seen in Ontario and British 
Columbia than the Atlantic provinces (Birch & Abelson, 1993). Also, a lower 
likelihood of a GP visit, but higher likelihood of at least one specialist visit, was found 
among Quebec residents than the rest of the country (Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000), 
Finally, residents of Ontario and Quebec appeared to represent distinct populations in 
terms of the incidence of family physician utilisation (Newbold, Birch, & Eyles, 1994).
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A recent international study applied the ECuity methods to study income-related equity 
in 21 high-income countries including Canada (see Section 2.3). They found that 
standardising for need differences, higher income groups in Canada had an increased 
probability of a GP, specialist and dentist visit (in other words there was a ‘pro-rich’ 
distribution of use), with the reverse seen in inpatient care (a ‘pro-poor’ distribution). 
Furthermore, the intensity of specialist and dentist use (measured as the number of 
visits) was concentrated among the rich, while intensity of GP visits was concentrated 
among the poor (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group 
Members, 2004). The importance of this study is that it applied a methodological 
approach that not only measured the existence of, but also quantified the extent of 
inequity. These features enable the comparison of equity across both service areas and 
jurisdictions. However, what remains missing in the literature is a systematic 
examination of equity in the different health care sectors across the Canadian provinces, 
given that all the provinces aim to achieve equity, and yet differ to some extent in their 
system characteristics.
3.2 Policy context in Canada as it relates to equity
Patterns of health care utilisation are affected by, among other things, the manner in 
which the system plans, administers, and funds health care. Canada introduced a 
system of universal health care coverage over a period of 25 years (1947 to 1972) 
following a succession of province-led reforms that aimed to distribute health services 
according to need and not ability to pay (Evans, 1983; Marchildon, 2005; Mhatre & 
Deber, 1992). In Canada, there are effectively 13 single-payer, universal insurance 
systems of hospital and primary physician care (referred to as Medicare). All services
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that are delivered in hospital and by physicians (with a few exceptions) are defined as 
“insured services” and are, hence, governed by the federal Canada Health Act.
The separate universal systems of hospital and physician care, governed by provincial 
legislation, are influenced by the federal government through its fiscal transfer policy: 
provinces must conform to the five principles of the Canada Health Act -  universality, 
public administration, comprehensiveness, portability, and accessibility -  in order to 
receive federal cash transfers (Marchildon, 2005). The federal government also 
distributes federal tax revenue from the wealthier to the poorer provinces with the aim 
of ensuring that “provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation” 
(Subsection 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982).
Administration of public health services in Canada is highly decentralised reflecting the 
provincial responsibility for the administration and delivery of most public health care 
services. Two factors further contribute to the decentralised nature of health care in 
Canada: the historic arm’s-length relationship between government on the one hand and 
the hospital sector and physicians on the other, and recent regionalisation reforms in 
which sub-provincial organisations are now responsible for the allocation of resources 
for hospital and community health services (Marchildon, 2005). These features place a 
tension on the pursuit of equity objectives in health policy both within provinces and at 
the national level.
Over the past decade, the Canadian provinces have experienced sweeping 
administrative reforms to public health services in the direction of regionalisation 
(Table 3.1 shows the size of the provincial populations, and the number and size of the
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regional health authorities). Broadly speaking, this reform was associated with a 
devolution of managerial and partial budgetary authority from the provincial to the 
regional (i.e. sub-provincial) level in the form of regional health authorities (Casebeer, 
Reay, Golden-Biddle, Pablo, Wiebe, & Hinings, 2006). The aims of regionalisation 
included both efficiency and equity dimensions: to contain costs by rationalising 
delivery; to better coordinate and integrate health care between hospital services and 
other provincial public services; to shift public resources from “downstream” illness 
care to “upstream” illness prevention and health promotion; to improve responsiveness 
to local needs and increase public participation; and to improve accountability from 
providers to patients and to government (Lewis & Kouri, 2005). Thus there is cross­
provincial agreement to deliver health care in an effective and equitable manner (some 
recent policy statements and public consultations are listed in Appendix 3A); but at the 
same time, regionalisation has devolved some administrative and managerial power to 
the “regional” level. This policy context allows not only provincial discretion over the 
implementation of national policies, which may lead to different utilisation patterns, but 
differences may also exist within provinces.
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Table 3.1 Population size and process of regionalisation in Canadian provinces
Province T otal
population 
in thousands
E stablished/
changed
(year)
C u rre n t 
n u m b er of 
RHAs
Population  size of 
RH A s in 
thousands (2005)
Prince Edward 139 1993-1994/2005 0 -
Island (P.E.I.) 
Newfoundland and 510 1994/2003-2004 6/4/2 295-41
Labrador (N.L.) 
New Brunswick 749 1992/2002 8 180-29
(N.B.)
Nova Scotia (N.S.) 934 1996/2001 9 398-33
Saskatchewan 985 1992/2001-2002 13 272-2
(Sask.)
Manitoba (Man.) 1178 1997-1998/2002 11 622-1
Alberta (Alta.) 3376 1994/2003 9 1043-66
British Columbia 4310 1997/2001 5/16 1314-286
(B.C.)
Quebec (Que.) 7652 1989-1992/2003 18 1783-10
Ontario (Ont.) 12,687 2005 14 1357-234
Note: Provinces are sorted in ascending order by total population. RHAs are regional health 
authorities.
Sources: Marchildon, 2005; Statistics Canada, 2006.
In compliance with the Canada Health Act, the large majority o f physician and hospital 
services are free at the point o f delivery. Private health insurance that attempts to 
provide a private alternative, or faster access, to “medically necessary” hospital and 
physician services is prohibited or discouraged by a complex set of provincial laws and 
regulations (Flood & Archibald, 2001). In Quebec this prohibition o f private insurance 
was challenged at the Supreme Court level in 2005 (the case o f Chaoulli v. Quebec). 
The Court ruled that the ban on private insurance violated the provinces’ Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms because in the face o f a long wait for publicly-financed 
elective surgery, patients should have the option o f insuring themselves privately for 
these same services.
Physician and hospital services are co-funded by the federal and provincial 
governments, and hence are guided by national policy. Coverage of services outside of 
physician and hospital care is left entirely to the discretion o f the provinces, although 
there is some consistency in the extent to which provinces subsidise these costs. To
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better ensure equitable access, services falling outside of Medicare are subsidised to 
various degrees by the provinces and territories. For example, prescription drug costs 
are generally covered by the different provincial insurance plans for vulnerable 
population subgroups such as those receiving social assistance, older people, individuals 
with specific diseases, and families with high prescription drug expenditures, with 
varying levels of cost sharing (Demers, Melo, Jackevicius et al., 2008; Grootendorst, 
2002). The majority of individuals who are not covered in a provincial prescription 
drug insurance plan are privately insured through employer-sponsored insurance, 
although those without adequate coverage may face additional cost barriers to accessing 
medicines. Moreover the proportion of the population without such additional coverage 
varies across the provinces.
Also the majority of dental care falls outside of the public system with the exception of 
those services provided in hospital (hospital services represent about 5% of total dental 
expenditure). There is very little provincial subsidy for ambulatory dental costs; the 
main mechanisms to fund dental care in 2005 were individuals’ out-of-pocket payments 
(45%) and private insurance (55%) (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007b). 
In fact the level of public subsidy for dental costs declined in those provinces with more 
generous programmes through the 1990s with the aim of containing costs in the face of 
economic slowdown. The few public provincial programmes for dental care for 
children or seniors were removed in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba and 
reduced in Newfoundland and Alberta (Leake, 2006). In the absence of province-wide 
dental programmes, most provinces appear to be concerned with the distribution of 
dental care as evidenced by the variety of community-level services to serve vulnerable 
populations. As in the case of prescription drug coverage, in dental care policy the
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provinces face a trade-off between the objectives of (public) cost containment and 
equity.
Very little public subsidy exists for vision care, over-the-counter medication as well as 
complementary, alternative medicines and therapies, for which the majority of financing 
is through out-of-pocket payments (Marchildon, 2005). Therefore the costs of non- 
Medicare services may represent a deterrent to seeking care for those who are poor, but 
not protected by social assistance or government insurance plans, in particular the 
‘working poor’. There has been a gradual increase in the relative importance of these 
non-Medicare services over the past thirty years (Marchildon, 2005), representing a 
concurrent shift of the burden of funding health care onto the individual (Tuohy, Flood, 
& Stabile, 2004). Further shifting of costs onto the individual has occurred through the 
gradual reduction of the basket of services provided in the public system, for example 
for physiotherapy services in the provinces of Alberta and Ontario (Stabile & Ward, 
2005).
In sum, the ten provinces (and three territories) vary to some extent in the financing, 
administration, delivery modes and range of public health care services in spite of their 
broad similarities in values, historical and macroeconomic context, and national 
constraints on social policies. While the federal equalisation payments redistribute 
federal taxes from the wealthier to poorer provinces and territories to ensure that they all 
have largely comparable resources for public services, there is still variation in spending 
per capita, the public/private mix of funding and supply of personnel (Table 3.2 
summarises some of these variations). The standardisation of the way in which 
‘insured’ services are funded has not led to a consequent standardisation of the
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organisation of planning, management, delivery and distribution o f these services 
(Newbold, Birch, & Eyles, 1994).
T a b le  3.2 C h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  p ro v in c ia l  h e a lth  sy stem s, 2004
Province Per capita 
spend on 
health  care 
(in CADS)
Public spend 
as a %  of 
total
spending
Avg. life 
expectancy 
a t b irth
GPs p er 
100,000 
people
Specialists 
p e r 100,000 
people
Que. 3900 69.8 79.3 108 106
P.E.I. 4100 70.0 78.6 95 57
B.C. 4300 69.9 80.4 108 88
N.B. 4300 69.4 79.0 100 67
Sask. 4400 75.1 79.0 87 66
N.L. 4400 76.3 77.9 99 93
N.S. 4500 68.9 78.8 115 98
Ont. 4600 67.2 79.7 86 92
Man. 4800 73.2 78.4 92 85
Alta. 4800 72.9 79.5 100 86
Canada 4400 69.6 79.0 97 92
Note: Provinces are sorted in ascending order by per capita expenditure (which is rounded to the 
nearest hundred).
Source: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2006a.
3.3 M e th o d s
This chapter addresses the first research question o f this thesis: what is the extent of 
inequity in the Canadian system, and how does this vary across the provinces? First, 
this section describes the data and variables used for the analysis, and then it reviews 
the statistical methods.
3 .3 .1  D a ta
This chapter addresses the above research question drawing on a nationally 
representative survey, the 2003 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS); it is
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described in detail in Section 2.3.3. The CCHS is representative of approximately 98% 
of the Canadian population aged 12 or older and the 2003 cycle has a total sample of 
134,072 respondents.
This analysis is based on the Public Use Microdata from 2003 (cycle 2.1). Individuals 
under age 15 (7410 observations) are not included in the analysis in order to focus on 
the young adult and adult populations, and to be consistent with previous studies. 
Territories are not included due to under-sampling of these regions (2360 observations). 
Also excluded are cases where the income data is missing (19,681 observations) and a 
further 111 observations for missing observations of the dependent and independent 
variables. There are some differences between those cases that are missing income data 
and the rest of the sample in terms of health status and socioeconomic status, though not 
as much with health care use (see Appendix 3B for more details on missing data). For 
instance those missing income are disproportionately represented by the youngest age 
group (ages 15-19), individuals who are female, in poorer health, and with lower 
education. The extent of missing income observations is relatively consistent across the 
provinces. Income is missing for 16.1% of the national sample, although it is lower in 
some provinces (Ontario: 14%, British Columbia: 15%, and Quebec: 16%) and higher 
in the others (Manitoba: 17%; Newfoundland: 17.8%, Alberta: 18%, Saskatchewan: 
18.1%, New Brunswick: 18.5%, Nova Scotia: 19%, Prince Edward Island: 20%).
Health care use is measured by the following questions.
• [Not counting when you were an overnight patient], in the past 12 months, how 
many times have you seen, or talked on the telephone, about your physical, 
emotional or mental health with:
o a family doctor or general practitioner? [GP]
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o an eye specialist or any other medical doctor (such as a surgeon, 
allergist, orthopedist, gynaecologist or psychiatrist)? [specialist] 
o a dentist or orthodontist? [dentist]
• In the past 12 months, have you been a patient overnight in a hospital, nursing 
home or convalescent home? [inpatient]
Specialists include any physician that is not a GP, and they may be based in hospitals or 
in ambulatory clinics. For the probability models the dependent variables were 
transformed into a dichotomous variable that equalled 0 if the individual had no visits in 
the past year, and 1 if he or she reported 1 or more visits. For the models of the 
conditional number of contacts, only individuals who report any use are included.
There may be issues with regards to recall capacity for this 12-month period; this is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3.1.
Indicators of health care need include demographic and health status variables (with the 
exception of dental care, see below). Interactions of age and sex are captured with 
dummy variables for the following age groups: 15-34; 35-44; 45-64; 65-74; 75 and 
above, separately for men and women; men aged 15-34 is the reference category. Self­
assessed health is measured in five categories (excellent -  reference category, very 
good, good, fair and poor), and limitations in activities due to health are reported as 
affecting the respondent “sometimes” or “often” (with no limitations as the reference 
category). The interaction between age and sex is particularly important given that 
women up to age 45 can be considered to be of child-bearing age and therefore 
potentially to be in need of regular physician consultations and then hospital services for
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childbirth10. For dental care, age and self-assessed oral health in five categories (as 
above) approximate need.
Total household income is measured in five categories and adjusted for the number of 
people living in the household, but not household composition, to represent individual 
income (see Table 3.3). The first income category, IC1 is the reference category. Using 
this categorisation, almost all Canadians fall into the third, fourth and fifth income 
groups.11
Table 3.3 National sample distribution by household income category________
Income Description Percentage
category (IC)__________________________________
IC 1 <$ 10,000 if  one to four people;
<$15,000 if  five+ people;
IC2 $ 10,000 to 14 999 if  one or two;
$10,000 to 19,999 if  three or four;
$15,000 to 29,999 iffive+
IC3 $15,000 to 29 999 if  one or two;
$20,000 to 39,999 if three or four;
$30,000 to 59,999 iffive+
IC4 $30,000 to 59 999 if one or two;
$40,000 to 79,999 if  three or four;
$60,000 to 79,999 if  five+
IC5 $60,000 if  one or two; $80,000 if  three+
Note: Due to rounding the sum o f the percentages is greater than 100%.
10 Further indicators o f  need were not included in order to replicate previous analyses and limit the extent 
o f missing observations (the latter is especially problematic in provinces with small sample sizes). 
Sensitivity analyses including chronic conditions as additional needs variables do not substantively affect 
the results. This analysis therefore does not include this additional information (see Appendix 3D for 
more information).
11 The use o f  gross as opposed to net household income as the ranking variable may not accurately 
represent household purchasing power. Moreover, after taking into account benefits and income taxes, 
the population ranking o f income may change. However, for the purpose o f this thesis, it is important to 
have a ranking o f  individuals on a variable that represents socioeconomic status, such as gross income, 
and not a measure o f purchasing power. Gross income represents not only purchasing power but social 
class and a household’s relative position in the social gradient. Further discussion o f  the methodological 
challenges associated with different measures o f income is found in Section 6.3.2.
2 .8%
6 .0%
19.5%
34.6%
37.2%
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Factors other than need and income have been shown to influence utilisation patterns 
(the literature is reviewed in Section 2.2); therefore, in order to gain an understanding of 
what contributes to any observed inequity by income, other socioeconomic variables are 
included in the utilisation models. Highest level of education is included and grouped 
into the following categories: less than secondary education (used as the reference 
category), secondary, and post-secondary education. The effect of education could be 
to increase health care utilisation because of higher degrees of health literacy (e.g. 
knowing when it is appropriate to seek care when ill), better knowledge about how to 
navigate the health system, better communication skills with health professionals, and 
being more demanding, for example for referrals or for more services (Dixon, Le Grand, 
Henderson et al., 2007; Roos & Mustard, 1997). However the education effect may 
also be negative, since higher educated individuals also tend to be in better health 
(Mustard, Derksen, Berthelot, Wolfson, & Roos, 1997; Raphael, 2004) and more 
efficient in producing health (Grossman, 1972); therefore, it may be capturing 
unobserved health. Also included is whether the individual resides in the capital city of 
the province (or province dummies for the national-level analysis) in order to capture 
some supply effects under the assumption that capital cities have both a greater density 
of professionals and hospitals and shorter travel times to access these facilities. I also 
consider whether the respondent is employed, a student, retired, unemployed, or self- 
employed (reference category), which may capture some of the time costs of seeking 
health care that would be greater for the employed than non-employed. As is the case 
with education, employment status could capture unobserved needs to the extent that the 
employed and students are in better health than those who are retired or unemployed.
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Complementary insurance coverage is included as an explanatory variable. Insurance 
that covers all or part of the cost of prescription drugs is included in the physician 
models; hospital charges for a private or semi-private room in the model of hospital 
inpatient care; and dental care in the dentist model. While for dental care and hospital 
amenities insurance mostly refers to private insurance (most often employment-based), 
complementary insurance for prescription drugs could be either private (again, mostly
1 *7employment-based) or public (for certain eligible groups) .
3.3.2 Statistical analysis
This empirical chapter calculates income-related inequity in four areas of health care 
use across the Canadian provinces: GP, specialist, inpatient, and dental care services. It 
does so by examining the probability of any use, the total number of visits (or nights in 
the case of hospital care) and the conditional number of visits (nights). Sampling 
weights included in the public dataset are used for all analyses.
Equity is calculated by comparing the distribution of health care use by income with the 
distribution of health care need (health status) based on the concept of the concentration 
curve (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000); as explained in detail in Section 2.3.2.
First, the concentration index (Cl) for unadjusted utilisation (CIunadj) is calculated as the 
product of utilisation, y, and the variance of the income rank,
12 In the CCHS 2.1 from 2003, which this analysis draws on, there is no information on the source of the 
complementary insurance. However, in 2005 this data is available for Ontario, and less than 8% of those 
with insurance coverage for dental costs or hospital amenities report this coverage through a government 
programme.
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(1) CIunadJ = ^ y .
y m
Second, a linear model of the determinants of utilisation is estimated using both need- 
and non-need variables;
(2) y  = a  + X P  + Z 8  + s ,
where y  is the utilisation variable, a  , p  and 8  are regression coefficients, X  is a vector 
of need-related indicators, and Z is a vector of non-need variables. Separate OLS 
regressions are run for the probability of a visit (or hospital admission) and for the total 
and conditional number of visits (nights) on the set of need and non-need indicators. 
Third, needs-adjusted utilisation is predicted for each individual in the sample by setting 
the value of all non-need variables at their sample mean during prediction. Fourth, the 
concentration index for the distribution of needs-adjusted utilisation (C I adj) is calculated 
as in (1), but replacing actual with needs-adjusted utilisation. Finally, the horizontal 
inequity index (H I)  derives from the difference between the estimates of income-related 
inequality in actual health care use and income-related inequality in needs-expected use
(3) H I =  C IUnadj- C Iadj.
The distinction between inequality and inequity is an important one. Unequal utilisation 
patterns by income are not necessarily unfair because of the underlying unequal 
distribution of need, whereas inequity captures any unequal health care use by income 
that remains after need standardisation.
The ‘convenient regression’ (4) on relative income rank (R )  is used to calculate the 
estimates and standard errors of the concentration indices (Kakwani, Wagstaff, & van 
Doorslaer, 1997)
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(4) C l — oc+PR + s ,
where p  and its standard error would be the point estimate and standard error of the 
concentration index (C I adp C Imadj, H I).
By construction, a zero index of horizontal inequity (H I)  implies that after controlling 
for differences in need across income groups, all individuals have equal probability of 
using health services or are using the same amount, regardless of income. After 
adjusting for need, when service use is more concentrated among the better-off, the 
horizontal inequity index is positive. Likewise, if service use is more concentrated 
among the lower income groups after adjusting for needs, then H I  would be negative. 
The index ranges from -1 to 1: a positive index implies that individuals on higher 
income are more like to visit a physician than one would expect on the basis of their 
reported need and vice versa.
By calculating horizontal inequity indices separately for each province, there is an 
underlying assumption that differences in the mean utilisation levels across provinces or 
in the differences in utilisation between people in different levels of need are acceptable. 
Thus, I assume that provincial norms of utilisation should be used for calculating 
inequity as opposed to national norms, in light of (often immeasurable) socio-cultural 
heterogeneity across provinces.
For binary outcomes such as the probability of visiting a physician, a linear probability 
model such as OLS may not be the most efficient functional form; likewise, for skewed 
count variables such as the number of physician visits, OLS may not be suitable (Jones, 
Rice, Bago d'Uva et al., 2007). Therefore, I checked the robustness of the study’s 
conclusions against probit models for the probability variables and negative binomial
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regressions for the total and conditional utilisation variables using the nonlinear 
approach to calculating inequity outlined in Section 2.3.2. The results do not appear to 
be sensitive to these changes in specifications, with the exception of hospital care, and I 
chose to use the simpler OLS to facilitate the calculation and interpretation of inequity 
and decomposition of contributing factors (Appendix 3F compares the estimates found 
under linear versus non-linear assumptions). This finding of insensitivity to the 
underlying functional form of the empirical model is consistent with the literature 
(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the 
OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004).
In addition, I use the decomposition method to measure whether socioeconomic factors
related to income, such as education, residence, employment status and complementary
insurance coverage, contribute to the overall level of income-related inequity (Wagstaff,
van Doorslaer, & Watanabe, 2003); this decomposition method is detailed in Section
2.3.2. Different utilisation patterns across income groups can theoretically be due to
underlying related socioeconomic characteristics such as education and insurance status;
therefore, the decomposition analysis allows us to discover what other factors may be
driving inequity. The contribution of each variable to inequity is a product of its impact
on demand, as measured by its marginal effect on utilisation, its prevalence, and its
correlation with the income distribution. For example, a positive contribution of
education to inequity in specialist care indicates that higher education is associated both
11with higher income and increased used of specialist services.
13 The above analyses were also conducted using CCHS 3.1 (from the year 2005) to detect any changes in 
the results over the two-year period. The two surveys however are not directly comparable. The year 
2003 was initially chosen for this analysis because of the availability of information on complementary 
insurance for dental care, hospital charges and prescription drug insurance; whereas information on 
insurance was only available for the province of Ontario in the 2005 survey. Another reason why the
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3.4 Results
This section presents the results of the analyses that directly address the research 
question and that are relevant to policy. Additional results are available in appendices 
(Appendix 3).
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
This section includes the descriptive statistics by province in utilisation and 
complementary insurance coverage. Appendix 3C shows the mean levels of the need 
and non-need variables by province. With the exception of income, there is relatively 
little variation in these variables across the provinces. Alberta and Ontario clearly have 
the highest proportion of high-income individuals.
There is some degree of variation in reported utilisation of health services across the 
country (Table 3.4).14 The mean likelihood of visiting a GP at least once in the past 
year is lowest in Quebec (70%) and highest in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia
results are not comparable is due to differences in the income variable: in 2005 income is not adjusted for 
household size, while in 2003 it is. Also, information on self-reported oral health for the analyses of 
equity in dental care is only available in British Columbia and Ontario in the 2005 survey. Appendix 3H 
shows the national-level analysis over these two years for comparative purposes and reveals only modest 
changes to the estimates of inequity.
14 According to OECD data, utilisation rates in Canada are relatively high compared to other countries. 
For example, number of doctor consultations per capita in 2005 was 6 consultations in Canada compared 
to 5 in the United Kingdom and 4 in the United States. The estimate for Canada is higher than that in 
Table 3.4 for Canada; this could be due to the exclusion of children from the survey. For acute inpatient 
days the per capita utilisation was 0.9 in Canada and the United Kingdom, compared to 0.7 in the United 
States. This is not directly comparable to Table 3.4 because the definition of inpatient care in the survey 
includes nursing and convalescent homes.
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(84-85%). About half of the population reported a specialist visit in the past year, the 
proportion ranges from 49% in British Columbia to 57% in Quebec. The probability of 
hospitalisation ranges from less than 8% in Ontario and British Columbia to about 11% 
in Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. Finally, the likelihood of a dentist visit in 
the past year ranges from 46% in Newfoundland to 70% in Ontario.
Utilisation rates do not appear to be related systematically to levels of supply as 
measured by per capita number of providers (as shown in Table 3.2). For example New 
Brunswick, Saskatchewan and in particular Prince Edward Island have the lowest 
supply of specialists, and possibly an ‘under-supply’ when compared to the national 
average, though only in New Brunswick is the average probability of a visit to a 
specialist lower than the national average. Also Quebec has a high density of GPs 
though low rates of use. Given these supply indicators are very crude and do not 
account for important factors such as whether GPs have open or closed patient lists 
(Glazier, 2007), the volume of services they provide (Watson, Katz, Reid, Bogdanovic, 
Roos, & Heppner, 2004), and the significant within-province differences (Canadian 
Institute for Health Information, 2006a), it is not surprising that at this aggregated level a 
correlation is not observed.
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for health care utilisation: percentage with one visit 
(mean number of visits), and percentage without a regular doctor_______________
Province n GP Specialist In p a tien t D entist No reg u la r 
doctor (% )
P.E.I. 1530 84.14 53.82 10.94 63.31 8.05
(3.10) (1.39) (0.80) (1.26)
N.L. 3067 83.04 51.13 9.84 46.38 13.36
(4.15) (1.15) (0.76) (0.91)
N.S. 3821 84.53 52.78 9.28 60.92 5.52
(3.92) (1.32) (0.61) (1.29)
N.B. 3827 80.24 51.77 11.33 52.3 7.55
(3.36) (1.16) (0.84) (1.07)
Sask. 5716 80.63 54.59 9.62 54.73 14.45
(3.66) (1.19) (0.57) (1.02)
Man. 5827 77.00 51.16 8.77 60.24 16.47
(3.00) (1.22) (0.53) (1.22)
Alta. 10,377 80.33 52.17 8.22 62.57 16.41
(3.35) (1.16) (0.42) (1.21)
B.C. 12,367 82.24 49.26 7.78 67.43 10.92
(3.74) (1.20) (0.41) (1.41)
Que. 21,552 69.69 56.67 8.88 56.22 26.10
(2.25) (1.30) (0.54) (1.05)
Ont. 34,419 79.76 55.4 7.52 69.61 8.41
(3.26) (1.34) (0.44) (1.48)
CANADA 104,510 77.85 54.18 8.26 63.69 14.26
(3.12) (1.28) (0.49) (1.29)
Notes: Provinces are sorted in ascending order by smallest to largest survey sample sizes. 
W hether or not an individual reports having a “regular doctor” (which is not defined in the 
survey but most probably would be interpreted as a regular family doctor who would be a GP) is 
not included in the utilisation models because it is likely to be endogenous to the decision to 
visit a doctor.
Also shown in Table 3.4 is the reported prevalence o f not having a regular family 
doctor. Arguably this indicator represents a disadvantage to individuals in terms of 
potentially having less opportunity to receive continuous primary care and referrals to 
secondary care when needed. This prevalence ranges from a low of 5.5% in Nova 
Scotia to a high o f 26% in Quebec.15
15 It is possible that the high prevalence o f  specialist utilisation in Quebec relates to cultural differences in 
the delivery o f  health care. Previous studies have found that controlling for measurable characteristics 
such as morbidity, residents o f  Quebec have a high use o f  specialists compared to other provinces 
(Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000). Possibly the very high use o f  specialist services in France (OECD, 
2008; Sandier, Paris, & Polton, 2004) is a cultural characteristic shared with the French Canadians.
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Some variation can also be seen in the self-reported insurance coverage for 
complementary services -  prescription drugs, hospital amenities and dental care (Table 
3.5). Prescription drug coverage ranges from a low o f 67% in Prince Edward Island to a 
high o f 90% in Quebec (where there is universal coverage, see Section 6.2.2). For 
dental care, 46% o f individuals in Quebec and 49% in Newfoundland report having 
insurance coverage, compared to 69% in Ontario and 71 % in Alberta (these two 
provinces are also those with the highest proportion o f high-income earners). Finally, 
coverage for hospital charges for private or semi-private rooms ranges from 54% in 
British Columbia to 70% in Alberta, compared to the national average of 63%.
Table 3.5 Percentage reporting insurance coverage for prescription drugs, dental 
care and hospital amenities___________________________________
In su rance  fo r 
p rescrip tion  
drugs
Insu rance for 
dental care
Insu rance for 
hospital 
am enities
P.E.I. 67.02 54.19 58.27
N.L. 69.15 49.66 56.79
B.C. 72.92 62.97 53.61
Man. 72.96 65.68 66.42
N.B. 73.27 60.11 61.38
Sask. 73.32 65.71 66.25
N.S. 77.53 59.93 65.37
Ont. 77.97 68.84 65.45
Alta. 80.26 71.14 70.07
Que. 89.80 46.45 61.27
CANADA 79.77 61.92 63.23
Note: Provinces are sorted in ascending order by the prevalence o f prescription drug insurance 
coverage. Insurance coverage in all three areas includes any public or private (employer/group 
based or individual) plans.
3 .4 .2  E q u ity  in C a n a d a  — n a tio n a l le ve l
National level analyses confirm that there are differential utilisation patterns across the 
provinces (the regression results are shown in Appendix 3E). At a national level,
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income effects on utilisation are significant and positive only the models of GP 
probability, and total and probability of a specialist and dentist visits. Canada-wide 
analyses of horizontal equity support the observed income effects and reveal significant 
pro-rich inequity in the probability of a GP, specialist and dentist visit, and also the total 
number specialist and dentist visits16. Negative HI indices are found in inpatient 
hospital care, for the total number of nights, the probability of an admission, and the 
conditional number of nights spent in hospital. As stated earlier, the estimates of 
inequity remain relatively unchanged when using data from the 2005 survey; both 
results are reported in Appendix 3H for comparative purposes.
3.4.3 Analysis o f  equity across provinces
The aim of this chapter is to compare estimates of income-related inequity across the 
Canadian provinces. The analyses of income-related inequity reveal some differences 
across the provinces in the extent of horizontal inequity, but some national patterns can 
be seen (Figures 3.1-3.4). The ‘convenient’ regression was used to calculate the indices 
and their standard errors (equation (4) in Section 3.3); the proceeding figures use circles 
to depict that the estimates of inequity are statistically significantly different from zero 
at the p<0.05 level.
There appears to be consistent though modest “pro-rich” inequity in the probability of a 
GP visit. For the total and conditional number of GP visits however, there is a greater
16Sensitivity analyses of income-related equity in specialist use that distinguished eye doctors from other 
specialists reveal little difference in estimates of equity for these two specialist groups. Analyses at 
Canada level revealed that the level of pro-rich inequity in the likelihood of a visit to an eye doctor was 
0.05, compared to 0.06 for other specialists, and it was 0.05 for the two groupings of specialists 
combined.
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concentration of utilisation among the lower income groups even after standardising for 
need, which can be referred to as “pro-poor” inequity (Figure 3.1). Therefore, although 
the probability of visiting a GP in the past year is concentrated among the rich, once the 
initial contact has been made, the extent of GP service use is greater among the poorer 
groups. The exceptions are Quebec, where the index of inequity in total utilisation is 
very slightly positive, and Prince Edward Island which has a pro-poor, although non­
significant, inequity in the probability of a visit to a GP. Considering the number of 
visits made that were made among those with at least one visit (conditional visits), the 
estimates of inequity become significant in most provinces. It is possible that including 
additional indicators of need would reduce the level of pro-poor inequity that is found, 
and in some cases this appears to be the case (Appendix 3D shows the equity estimates 
that also adjusts for six chronic conditions). However, in those provinces where the 
pro-poor inequity was significantly different than zero, the addition of chronic 
conditions into the models did not make these estimates non-significant, with the 
exception of Quebec.
For specialist visits, the estimates of inequity are consistently higher than seen with 
GPs, for both the probability of a visit and also the total number of visits in all 
provinces (Figure 3.2). For the probability of a visit, the lowest index of inequity for 
specialists is greater than the highest for GPs (see Figure 3.1). When only those who 
had at least one specialist visit are included, i.e. conditional number of visits, the 
observed inequity disappears in most cases, with the exception of Saskatchewan where 
it remains significantly pro-rich.
106
Figure 3.1 Equity in the probability of a GP visit, and total and conditional
num ber of GP visits
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Notes: Provinces are ranked in ascending order o f inequity in the probability o f a GP visit. 
Encircled indices denote significance at p<0.05, meaning the estimates o f  inequity are 
statistically significantly different from zero (the 95% confidence intervals do not cross zero).
Figure 3.2 Equity in the probability of a specialist visit and the total and 
conditional number of visits
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Notes: Provinces are ranked in ascending order of inequity in the probability o f a specialist visit. 
Encircled indices denote significance at p<0.05.
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Dental care is the most inequitable, both for the probability of at least one visit and the 
total number o f visits (Figure 3.3). However, there is notable variation across the 
provinces, with the lowest level o f inequity in Prince Edward Island and the highest in 
Newfoundland. As seen with specialist visits, the conditional number o f dentist visits 
remains pro-rich in most cases, but becomes non-significant in all provinces but British 
Columbia and Ontario (these have larger sample sizes than in Manitoba where the point 
estimate is slightly higher).
Figure 3.3 Equity in the probability of a dentist visit and the total and conditional 
number of visits
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Notes: Provinces are ranked in ascending order o f inequity in the probability o f  a dentist visit. 
Encircled indices denote significance at p<0.05.
In the case o f inpatient care, there appears to be considerable variation in the estimates 
o f inequity across the provinces, although there is little evidence of significant inequity. 
For the total number o f nights spent in hospital the index o f inequity is pro-poor but 
non-significant in most provinces (Figure 3.4). The probability o f spending a night in
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hospital is significantly pro-poor in five provinces (the highest in Newfoundland), and 
non-significantly pro-poor in the remaining. There is a wide range of estimates of 
inequity in the conditional number of inpatient nights. Comparison of inequity in 
admissions however is made difficult because of the small sample sizes in some 
provinces coupled with low admission rates. It is possible that the effect of lower 
income on utilisation is driven by unobserved need (Asada & Kephart, 2007). The 
inclusion of further indicators of need, measured by reported chronic conditions, 
however, does not reduce the level of pro-poor inequity that is found in most provinces 
(a comparison of the estimates of inequity with additional needs adjustment is shown in 
Appendix 3D). Some reduction from the addition of these variables can be found in 
Saskatchewan for the total inpatient nights and the probability of admission (with a 
reduction of one-third to one half, respectively), and in Newfoundland there is about a 
one-third reduction in the estimate of inequity for the total inpatient nights. Estimates 
of inequity are sensitive to the choice of the needs indicators and to the assumption of 
linearity in the utilisation model (see the note below). Therefore, these findings should 
be interpreted cautiously.
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Figure 3.4 Equity in the probability of hospital admission, total and conditional
num ber of nights spent in hospital
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Notes: Provinces are ranked in ascending order o f inequity in the probability o f an inpatient 
stay. Encircled indices denote significance at p<0.05. As shown in Appendix 3F, the pro-poor 
but non-significant inequity in total hospital nights disappears in Ontario, Quebec and Prince 
Edward Island when using non-linear estimations, and in Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia the negative index becomes positive (but non-significant). Little 
change can be seen with the conditional number o f hospital nights. For the probability o f 
admission, the level o f inequity becomes less pro-poor in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, 
Quebec and Prince Edward Island, but more pro-poor in M anitoba and New Brunswick under 
non-linear specifications. This sensitivity to the assumption o f linearity o f the utilisation 
variable signals a need for caution in interpreting the results and for further research using more 
disaggregated information o f hospital utilisation.
The results o f the decomposition analyses provide some indication o f the drivers of 
inequity across the country (the contributing factors are presented in Tables 3.6-3.9).
The tables can be interpreted in the following way, using the example o f the probability 
o f a GP visit in Saskatchewan (Table 3.6, third column). Here, the unadjusted 
concentration index (C Iunadj) o f the probability o f a GP visit is very slightly positive 
(0.005), which implies that, across the income distribution, there is nearly a proportional 
probability o f visiting a GP, although it is slightly concentrated among the rich. Once 
needs are standardised for, the level of inequity (H I) is 0.022, which implies a pro-rich 
distribution. The contribution o f the need factors to inequality are negative (-0.017),
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meaning individuals with poorer self-assessed health and activity limitations and who 
are older are more concentrated among the lower income groups and are also more 
likely to have visited a GP. The most important needs-adjustor (the variable with the 
most negative contribution) appears to be older women. The sum of the contributions 
of non-need indicators represents H I, which in this case is equivalent to the estimate of 
H I  that is calculated as the difference between C Iunadj and C Iadj, (equation 3 above). The 
main contributing factor is income (its contribution is 0.015), explaining 68% of H I: 
higher income earners are more likely to visit a GP, holding all else constant. The 
other non-need contributors are education (0.004), which explains 18% of H I, 
prescription drug insurance (0.004), which explains a further 18% of HI, and residence 
in the capital city health region (0.001), which explains 4%. Activity status has a 
negative contribution to inequity, meaning the net effect of the dummies for 
employment, student, retired and unemployed is to reduce inequity. Finally the error 
term is almost zero, which implies that there are only some effects on the probability of 
visiting a GP that are related to income and that are not accounted for in the utilisation 
model.
Overall, Tables 3.6-3.9 show negative signs for the contributions of needs variables, 
which mean that poor self-assessed health, activity limitations and older age are 
inversely correlated with income groups and are positively associated with utilisation. 
For the non-need indicators, there is a less consistent pattern. If the contributions of 
education and activity status were consistently negative, this would indicate that they 
captured some effect of unobserved needs. In some cases, these contributions are 
negative, and in some cases they are positive. In cases where there is pro-rich inequity, 
such as in specialist and dental care, it appears that income itself is not the only 
contributor to the inequitable patterns of health care use by income groups, but these
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other socioeconomic factors also contribute to inequity because they are correlated with 
income and utilisation. If the error component is not zero then there are some 
systematic determinants of utilisation that are not captured by the independent variables, 
but that are correlated with income.
For GP care, total use is concentrated among the poor in all provinces except Quebec 
(Table 3.6). The contributions of prescription drug insurance coverage, education and 
activity status are not much higher in Quebec than in the other provinces, while the 
negative role of income is less important. In other words, individuals on lower income 
still make more use of services than the higher income groups, but to a less extent in 
Quebec than the other provinces. There is consistent modest “pro-rich” inequity in the 
probability of a GP visit across all provinces except Prince Edward Island, and in most 
cases income itself is the main contributing factor; it explains about two-thirds of the 
pro-rich inequity in most provinces, but over 80% in New Brunswick. Education 
contributes positively to inequity in the probability of a visit, and explains around one 
quarter of inequity; therefore, the observed inequity by income is partly explained by 
the fact that higher educated people have higher income and are also more likely to visit 
a GP. This does not imply that a reduction in levels of education would reduce 
estimates of inequity, but rather that the differential treatment of higher educated 
individuals than those with less education is one of the mechanisms through which 
income-related inequity arises. Education has a similar positive contribution to the level 
of equity in the total and conditional number of visits in some provinces (Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland), but it contributes negatively in the remaining 
provinces. There is more of a consistent negative impact of activity status on equity, 
which, upon closer inspection, appears to be driven by the dummy variables indicating 
that a person is retired or unemployed; individuals who are either retired or unemployed
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are more likely to have lower income and also to use more health services. Among the 
other variables, urban residence exerts very little effect on inequity, while 
complementary insurance for prescription drugs makes a positive contribution of a 
similar magnitude to education. The positive effect of insurance means that private 
insurance dominates the overall effect on inequity, because it is the privately insured 
who are more likely to represent higher income groups (in most provinces public 
insurance covers older people and social assistance recipients). The role of insurance is 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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Table 3.6 Decomposition of inequality in the total num ber of visits to a GP, the probability of a GP visit, and the conditional num ber of visits
B.C. Alta. Sask. M an. Ont. Quc. N.L. N.B. P.E.I. N.S.
T otal n u m b er of G P  visits
CIUnadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
-0.081 
(-.098, -.06) 
-0.014 
(-.029, .001)
-0.083 
(-.11, -.06) 
-0.021 
(-.04,.002)
-0.081 
(-.11,-.05) 
-0.010 
(-.03, .014)
-0.084 
(-.11,-.06) 
-0.027 
(-.05,-.004)
-0.072 
(-.08, -.06) 
-0.010 
(-.02,.0005)
-0.063 
(-.08, -.05) 
0.002 
(-.013,.02)
-0.067 
(-.10, -.033) 
-0.003 
(-.035, .03)
-0.078 
(-.10, -.05) 
-0.001 
(-.023, .022)
-0.092 
(-.13,-.05) 
-0.027 
(-.06,.009)
-0.090 
(-.12, -.06) 
-0.012 
(-.04,.014)
Need -0.068 -0.066 -0.073 -0.059 -0.064 -0.068 -0.065 -0.077 -0.067 -0.079
SAH -0.045 -0.028 -0.036 -0.028 -0.031 -0.033 -0.036 -0.048 -0.039 -0.039
health limitations -0.014 -0.026 -0.024 -0.015 -0.021 -0.022 -0.018 -0.019 -0.022 -0.028
age-male -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
age-female -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013
Non-need -0.014 -0.018 -0.011 -0.027 -0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.026 -0.013
Income -0.023 -0.015 -0.023 -0.037 -0.003 -0.008 -0.017 -0.005 -0.024 -0.013
Education -0.002 -0.004 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005
Activity status 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.009 0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.002
Capital city 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
Drug insurance 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.009
E rror 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002
P robab ility  of G P visit
CIUnadj
(95%  interval) 
H I
(95%  interval)
-0.002 
(-.008, .005) 
0.008 
(.001, .014)
0.003 
(-.006,.01) 
0.014 
(.006, .02)
0.005 
(-.004,.015) 
0.022 
(.013,.031)
0.006 
(-.006, .02) 
0.021 
(.01, .032)
0.003 
(-.002,.008) 
0.015 
(.011, .02)
-0.003 
(-.01,.004) 
0.017 
(.009, .02)
0.003 
(-.008,.013) 
0.021 
( .o n ,  .031)
0.009 
(-.001,.02) 
0.029 
(.019, .039)
-0.017 
(-.03, -.01) 
-0.007 
(-.019,.004)
-0.003 
(-.01,-01) 
0.011 
(.001,.02)
Need -0.009 -0.012 -0.017 -0.015 -0.012 -0.021 -0.018 -0.020 -0.010 -0.014
SAH -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004
health limitations -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
age-male 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
age-female -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009
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Non-need 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.020 0.015 0.017 0.022 0.028 -0.007 0.010
Income 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.024 -0.013 0.001
Education 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004
Activity status -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.000
Capital city 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Drug insurance 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005
Error -0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0011 0.0003 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0011 0.0003 0.0010
C onditional n u m b er o f G P visits
CIUnadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
-0.080 
(-.095, -.06) 
-0.022 
(-.036,-.008)
-0.086 
(-.11,-.06) 
-0.033 
(-.05,-.01)
-0.086 
(-.11,-.06) 
-0.033 
(-.05,-.01)
-0.089 
(-.11,-.07) 
-0.045 
(-.067,-.02)
-0.075 
(-.086, -.07) 
-0.023 
(-.03,-.013)
-0.060 
(-.07, -.05) 
-0.013 
(-.03,-.00)
-0.070 
(-.10, -.038) 
-0.022 
(-.05, .008)
-0.087 
(-.11,-.06) 
-0.027 
(-.048,-.006)
-0.076 
(-.11,-.04) 
-0.019 
(-.05,.016)
-0.087 
(-.11,-.06) 
-0.019 
(-.04,.004)
Need -0.059 -0.055 -0.055 -0.045 -0.054 -0.048 -0.048 -0.060 -0.057 -0.068
SAH -0.040 -0.027 -0.032 -0.023 -0.029 -0.027 -0.031 -0.039 -0.035 -0.034
health limitations -0.012 -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.027
age-male -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.003
age-female -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
Non-need -0.022 -0.031 -0.034 -0.046 -0.021 -0.012 -0.023 -0.028 -0.018 -0.020
Income -0.029 -0.025 -0.038 -0.051 -0.015 -0.017 -0.032 -0.026 -0.011 -0.016
Education -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
Activity status 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.005
Region 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002
Drug insurance 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005
E rror 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Note: 95% interval is the confidence interval for concentration indices and indices o f horizontal inequity.
Specialist care appears to be the most inequitable in Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia (Table 3.7). In Saskatchewan, income is the most important driver of 
inequity; it contributes over 80% of inequity in the total number of visits, 70% of 
inequity in the probability of a visit, and 85% in the conditional number of visits. In 
Newfoundland, income itself explains less than half of the pro-rich inequity. Here, the 
contribution of urban (capital city) residence is pro-rich, and explains 25% of the 
inequity in total visits, 17% in the probability of a visit, and 33% in the conditional 
number of visits. Positive contributions by residence are also seen in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, although of the magnitude of about 10%. Complementary insurance 
contributes a further 25% in the total number of specialist visits in Newfoundland. In 
Nova Scotia, the relatively high level of inequity appears to be driven by income, 
education and drug coverage. There is a consistent positive effect of education on 
inequity; in Manitoba and New Brunswick, education explains a greater proportion of 
the inequity in the total number of specialist visits than income.
Appendix 3G provides the detailed decomposition for the total number of specialist 
visits in Newfoundland, where inequity is the most pro-rich. It also compares the 
decomposition results using linear (as in this analysis) versus nonlinear models. It 
appears that the estimate of inequity is slightly higher when it is calculated as the sum 
of the non-need contributions based on the linear model (HI= 0.085) than when it is 
calculated as the sum of the contributions based on the nonlinear model (HI= 0.077). 
Each variable’s contribution to inequity, calculated based on the mean of each variable, 
its concentration index (Cl), and its marginal effect on utilisation, is similar across the 
linear and nonlinear models. It seems the contribution of income to inequity is almost 
wholly driven by the highest income category. Likewise, the positive contribution of 
education is mainly through the highest educational category (post-secondary
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education). Therefore, it is the highest income earners and the most educated who use 
more specialist services, holding all else constant. The different categories of activity 
status contribute differently to inequity. There is a negative contribution from the 
employed (because the employed have higher income alongside a negative marginal 
effect on utilisation), and a positive contribution from the unemployed (because the 
unemployed have lower income and have a negative marginal effect on specialist 
utilisation). The contributions of being a student and being retired are low because of 
their low prevalence combined with weak marginal effects on utilisation.
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Table 3.7 Decomposition of inequality in the total number of visits to a specialist, the probability of a visit, and the conditional number of 
specialist visits___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
B.C. Alta. Sask. M an. Ont. Que. N.L. N.B. P .E .I. N.S.
T otal num ber of specialist visits
Clunadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
-0.012 
(-.037, .013) 
0.057 
(.033, .081)
-0.024 
(-.05,.004) 
0.026 
(-.001, .05)
0.014 
(-.02, .048) 
0.078 
(.045,. 11)
0.001 
(-.035, .036) 
0.059 
(.025, .09)
-0.013 
(-.03,.001) 
0.048 
(.035,-.06)
-0.006 
(-.025,.01) 
0.049 
(.03, .066)
0.022 
(-.019, .06) 
0.079 
(.04 ,. 12)
-0.036 
(-.067,-.006) 
0.040 
(.011, .069)
-0.001 
(-.04, .04) 
0.069 
(.03 ,.11)
-0.026 
(-.06, .01) 
0.074 
(.04 ,. 11)
Need -0.071 -0.053 -0.072 -0.060 -0.064 -0.060 -0.056 -0.076 -0.071 -0.101
SAH -0.037 -0.015 -0.022 -0.020 -0.025 -0.033 -0.029 -0.042 -0.031 -0.046
health limitations -0.015 -0.027 -0.026 -0.018 -0.022 -0.017 -0.028 -0.021 -0.020 -0.028
age-male -0.006 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
age-female -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.006 0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.023
Non-need 0.054 0.028 0.089 0.061 0.052 0.052 0.079 0.039 0.071 0.074
Income 0.042 0.017 0.065 0.020 0.046 0.034 0.019 0.010 0.043 0.040
Education 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.029 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.026 0.020 0.025
Activity status -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.000 -0.014 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
Capital city 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.021 0.002 0.001 0.000
Drug insurance 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.005 0.012 0.014
Error 0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
P robab ility  of specialist visit
Clunadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
0.013 
(-.001, .027) 
0.046 
(.032, .06)
0.014 
(-.002,.03) 
0.039 
(.02, .054)
0.007 
(-.011, .02) 
0.035 
(.018,.052)
0.030 0.017 
(.008, .051) (.01, .026) 
0.063 0.047 
(.043, .083) (.04, .055)
0.018 
(.008, .03) 
0.048 
(.04, .057)
0.045 
(.023, .068) 
0.076 
(.055, .097)
0.002 
(-.017, .022) 
0.040 
(-.043, .033)
0.003 
(-.02,.028) 
0.036 
(.012, .06)
0.016 
(-.007,.04) 
0.058 
(.036, .08)
Need -0.033 -0.025 -0.029 -0.034 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 -0.037 -0.033 -0.043
SAH -0.011 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011
health limitations -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.011
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age-male -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.000
age-female -0.011 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.017 -0.022
Non-need 0.044 0.037 0.037 0.063 0.047 0.048 0.077 0.039 0.038 0.057
Income 0.034 0.021 0.025 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.037 0.021 0.027 0.036
Education 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.007
Activity status -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.006 0.004
Capital city 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.000
Drug insurance 0.008 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.010
E rror 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002
C onditional n um ber o f specialist visits
C lu n a d j
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
-0.025 
(-.05, -.005) 
0.014 
(-.005, .034)
-0.038 
(-.06, -.01) 
-0.010 
(-.03,.012)
0.008 
(-.02, .036) 
0.047 
(.019,.075)
-0.029 
(-.06, -.00) 
-0.002 
(-.03, .026)
-0.031 
(-.04, -.02) 
0.007 
(-.005,.02)
-0.024 
(-.04, -.01) 
0.006 
(-.009,.02)
-0.023 
(-.06, .011) 
0.003 
(-.03, .036)
-0.038 
(-.06, -.015) 
-0.004 
(-.027, .019)
-0.004 
(-.04, .03) 
0.037 
(.007, .07)
-0.041 
(-.07, -.01) 
0.017 
(-.01, .04)
Need -0.041 -0.030 -0.046 -0.027 -0.039 -0.033 -0.027 -0.035 -0.042 -0.119
SAH -0.028 -0.014 -0.019 -0.011 -0.022 -0.024 -0.019 -0.029 -0.019 -0.071
health limitations -0.010 -0.020 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.014 -0.019 -0.011 -0.014 -0.040
age-male -0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009
age-female -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.014 0.006 -0.002 0.001
Non-need 0.014 -0.008 0.055 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.003 0.037 0.037
Income 0.012 -0.002 0.040 -0.026 0.009 0.001 -0.016 -0.015 0.018 0.006
Education 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.039
Activity status -0.007 -0.013 0.001 0.002 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.019
Region 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.003
Drug insurance 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.008
E rror 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.041
Note: Appendix 3F compares the decomposition o f inequity in the probability o f a specialist visit in Newfoundland, where the level o f  inequity is highest.
Estimates of inequity in hospital care are either near zero (equitable) or negative (pro­
poor) in all provinces (Figure 3.4). When the inequity indices are positive, they are not 
significantly different from zero. There is a large error component in the estimates of 
inequity for most provinces, which means that the variables included in the models do not 
sufficiently explain hospital utilisation, and these omitted variables are associated with 
income (Table 3.8). In general, the needs variables contribute negatively to inequity, 
which means that they make the index of inequity more pro-poor. Income either 
contributes negatively or positively; and the contribution of insurance for hospital 
amenities is usually positive.
The main contributors to inequity in dental care are income and dental insurance coverage 
in all provinces (Table 3.9). Income contributes more to the pro-rich inequity than 
insurance in all provinces except Newfoundland. In Newfoundland, inequity is highest 
than in the other provinces, and income and insurance contribute about equally to inequity 
in the total number of dentist visits (both income and insurance contribute about 42% to 
inequity). Living in the capital city of the province is associated with greater use of dental 
services, but, because region is only weakly associated with income, its overall effect on 
income-related inequity is small in all provinces except Newfoundland, where it 
contributes about 10%.
120
Table 3.8 Decomposition of inequality in the total number of nights spent in hospital, the probability of admission, and the conditional number of inpatient
nights_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
B.C. Alta. Sask. M an. O nt. Que. N.L. N.B. P.E.I. N.S.
T otal n um ber of nights
CIunadj -0.173 
(95%  interval) (--24, -.11) 
HI 0.028 
(95%  interval) (-.03, .08)
-0.242 
(-.32, -.16) 
-0.083 
(-.16,-006)
-0.197 
(-.27,. -12) 
-0.026 
(-.10, .048)
-0.194 
(-.29 ,. 10) 
-0.046 
(-.13, .04)
-0.204 
(-.25, -.15) 
-0.035 
(-.08,.014)
-0.235 
(-.29, -.18) 
-0.046 
(-.10, .01)
-0.176 
(-.30, -.05) 
-0.020 
(-.14, .10)
-0.211 
(-.288, -.14) 
-0.003 
(-.075, .07)
-0.215 
(-.35, .08) 
-0.072 
(-.19, .05)
-0.211 
(-.29, -.12) 
-0.058 
(-.14, .03)
Need -0.227 -0.169 -0.174 -0.146 -0.185 -0.203 -0.154 -0.205 -0.143 -0.156
SAH -0.101 -0.074 -0.076 -0.051 -0.066 -0.083 -0.095 -0.090 -0.104 -0.064
health limitations -0.040 -0.038 -0.045 -0.035 -0.052 -0.051 -0.043 -0.047 -0.022 -0.074
age-male -0.017 -0.022 -0.009 -0.034 -0.018 -0.027 -0.012 -0.029 -0.017 0.004
age-female -0.069 -0.035 -0.045 -0.025 -0.050 -0.043 -0.005 -0.039 -0.001 -0.022
Non-need 0.057 -0.089 -0.030 -0.056 -0.017 -0.033 -0.024 -0.015 -0.067 -0.062
Income 0.024 -0.096 -0.058 -0.043 -0.011 -0.053 0.002 -0.017 -0.031 -0.045
Education 0.008 0.000 0.013 0.014 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 0.008
Activity status 0.001 -0.025 -0.007 -0.025 -0.015 0.016 0.012 -0.001 -0.032 -0.022
Capital city 0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.014 -0.003 0.002 -0.013
Insurance 0.024 0.036 0.027 0.007 0.010 0.004 -0.018 0.013 0.005 0.010
Error -0.004 0.016 0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.007
P robab ility  o f adm ission
CIunadj -0.122 
(95%  interval) (-.17,-.08) 
H  -0.013 
(95%  interval) (-.055, .03)
-0.124 
(-.18, -.07) 
-0.032 
(-.09,.026)
-0.143 
(-.20, -.09) 
-0.047 
(-.10, .006)
-0.160 
(-.22 ,. 10) 
-0.089 
(-.15, .03)
-0.121 
(-.15, -.09) 
-0.028 
(-.06,.005)
-0.156 
(-.19,.12) 
-0.063 
(-.10, -.03)
-0.154 
(-.219, -.09) 
-0.055 
(-.116, .007)
-0.176 
(-.231,. 12) 
-0.083 
(-.136, .029)
-0.069 
(-.15, .011) 
0.006 
(-.07, .08)
-0.189 
(-.26, -.12) 
-0.105 
(-.17,-.04)
Need
. . . . . . . . S'
-0.115 -0.090 -0.094 -0.072 -0.071 -0.098 -0.103 -0.093 -0.077 -0.178
SAH -0.045 -0.027 -0.040 -0.024 -0.036 -0.051 -0.068 -0.041 -0.052 0.000
health limitations -0.020 -0.024 -0.020 -0.020 -0.005 -0.026 -0.020 -0.031 -0.008 -0.110
age-male -0.009 -0.018 -0.007 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.009 -0.010 -0.001 -0.068
age-female -0.041 -0.021 -0.027 -0.014 -0.020 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017 0.000
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Non-need -0.003 -0.047 -0.055 -0.088 -0.023 -0.062 -0.060 -0.090 0.013 -0.110
Income -0.010 -0.050 -0.058 -0.082 -0.017 -0.058 -0.034 -0.074 -0.009 -0.068
Education -0.005 -0.004 0.015 0.010 0.001 -0.001 -0.015 0.009 0.018 -0.003
Activity status 0.000 -0.010 -0.025 -0.023 -0.013 -0.002 0.019 -0.007 -0.010 -0.039
Capital city 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013
Insurance 0.013 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.005 -0.001 -0.027 -0.014 0.016 0.014
Error -0.005 0.013 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.005 0.008 0.007 -0.005 0.005
C onditional num ber of nights
Clunadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
-0.054 
(-.11,-.002) 
0.021 
(-.022, .06)
-0.117 
(-.18, -.06) 
-0.069 
(-.12, -.02)
-0.055 
(-.12, .006) 
0.022 
(-.03, .07)
-0.033 
(-.107, .40) 
0.032 
(-.03, .09)
-0.088 
(-.13, -.05) 
-0.028 
(-.06,.007)
-0.080 
(-.12, -.04) 
-0.003 
(-.04,.035)
-0.022 
(-.13, .08) 
0.026 
(-.077,. 13)
-0.038 
(-.09, .018) 
0.040 
(-.007, .086)
-0.148 
(-.24,-.06) 
-0.089 
(-.15,-.02)
-0.027 
(-.09, .04) 
0.045 
(-.02, -.11)
Need -0.484 -0.046 -0.076 -0.417 -0.067 -0.083 -0.047 -0.080 -0.055 -0.073
SAH -0.173 -0.036 -0.023 -0.099 -0.019 -0.021 -0.033 -0.047 -0.023 -0.028
health limitations -0.113 -0.012 -0.018 -0.149 -0.020 -0.023 -0.040 -0.012 -0.019 -0.026
age-male -0.030 0.010 -0.007 -0.060 0.001 -0.006 0.020 0.000 -0.010 0.001
age-female -0.168 -0.009 -0.028 -0.108 -0.029 -0.033 0.006 -0.021 -0.003 -0.021
Non-need 0.196 -0.075 0.019 0.173 -0.017 0.006 0.031 0.039 -0.094 0.044
Income 0.103 -0.065 0.004 0.159 -0.005 -0.017 0.058 0.029 -0.056 0.004
Education 0.042 0.007 0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.012 -0.035 0.029
Activity status -0.006 -0.031 0.009 0.033 -0.014 0.010 -0.020 -0.005 -0.027 0.014
Region 0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.023 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.003 -0.001
Insurance 0.050 0.017 0.008 -0.004 0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.027 0.021 -0.001
Error 0.234 0.004 0.002 0.211 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 0.003 0.001 0.002
Note: 95% interval is the confidence interval for the concentration indices and indices o f horizontal inequity.
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Table 3.9 Decomposition of inequality in the total num ber of visits to the dentist, the probability of visiting a dentist, and the conditional
num ber of dentist visits
B.C. Alta. Sask. M an. O nt. Que. N.L. N.B. P.E .I. N.S.
T otal nu m b er of visits
C I Unadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
0.099 
(.08,.11) 
0.093 
(.08, .11)
0.087 
(.067, .11) 
0.075 
(.055, .095)
0.080 
(.05, .106) 
0.073 
(.05, .099)
0.123 
(.094, .15) 
0.124 
(.096, .15)
0.094 
(.08, .10) 
0.100 
(.09, .11)
0.112 
(.09 ,. 13) 
0.105 
(.086, .12)
0.176 
(.14, .22) 
0.155 
(.11,.195)
0.147 
(.102, .19) 
0.130 
(.084, .18)
0.064 
(.03, .098) 
0.043 
(.009, .08)
0.124 
(.095 ,. 15) 
0.119 
(.089, .15)
Need 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.007 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.006
Age 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.003
SAH oral -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.004
Non-need 0.092 0.072 0.072 0.119 0.099 0.105 0.152 0.128 0.042 0.117
Income 0.053 0.049 0.049 0.105 0.075 0.066 0.067 0.084 0.022 0.058
Male -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.004
Education 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.014 0.002 0.020 0.007 0.017
Activity status 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.011 -0.010 -0.002 0.006
Capital city 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.000
Insurance 0.042 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.031 0.026 0.065 0.040 0.021 0.040
E rror 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.001
Probab ility  o f dentist visit
C I Unadj
(95%  interval) 
HI
(95%  interval)
0.092 
(.085, .099) 
0.077 
(.068, .087)
0.089 
(.08, .097) 
0.074 
(.06, .087)
0.093 
(.08, .105) 
0.075 
(.06, .092)
0.114 
(.104, 12) 
0.102 
(.086, .12)
0.089 
(.085, .09) 
0.080 
(.07, .085)
0.117 
(.11,-12) 
0.102 
(.09, .11)
0.181 
(.165, .198) 
0.159 
(.137, .181)
0.142 
(.129, .156) 
0.121 
(.103, .139)
0.079 
(.064, .094) 
0.053 
(.033, .072)
0.127 
(.12,-14) 
0.116 
(.10,.13)
Need 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.012
Age 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.001
SAH oral 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.011
Non-need 0.077 0.071 0.073 0.100 0.079 0.101 0.157 0.120 0.052 0.115
Income 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.075 0.058 0.064 0.082 0.074 0.034 0.066
Male -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
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B.C.__________Alta.________Sask._______ M an.________Ont.________Q uc.________N X ._________ N X .__________ P.E .I. N.S.
Education 0.005 0.006 0.007 -0.004 0.005 0.020 0.012 0.020 0.013 0.017
Activity status -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.006 0.003
Capital city 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.001
Insurance 0.031 0.022 0.024 0.015 0.022 0.017 0.051 0.031 0.015 0.032
Error 0.019 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.000
C onditional n um ber of visits
Clunadj
(95%  interval) 
H I
(95%  interval)
0.006 
(-.006, .02) 
0.015 
(.003, .027)
-0.002 
(-.017, .01) 
0.0005 
(-.01,.015)
-0.013 
(-.03, .007) 
-0.001 
(-.021, .02)
0.009 
(-.014, .03) 
0.020 
(-.002, .04)
0.005 
(-.003, .01) 
0.018 
(.01, .026)
-0.005 
(-.02, .01) 
0.002 
(-.01,.018)
-0.005 
(-.045,-036) 
-0.002 
(-.04, -.038)
0.004 
(-.036, .044) 
0.009 
(-.03, .05)
-0.015 
(-.04, .01) 
-0.011 
(-.04, .02)
-0.003 
(-.03, .02) 
0.001 
(-.024, .03)
Need -0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
Age 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
SAH oral -0.010 -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006
Non-need 0.014 -0.002 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.004 -0.002 0.008 -0.012 0.001
Income 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.027 0.016 0.003 -0.012 0.007 -0.012 -0.006
Male -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
Education -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000
Activity status 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.002
Capital city 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Insurance 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.005
Error 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
Note: 95% interval is the confidence interval for the concentration indices and indices o f horizontal inequity.
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3.5 Discussion
In Canada, the provinces share common national constraints on social policies; they also 
broadly share a common historical and macroeconomic context. Furthermore, the 
training of health professionals is harmonised across the country and federal 
equalisation payments redistribute federal taxes from the wealthier to the poorer 
provinces with the aim that they all have largely comparable resources for public 
services. The provinces also aim to achieve equity goals in health care, but face 
tradeoffs with other policy goals, namely public cost containment. In spite of some 
commonalities, some variation still exists in spending per capita, in the public/private 
mix of funding, and in supply and quality of care that may impact upon equity in health 
care use. It has been argued that aggregate (i.e. national) analyses of health care 
utilisation may risk overlooking significant variations across jurisdictions (Newbold, 
Birch, & Eyles, 1994). In this analysis, there appear to be similar patterns of inequity 
across the provinces, although with some variations in extent and in the underlying 
contributors.
3.5.1 Inequity in physician utilisation
At a national level the results demonstrate that there is inequity in the probability of 
using physician services; provincial analyses also reveal inequity in the probability of a 
specialist visit in all provinces, and inequity in the probability of a GP visit in all 
provinces except Prince Edward Island. Higher income individuals are more likely to 
visit a GP and specialist after adjusting for differences in need across income groups. 
The total number of GP visits has a distribution that is more concentrated among lower
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income groups, however for total specialist visits the distribution remains pro-rich. 
Moreover, conditional upon one visit, in all provinces, inequity in GP visits becomes 
pro-poor (significantly in most provinces), and even nears zero for specialist care. 
Therefore, there may be some barriers to accessing a GP for an initial visit for lower 
income groups, which can be considered to be more patient-driven, but the intensity of 
primary care use, which is more provider-driven, is more concentrated among the lower 
income groups.
It is possible that inequitable access to a GP to some extent drives the inequity in 
specialist care. Since these results show that individuals with higher income are more 
likely to visit their GP, conditional on their needs, then reducing this inequity at the 
initial point of contact in the system may have the effect of reducing inequity in 
specialist care. Policy makers should not only be concerned about the implication of 
inequity at the stage of initial contact with a GP on the delivery of appropriate and 
needed primary care services but also on the accessibility of more specialised services 
for which GP referrals are needed.
Similarly, in the case of specialist care the well documented disparity in specialist care 
favouring higher income and better educated individuals (see, for example, (Dunlop, 
Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity 
Research Group Members, 2004) appears to be more important in securing the initial 
appointment, which is available only through GP referral, than in accessing further 
needed specialist care. Patients may be able to exert pressure on their doctors to receive 
a referral to a specialist. Indeed, at least one study of referral patterns in Ontario did 
show a higher specialist referral rate in the highest-income neighbourhood after 
adjusting for differences in disease prevalence (Chan & Austin, 2003). The finding of
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non-significant inequity in conditional specialist visits is consistent with a national-level 
study of the income effects on utilisation using earlier data from the CCHS (Asada & 
Kephart, 2007). However, the persistent inequity in the use of physician services, in 
particular at specialist level, goes against the equity objectives of the provincial health 
systems. Moreover, this finding signals the need for further policy action to better align 
the distribution of physician service utilisation with health care need, and for policy 
makers to place more weight on achieving equity relative to other competing health 
policy objectives.
3.5.2 Inequity in dentist utilisation
Inequity in dentist use exists in all of the provinces. It is not surprising that the level of 
inequity is highest in dental care (very high in most provinces, i.e. HI is 0.10 or larger). 
This sector is left entirely outside of the public system and federal oversight, and 
complementary insurance coverage is held almost exclusively by the wealthy and 
younger age groups (Bhatti, Rana, & Grootendorst, 2007). The high costs of dental care 
can act as a barrier to the use of needed services by those with no, or inadequate, dental 
insurance coverage. The positive contribution of holding dental insurance on inequity 
in dental care is consistent with previous studies that have identified a positive effect of 
insurance on visits to the dentist (Kosteniuk & d’Arcy, 2006; Millar & Locker, 1999). 
Relatively simple procedures such as fillings and extractions can cost up to $200 and 
$150, respectively; more complicated procedures such as dental crowns and root canals 
can be much more expensive (Grignon, Hurley, Wang et al., 2008). Since the survey 
question that is used in this analysis includes both dentist and orthodontist visits, and 
orthodontics are generally very expensive and include many cosmetic procedures such
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as teeth straightening, it is possible that the estimate of inequity is driven in part by the 
inclusion of these more expensive, and arguably less essential, services.
This finding of consistent pro-rich inequity implies that more public funding could be 
directed towards subsidising dental care costs or dental insurance costs to improve 
access for lower income groups, in particular in provinces with the highest level of 
inequity. Indeed the Liberal Party pledged to “support dental services for low-income 
Ontario families” as part of their platform during the 2007 Ontario provincial election 
(The Ontario Liberal Party, 2007, p. 18); though to date this has not yet been 
implemented (Section 6.2.1 offers further discussion of dental care policy in Canada).
In addition to having the highest level of inequity, dental care also displays notable 
variability in the extent of inequity across the provinces. The highest level of inequity 
is found in Newfoundland, where both mean utilisation and dental insurance coverage 
are lowest, and the least inequity in Prince Edward Island, where utilisation rates are 
high. However, more information is needed on the types of dental services used and 
how these contribute to inequity. This information would enable use to distinguish 
between cosmetic services, for which public subsidies should not necessarily be given, 
and preventive and restorative services that actually improve health (suggestions for 
future research in equity in dental care can be found in Section 6.2.1).
Some information on the type of dental services received is available in an optional 
component to the CCHS. Respondents in two provinces, British Columbia and Ontario, 
completed this more detailed set of questions related to dental care services allowing 
some testing of the level of inequity in check-ups compared to overall utilisation. These 
provinces completed the optional module in the CCHS that included the following
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question: “Do you usually visit a dentist for a check up: (a) more than once a year; (b) 
about once a year; (c) less than once a year; or (d) only for emergency care?” We 
undertook exploratory analyses to compare inequity in frequent preventive care (a 
positive response to (a)), and some preventive care (a positive responses to either (a),
(b) or (c)) (Grignon, Hurley, Wang et al., 2008). Appendix 31 shows the results of the 
decomposition of inequity for these two dependent variables in Ontario and British 
Columbia, in addition to a graphical depiction of inequity using the concentration curve. 
A much higher level of inequity was found for frequent check-ups (about 50% higher) 
than with total utilisation and regular check-ups. Since there is limited evidence 
supporting more frequent check-ups than once per year, it is likely that even this 
measure of ‘preventive care’ includes some degree of cosmetic, or less essential, 
services.
To what extent that dentists may induce patient demand in Canada is not known, 
although it is likely to play some role in explaining utilisation patterns. Some studies 
have shown a positive effect of the supply of dentists on utilisation (Birch, 1988; 
Nguyen, Hakkinen, & Rosenqvist, 2005).
3.5.3 Inequity in hospital utilisation
The evidence of inequity in inpatient service use is limited, although wide variations in 
the estimates of inequity are seen across the country. Overall, it appears on the basis of 
these analyses that there is a non-significant trend in the direction of pro-poor inequity. 
Therefore poorer groups are more likely to be admitted to hospital and also stay longer 
than higher income groups. The equitable, or pro-poor, distribution of hospital care 
differs from the other service areas. Perhaps this is because the hospital services within
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the regional health authorities are better integrated and therefore more able to meet the 
needs of disadvantaged groups. Alternatively, perhaps a lack of effective primary care 
leads to a greater reliance on emergency hospitalisations for lower income groups, as 
has been shown in Ontario (Glazier, Tepper, Agha, & Moineddin, 2006). Also, it is 
possible that when faced with difficulties getting a referral to see a specialist, lower 
income individuals access specialist care in an emergency hospital setting. Better data 
that disaggregates the type of hospitalisation that occurred would be useful to 
disentangle some of these possible effects.
The analysis of inequity in hospital care presents some specific methodological 
challenges, such as a heavily skewed distribution, a small numbers of users, and the 
reliance on a single question to capture a multitude of possible services and levels of 
service complexity. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution.
Because the survey question includes all types of hospitalisation, including nursing 
homes, it is very difficult to understand the underlying contributors to the seemingly 
pro-poor inequity as these are likely to be different for acute, emergency, elective and 
long-term care admissions (see Section 6.3.2 for further discussion of these limitations). 
As illustrated in Appendix 3F, it is the analysis of equity in hospital care that is the most 
sensitive to the choice of linear versus nonlinear specifications. Using nonlinear models 
brings the estimates of inequity in hospital care closer to zero in most cases; therefore, 
the observation that hospital utilisation is heavily concentrated among lower income 
individuals (after adjusting for need) is sensitive to the underlying choice of estimation. 
Clearly in the hospital sector more refined data and estimation techniques are needed to 
address the question of how inequitable are the use of these services.
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3.5.4 Provincial variations
There is no one province with the lowest level of income-related inequity in all four 
service areas. Prince Edward Island, a very small island province of less than 140,000 
inhabitants appears to have the lowest inequity in primary and dental care. This finding 
may relate to fewer geographic barriers to access or it could relate to more 
homogeneous preferences for health services in this population. Relatively high levels 
of inequity can be found in Newfoundland. Geographical barriers may partly explain 
the high level of inequity in specialist and dental care in Newfoundland, where residing 
in the capital city contributes to pro-rich inequity. In other words, individuals living in 
the capital city are more likely to have higher income and also more likely to make use 
of specialist and dental services in Newfoundland.
The differential impact of complementary insurance across the country appears to play 
some role in explaining the observed variations. In Newfoundland, where the highest 
level of inequity in dental care is seen, there is also the strongest effect of insurance on 
utilisation and the largest contribution to inequity. In Newfoundland, having insurance 
is associated with an increase in the likelihood of visiting a dentist by 28%, compared to 
18.5% in Canada as a whole (the marginal effects of holding insurance on the likelihood 
of visiting a dentist are reported in Appendix 3J).
For GP and specialist care, complementary coverage for prescription drugs appears to 
contribute more to pro-rich inequity in the Atlantic provinces, where levels of reported 
coverage are among the lowest (see Table 3.2). Moreover, the decomposition of GP 
inequity reveals that prescription drug coverage, which includes both private and public 
coverage, is the main positive contributing factor to inequity (as displayed in Table 3.7).
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Some steps have recently been taken to extend eligibility for public drug insurance in 
the province of Newfoundland to a further 85,000 inhabitants (over 15% of the 
population) with the passage of the new Pharmaceuticals Services Act in 2006; this may 
reduce inequity in physician care in this province.
Patterns of inequity may also relate to differences in utilisation rates. The descriptive 
statistics show that Prince Edward Island has a high-use population compared to the 
other provinces, in particular for the probability of a GP visit (see Table 3.4).
Moreover, the provinces with the lowest levels of inequity in GP services are also those 
with the highest utilisation rates -  Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and British 
Columbia. The same relationship also exists to some extent with dental care, as noted 
above.
In this analysis, I decided not to include as an independent variable whether or not an 
individual has a regular family doctor, because this is arguably endogenous to the 
decision to visit a physician. An individual who needs to visit a physician is also more 
likely to ensure that he or she has a regular physician. Having a regular family doctor is 
an important point of contact into the health system, both for primary care and specialist 
care. One study found that those without a regular family doctor were twice as likely to 
report difficulties in accessing routine care than those with a regular doctor, an effect 
that was not seen in immediate care (Sanmartin & Ross, 2006). The ‘protective effect’ 
of having a family doctor has been shown in previous studies to reduce the use of 
emergency care services (Dunlop, Coyte, & Mclsaac, 2000). By observing the 
variations in reporting having a regular physician across the country, it seems that while 
a higher proportion of the population than the national average reports not having a 
regular doctor in Manitoba, Alberta and Quebec, these provinces do not exhibit higher-
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than-average levels of inequity, with the exception of the likelihood of visiting a 
specialist in Manitoba. The province of Quebec appears to be something of an outlier, 
with lower rates of GP utilisation alongside the lowest proportion of respondents 
reporting a regular doctor. And yet the results point to relatively low inequity the 
probability of visiting a GP and in the total number of GP visits. Perhaps there are 
cultural differences in health care seeking behaviours relative to other provinces.
Overall conclusions
These analyses reveal some variation across the provinces in the rates of health care use 
and in the levels of income-related inequity alongside some national trends. These 
trends include evidence of inequity favouring higher income groups - for the probability 
of visiting a GP, specialist and dentist, and for the total number of specialist and dentist 
visits. There is evidence of pro-rich inequity, to a less extent, in the number of specialist 
and dental visits conditional on one visit. There is limited evidence of inequity in the 
use of hospital services and in the total number of visits to the GP. These findings 
cannot be attributed to financial barriers to access to physician and hospital services; 
those imposed by geography, by an inability to secure a regular physician, by a lack of 
insurance for the costs of dental services, and by difficulties in getting a referral to 
specialist care may be important. Direct financial barriers may, however, exist in the 
case of specialist care, since not all services are fully funded by provincial public 
insurance systems, e.g. some dermatology and ophthalmology services. Moreover, 
inequity is clearly highest in dental care where there is very little public funding, 
therefore substantial costs are likely to deter lower income groups from seeking care.
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These national trends suggest that federal oversight and public funding of hospital and 
physician sectors helps to achieve the goal of reasonable and uniform access to care, in 
particular to GP services, as indicated by low levels of inequity and relatively little 
variation across the country. This low level of variation has been achieved in spite of a 
declining federal role in funding provincial health insurance programmes, as measured 
by the funding from federal transfers as a proportion of total spending (Marchildon, 
2005). Further research is needed on the provincial policies that affect utilisation, such 
as the coverage of services outside the public insurance programmes, to better 
understand the observed variations in the level and drivers of inequity.
Methodological limitations
These findings should be interpreted in light of the analyses’ methodological 
limitations. Self-reported health care use may be biased because of problems in recall. 
If different population groups report utilisation in a systematically different way (e.g. 
older people may have worse recall), then some bias may be introduced. Some 
researchers believe that self-reported data on physician visits may be unreliable 
(Roberts, Bergstralh, Schmidt, & Jacobsen, 1996); and that recall for hospital visits is 
generally better than that for physician contacts (Barer, Manga, & Shillington, 1982). 
These limitations are also discussed in Section 6.3.1.
There is considerable debate surrounding the approximation of need with self-reported 
health status (Goddard & Smith, 2001). First, although measuring need for health care 
with ill-health is the most convenient and commonly used approach, it may not 
accurately measure an individual’s need for care. In the case of dental care it can be 
argued that self-assessed oral health may be an endogenous outcome of dental care,
134
especially preventive care, as opposed to an endogenous prompter of dental care 
utilisation (Nguyen & Hakkinen, 2004). Second, biases in the reporting of health may 
systematically exist across population groups (Adamson, Ben-Shlomo, Chaturvedi, & 
Donovan, 2003; Lindeboom & van Doorslaer, 2004; O’Donnell & Propper, 1991). 
However, numerous studies support the validity of self-reported health status, 
demonstrating significant relationships with other measures of health status (Idler & 
Benyamini, 1997; Kaplan & Camacho, 1983; Mossey & Shapiro, 1982; Sutton, Carr- 
Hill, Gravelle, & Rice, 1999). I will discuss these issues further in Section 6.3.4.
It is important to note that because of missing data on income, the findings cannot be 
generalised to the under-20 population. Finally, it is important to underscore that this 
line of research, based on a macro-level study of inequity in health care in Canada rather 
than a micro level investigation of a specific disease or service category, does not 
address the issue of appropriateness or quality of care.
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C h a p t e r  4: I n e q u it y  in  pu b l ic l y  fu n d ed  ph y s ic ia n  c a r e : w h a t  is  t h e  r o l e  o f
PRIVATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG INSURANCE? 17
4.1 Introduction
Private health insurance is commonly thought to contribute to inequity in the health 
system, both in its finance and access (Mossialos & Thomson, 2004; OECD, 2004). 
Private insurance for services covered within a public insurance system that allows the 
holder to bypass public queues has been identified as a source of income-related 
inequity in the use of physician services in Australia and Ireland (van Doorslaer, Clarke, 
Savage, & Hall, 2007; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research 
Group Members, 2004). Indeed its contribution to inequity has been identified as one 
of the arguments against supplementary private insurance in the persistent debates over 
public and private financing in many countries (Mossialos & Thomson, 2004).
Such equity effects, however, should not be limited to this type of supplementary 
insurance. Complementary private insurance -  insurance for services and costs not 
insured by a public plan -  may also give rise to inequity in the use of publicly financed 
services. If the services or costs not insured by the public system but covered by 
complementary insurance are complements to the use of publicly financed services,
17 This chapter is based on the published peer-reviewed article: Allin, S and Hurley J (2008). Inequity in 
publicly funded physician care: what is the role of private prescription drug insurance? Health 
Economics. My co-author, Jeremiah Hurley, played a supervisory role in this project during the period 
Sept -  Dec 2007, contributed to the refinement and revision of the paper (a draft had been written in July 
2007), and suggested the subgroup analysis for people with and without chronic conditions. The 
origination of the research question, drafting of the chapter, review of the literature, statistical analysis 
and writing was my own work.
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such insurance can create inequity in the use of a publicly insured service. This effect 
is best documented for private insurance that covers the cost-sharing provisions of 
public insurance plans. In both the United States and France, for example, whose public 
insurance systems require substantial patient cost-sharing, private complementary 
insurance that covers the cost-sharing provisions increases use of the publicly insured 
services (Atherly, 2001; Buchmueller, Couffmhal, Grignon, & Perronnin, 2004). 
Because such insurance is held disproportionately by middle and high-income 
individuals, researchers have argued that it contributes to inequity in the use of 
physician services in France and the US (Chen & Escarce, 2004; van Doorslaer, 
Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004).
Much less studied is the extent to which private insurance for services that fall outside 
the public system contributes to inequity in the use of publicly insured services. 
Prescription drugs and physician visits, for instance, are complements: legally, in most 
developed countries one can only obtain a prescription drug by first visiting a physician 
to obtain the prescription. Obtaining a prescription is often a primary purpose of a 
physician visit. But most countries provide less generous public coverage for drugs 
than they do for physician visits; in Canada, the level of public coverage is the lowest, 
next to the Untied States, compared to other high-income countries (OECD, 2008; 
Robinson, 2002). Greater reliance on private finance for drugs can induce an income 
gradient in the use of physicians. Stabile (2001) estimated that in Canada those with 
‘supplemental’ insurance that covers prescription drugs were significantly more likely 
to make a publicly financed physician visit than those without such insurance (Stabile, 
2001). The impact of such spill-over effects is of growing importance for drugs, which 
are becoming the primary treatment for many medical conditions. Indeed the role of 
pharmaceuticals in the health system has increased markedly in the past 20 years; as a
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proportion o f total health spending, pharmaceuticals constituted 9.5% in 1985 and 17% 
in 2006 (see Figure 4.1). Pharmaceutical price regulation takes place at the federal level 
in Canada (as discussed in Chapter 1), with the objective o f ensuring patented drug 
prices are not excessive; further regulations are in place at the provincial level. In 
Ontario, the setting for this chapter’s analysis, there are also price-volume agreements 
with manufacturers in addition to generic price caps at 50% of the original product price 
(Paris & Docteur, 2007). Also the Ontario public plan has frozen the negotiated prices 
on its drug formulary since 1994 to avoid price inflation (Morgan, Barer, & Agnew, 
2003).
Figure 4.1 Spending on pharmaceuticals as a proportion of total health 
expenditure (HE), public health expenditure and private health expenditure, 1985- 
2006
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Source: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007b.
Drugs, however, are but one example o f a more general challenge for the achievement 
of equity goals in health care. To the extent that privately financed health care services
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are complements to use of publicly financed services, policies to achieve equitable 
access to and use of publicly financed services must look beyond the public system.
This chapter examines the impact that private financing of prescription drugs in Canada 
has on equity in the use of publicly financed physician services. Canada offers a unique 
setting for investigating this question. Public insurance provides universal, first-dollar 
coverage for medically necessary physician services. Private insurance for these same 
publicly insured physician services is either prohibited (in 4 of 10 provinces) or 
restrictions on physicians’ ability to provide services in both the public and private 
sectors and that limit the fees they can charge for private services have deterred the 
development of a private sector and consequently private insurance (Flood & Archibald, 
2001). Over 98% of physician expenditures are publicly financed (Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, 2007b). In contrast, in 2005 private sources financed 53% of 
prescription drug costs (of which 34% was through out-of-pocket expenditures and 66% 
through private insurance) (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007b). Public 
drug insurance is mostly limited to defined populations, primarily those aged 65 or over 
and those receiving social assistance. Because private insurance for drugs is not 
confounded by private insurance for physician services and effectively all physician 
visits are publicly financed, this chapter therefore aims to identify the impact of private 
insurance on income-related equity in the use of publicly financed physician services.
It is possible to address these empirical questions with the CCHS, a representative 
survey of the community-dwelling population, includes information on whether an 
individual has drug insurance. Among those with drug insurance, the 2005 survey 
further documents whether the source of the insurance is a public programme, 
employer-provided private insurance or individual-purchased private insurance.
139
As shown in Chapter 3, the utilisation of specialist services in most provinces in Canada 
appears to be inequitable favouring the wealthier individuals, while use of GP services 
tends to be mildly, but significantly, concentrated among the rich for the probability of a 
visit (pro-rich), and mildly pro-poor for the number of visits conditional on one visit. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies (Asada & Kephart, 2007; Curtis & 
MacMinn, 2007; Jimenez-Rubio, Smith, & van Doorslaer, 2008; van Doorslaer, 
Masseria, & Koolman, 2006). While inequitable use of specialist care is evidenced in 
most countries, pro-rich inequity in the probability of a GP visit is unusual 
internationally; inequity was found in only three of 16 OECD countries included in the 
analysis - Canada, Portugal and Finland (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health 
Equity Research Group Members, 2004). The positive income gradient for the 
likelihood of a visit, the aspect of utilisation most controlled by the individual, may be 
partly explained by the interaction with the largely privately funded complementary 
prescription drugs.
4.2 Drug consumption, drug financing, and use of physician services
Are prescription drugs and physician services complements? Ostensibly, they are: 
many countries require a physician visit to obtain a prescription before an individual can 
obtain a prescription drug. In Canada, 60% of office-based physician consultations 
result in a prescription (IMS Health, 2007). Moreover, individuals appear to be 
sensitive to the cost of medicines associated with physicians since a Canadian study 
found that one stated reason for not visiting a physician when ill was the cost of 
prescriptions (Williamson & Fast, 1998).
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But complementarity is not the only possibility. Drugs can also substitute for physician 
services. A number of mental health conditions that previously required regular 
therapy visits with a psychiatrist are now treated primarily with prescription drugs. 
Similarly, prescription drugs play a large role in controlling many chronic conditions 
(e.g., hypertension, diabetes, heart disease) that, if not controlled properly, require 
physician and hospital care. Such dynamics presumably underlie the conclusions of 
Shang and Goldman (2007) and Anis et al. (2005) that drugs are a substitute for 
physician care (Anis, Guh, Lacaille, Marra, Rashidi, Li et al., 2005; Shang & Goldman, 
2007). A growing literature also documents that prescription drugs may clinically 
substitute for inpatient hospital care, where a reduction of the cost of prescription drugs 
is associated with a decrease in inpatient utilisation (Choudhry, Avom, Antman, 
Schneeweiss, & Shrank, 2007; Shang & Goldman, 2007), and similarly that increased 
patient cost-sharing for prescription drugs appears to increase hospital admission rates 
(Chandra, Gruber, & McKnight, 2007) and the use of nursing homes (Soumerai, Ross- 
Degnan, Avom, McLaughlin, & Choodnovskiy, 1991).
Estimates of the impact of drug insurance on physician visits will include these counter­
acting complementary and substitutive relationships, potentially masking the impact of 
insurance. In the analysis it is therefore possible to identify situations in which one of 
them is expected to dominate. For instance, a lack of drug insurance is most likely to 
inhibit an initial GP visit, that aspect of utilisation over which patients exert the greatest 
control. In some cases physician visits can substitute for dmgs, a phenomenon that can 
be expected to be associated with a positive relationship between lack of drug insurance 
and the conditional utilisation of physician services. It is also expected that drug 
insurance will exert a stronger influence on GP visits than on specialist visits, because 
GPs serve as gatekeepers to specialist care. Overall, therefore, it is hypothesised that
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drug insurance should have the largest impact on the likelihood of a GP visit. This is 
consistent with Stabile (2001), which found that those with drug insurance were 
significantly more likely to visit a physician, but did not have a higher number of visits 
conditional on some use, controlling for past utilisation and potential selection into 
insurance.
The impact of insurance on use is also expected to be largest among otherwise healthy 
people who suffer occasional acute problems (e.g., respiratory infection). Individuals 
with chronic conditions are both more likely to visit their physician regularly and more 
likely to exhibit the substitutive relationship, muting any overall estimated effect. To 
test these hypotheses, in this analysis, models are estimated separately for GP visits and 
specialist visits; separately for the likelihood of a visits and the conditional number of 
visits among users; and for the overall sample and separately for those with and without 
a chronic condition.
Even if drug insurance influences the use of physician visits, its impact on income- 
related equity of physician use also depends on whether insurance status and income are 
correlated in the population. Prescription drug costs in Canada may be covered in four 
ways:
1. Provincial public drug insurance generally covers those on social assistance, 
those aged 65 or over, those with catastrophic expenditures (e.g., over 4% of 
income) and those who suffer from a small number of designated diseases.
2. Group-based or employer-sponsored private insurance, which covers much of 
the employed population and benefits from a tax subsidy.
3. Individual private insurance (a very small segment).
4. No coverage.
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The details of the four options vary somewhat across the Canadian provinces; for 
example British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have income-, and not age- 
based prescription drug insurance programmes, and private insurance premiums are not 
tax-exempt in the province of Quebec.
Approximately two-thirds of Canadians hold private drug insurance (Canada Life and 
Health Insurance Association, 2007), which finances 20% of total prescription drug 
expenditures (CIHI2007). A clear income gradient in private insurance coverage for 
drugs has been previously noted (Naylor, 1999). Estimates of the proportion uninsured 
range from 10% of the population, based on a combination of survey and administrative 
data (Applied Management in association with Fraser Group and Tristat Resources, 
2000b), to 23% of the population, based on survey data (Dewa, Hoch, & Steele, 2005; 
Kapur & Basu, 2005). The “uninsured” in most provinces are eligible for high- 
deductible catastrophic public insurance, although most people are not aware of this 
coverage and would therefore report themselves as uninsured (Applied Management in 
association with Fraser Group and Tristat Resources, 2000b; Kapur & Basu, 2005). 
These institutional arrangements imply that public drug insurance is negatively 
correlated with income while private insurance coverage is positively correlated with 
income since most get it through employment in a full-time job (Dewa, Hoch, & Steele, 
2005).
4.3 Methods
This chapter addresses the following research question: to what extent does the 
exclusion of prescription drugs from the universal public insurance plan and reliance on
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private insurance contribute to inequity in physician service utilisation, given that these 
two services are complementary?
To address this question, income-related inequity in physician visits is estimated using 
the well-established ECuity methods based on concentration curves for utilisation, 
which compare the cumulative distribution of health care use to the cumulative 
distribution of the population rank-ordered by income (Kakwani, Wagstaff, & van 
Doorslaer, 1997; O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al., 2008; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2000; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Paci, 1991). This method is explained in 
detail in Section 2.3.2, and involves five basic steps:
1. calculate the concentration index (Cl) for unadjusted physician utilisation
(CIunadj)i
2. estimate a model of the determinants of physician utilisation using both need- 
related and non-need related variables;
3. predict needs-adjusted utilisation for each individual in the sample by setting the 
value of all non-need variables at their sample mean during prediction;
4. calculate the concentration index for the distribution of needs-adjusted 
utilisation (CIadj)\
5. calculate horizontal inequity (HI) as the difference between the unadjusted Cl
1 Rand the needs-adjusted Cl: H I = CIunadj - CIajy
A zero HI index implies that, after controlling for differences in need across income 
groups, all individuals have equal utilisation, regardless of income. A positive HI 
implies ‘pro-rich’ inequity in which, after adjusting for need, higher-income individuals
18 Note: this is different from the calculation o f HI using non-linear estimates; instead, HI is calculated 
directly as the concentration index for needs-standardised utilisation (see Section 2.3.2 for more 
information).
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are more likely to visit the physician, or have more visits, than lower-income 
individuals. A negative HI implies ‘pro-poor’ inequity in which, after controlling for 
need, lower-income individuals are more likely to visit the physician, or have more 
visits, than are higher-income individuals. To assess the contribution of drug insurance 
to income-related inequity in the physician utilisation, I decompose the unadjusted 
concentration index (C I unadj) using the methods described in Section 2.3.2 (Wagstaff, 
van Doorslaer, & Watanabe, 2003).
Multivariate regression models of physician visits for step (2) above are central to these 
methods. Models for GP visits and for specialist visits are estimated separately. For 
each the standard two-part model is employed in which part 1 analyses the decision to 
make at least one visit (i.e., use vs. no use) and part 2 analyses the number of visits 
conditional on being a user. The dichotomous dependent variable for part 1 and the 
count nature of the dependent variable for part 2 formally call for non-linear models 
(Deb & Trivedi, 2006). Because estimates derived from linear models often provide a 
good approximation to those of non-linear models and aspects of the equity analysis 
(especially the decomposition) are easier to implement and interpret with linear models, 
I compared the results when I employ non-linear models and linear models. As in the 
previous chapter, the pattern of coefficient estimates did not differ importantly across 
the two approaches and the resulting HI estimates were nearly identical, so the 
following analysis is based on the linear models. Results for the non-linear models are 
presented in Appendix 4A for comparison.
The variable of particular interest in this analysis -  drug insurance -  may be 
endogenous. The usual concern is adverse selection whereby those with above-average 
(unobserved) risk purchase drug insurance. Three factors mitigate concern about
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endogeneity in this setting. First, the largest group of individuals who hold public drug 
insurance are automatically eligible because of age. There is no element of voluntary 
choice and therefore chance of selection. Second, there is very little choice in the 
private insurance market. Over 90% of those with private insurance obtain the 
insurance through group plans, most often through employment; insurance premiums 
for individual insurance are risk-rated and include pre-existing condition clauses, 
thereby either explicitly excluding many individuals in poor health or pricing them out 
of the market (Hurley and Guindon, 2008). Tying private insurance to employment 
may create counter-acting selection effects: selection into employment would create 
favourable selection into the insurance pool that would bias the estimates downward; 
but, conditional on working, health-related selection into jobs that offer better extended 
health care benefits would create adverse selection. Some evidence of favourable 
selection can be found both in Stabile (2001) whose instrumental variable-estimates of 
the impact of insurance of a GP visit are larger than his uncorrected OLS estimates 
(0.026 vs 0.020) and in a study of four European countries, where adopting a 
simultaneous equation approach actually increased the effect of insurance on specialist 
utilisation (Jones, Koolman, & van Doorslaer, 2007). Stabile (2001) used as an 
instrument cross-provincial variation in marginal tax rates (which are correlated with 
insurance status because employer-provided insurance is not included in taxable 
income). Such an instrumental variable approach is not possible in this single-province 
study. Nor is it possible to implement the strategy employed by Jones et al (2007) 
because there is not any information on whether an individual’s employer offers private 
insurance as a fringe benefit. Given that both of these studies find evidence of 
favourable selection, to the extent that selection bias is present in the estimates, it likely 
biases them downward.
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Third, the problem of endogeneity is substantially reduced when, as in this case (see 
below), models include good measures of health status so that any unobserved 
component in the residual is small (Buchmueller, Grumbach, Kronick, & Kahn, 2005). 
In other words, any bias arising from the possible selection of sicker individuals 
(adverse selection) or healthier individuals (favourable selection) into insurance is 
minimised by adjusting for a comprehensive set of health indicators.
Another concern lies with the potential for employers that offer insurance to also 
provide higher salaries, thereby possibly confounding the effects of insurance and 
income on utilisation. The effect of such collinearity would be to bias the estimated 
coefficients, which could either lead to an under- or over-estimation of the insurance 
effect, the former if the insurance effect is inflating the estimate of the income 
coefficient, and the latter if some of the effect of income is picked up by the variable of 
insurance. Because those with group-based insurance cover a large proportion of the 
population with a wide range of income levels, I assume that the estimates are unbiased 
and that if there is any bias, it does not affect substantively the study’s findings.
To test the robustness of the estimates to various types of unobserved heterogeneity that 
might be associated with both holding insurance and physician use, the above models 
are estimated by a) excluding individuals aged 65 or over, which constitutes the 
majority of the population eligible for public drug coverage; and b) excluding income. 
The findings are robust to these changes in sample and specification (Appendix 4B).
Self-reported measures of insurance status may also introduce bias. Individuals who 
visit a physician and receive a prescription are more likely to know their true insurance 
status; non-users are more likely to misreport that they have no insurance. A review of
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studies measuring the uninsured in the US found under-reporting of coverage by the 
public programme for low income earners -  Medicaid -  which the authors speculate 
may be due to stigma associated with public assistance programmes, or because the 
respondent is not currently receiving health services (Lewis, Ellwood, & Czajka, 1998). 
One would expect under-reporting of insurance coverage to be greater among people 
who are healthy and less likely to visit a physician. One would also expect it to be 
greater among people with public insurance who are automatically eligible compared to 
those with private insurance for which insurance is an explicit component of the 
employment contract. Self-reported insurance status in the National Population Health 
Survey in Canada from 1996/7 also identified just half of the population aged 65 or over 
who were eligible for public insurance reported they had insurance, and reporting was 
more likely among seniors who had taken prescription drugs in the past two days 
(Grootendorst, Newman, & Levine, 2003). It is not possible to measure the extent to 
which this bias may affect this chapter’s results. However, because an individual’s 
decisions regarding care are influenced by their perceived coverage (even if this 
perception is incorrect), it can be argued that such misreporting is not an important 
problem for this analysis.
4.4 Data and variable specification
To address the research question, this chapter draws on the Ontario component of the 
2005 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) master data file. Ontario was the 
only province with data that distinguished private and public prescription drug 
coverage, an optional component of the survey. The CCHS, conducted by Statistics 
Canada, is a cross-sectional, community-based population health survey based on a 
multi-stage clustered design with individual occupants of private occupied dwellings as
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the final sampling unit. The survey response rate for Ontario was 77.2%. The Ontario 
sample totals 41,766 and this analysis includes 33,161 individuals after dropping 
children under 15 and observations with missing data (see below for more information).
4.4.1 Dependent variables
As in the previous chapter, physician utilisation is measured separately for GPs and 
specialists, and separately for the likelihood of a visit (no visits versus one or more 
visits) and the number of visits conditional on at least one visit. The survey asks the 
respondent how many times, in the past 12 months, he or she has seen or talked on the 
telephone about his or her physical, emotional or mental health with a family doctor or 
general practitioner (GP). It also asks the same question in reference to an eye 
specialist, in addition to any other medical doctor such as surgeon, allergist, 
orthopaedist, gynaecologist or psychiatrist (this question is used to define specialist 
utilisation).
4.4.2 Independent variables 
Income
Income is measured as the respondent’s best estimate of gross annual household income 
aggregated from all sources. Unlike in the previous chapter that draws on the Public 
Use Micro Data, for this analysis I use the full microdata file where income is available 
as a continuous variable. Therefore, I calculate individual income by adjusting the 
estimate of household income for household size and composition using the modified
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OECD scale. The modified OECD equivalence scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first 
adult household member, 0.5 to the second adult household member and 0.3 to children.
About 14% of the sample did not report income and were dropped from the analysis. A 
further 15% reported their income categorically rather than on a continuous scale. For 
those 15% with income category but not their “best estimate”, continuous income is 
predicted using a linear regression of the natural logarithm of income on income 
category (in eleven categories), age, sex, employment status, level of food security, 
education, and whether they were bom in Canada (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Auxiliary linear regression to impute income for subset of observations 
with categorical income information (dependent variable: ln(income))
Coef. Std. Err.
Socio-dem ographic an d  econom ic variables
Age 0.002 0.001
Age2 0.000 0.000
Male 0.012 0.004
Employed 0.028 0.005
Student -0.030 0.007
Household size (ranges from 1-14) -0.159 0.002
Resides in Toronto 0.023 0.007
Bom in Canada 0.029 0.005
Marital status: married -0.064 0.005
Marital status: common-law -0.070 0.007
Marital status: single -0.043 0.006
Education: secondary -0.003 0.006
Education: some postsecondary 0.000 0.008
Education: postsecondary degree/diploma 0.032 0.004
Income category
$5000-10,000 (<$5000 is the reference
category) 0.344 0.032
$10,000-15,000 0.621 0.031
$15,000-20,000 0.825 0.030
$20,000-30,000 1.056 0.030
$30,000-40,000 1.298 0.030
$40,000-50,000 1.483 0.030
$50,000-60,000 1.642 0.031
$60,000-80,000 1.834 0.031
$80,000-100,000 2.034 0.031
$100,000+ 2.445 0.031
Constant 9.251 0.034
Sample size 28,267
R2 0.889
F ( 24, 28242) 5955.75
Note: bold is significant at p<0.05
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An alternative approach to imputing income for individuals who only reported their 
income in categorical form is to assign an income estimate as the mid-point of the 
reported income category. In this way, individuals who report their categorical income 
as less than $5000, their income estimate is entered as $2500, and for those in the range 
of $5000 and $10,000, it would be $7500, and so on. As a sensitivity analysis, the below 
analyses were run using this alternative income estimation and results are reported in 
Appendix 4C, demonstrating the robustness of the main results to the choice of income 
imputation method.
Indicators o f health care need
Need-related variables included in the models of physician utilisation include age, age- 
squared, sex, an interaction between female and usual child-bearing age (18-45), self­
assessed health based on five categories (excellent, very good, good, fair and poor), and 
whether the individual reports no, moderate or severe activity limitations due to health. 
Also included is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual reports any chronic 
conditions. The assumption is that individuals who are older, in worse general health, 
with greater health-related limitations in activities and with a chronic illness need more 
physician-delivered health services. There is a concern that indicators of need will be 
endogenous to the outcome variable of utilisation; it is possible that poorer health leads 
to more service use but also that utilisation leads to improved health. It appears that the 
bias associated with this bidirectional association is minimal in studies that control for 
past health status (Bago d'Uva, Jones, & van Doorslaer, 2007); however, to the extent 
that indicators of need are endogenous, the effects of need on utilisation may be 
underestimated.
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Indicators unrelated to health care need
Non-need related variables in the models include highest level of education attained 
(less than secondary, secondary, some post-secondary, or post-secondary), residence in 
an urban area, employment status (employed, student, retired or not working) whether 
the individual was bom in Canada, and, the variable of particular interest, dmg 
insurance status. Dmg insurance status is defined through a set of dummy variables 
representing the following coverage categories: no dmg insurance; public dmg 
insurance; private employer- or group-based dmg insurance; and private, individual 
dmg insurance.
4.5 Study results
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics by insurance status
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics on the total sample and for the sample sub­
groups defined by insurance status. Utilisation of physician services varies by insurance 
coverage: those with no dmg insurance are the least likely to have a GP and specialist 
visit, and make fewer visits than the insured, while individuals with public insurance are 
the highest users. Higher rates of health care use among the publicly insured is not 
surprising since it covers seniors, lower income groups, and individuals with high dmg 
consumption relative to their income (Appendix 4D provides more information on the 
public dmg programme in Ontario).
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The uninsured, publicly insured and privately insured also differ in their needs and non­
needs profiles. In terms of health status, compared to the uninsured, the publicly 
insured have worse self-assessed health, more moderate limitations in activities, and 
greater likelihood of reporting a chronic condition than the uninsured, while the 
privately insured have better self-assessed health, fewer limitations in activities but are 
more likely to report a chronic condition. Levels of education are different across the 
three population groups: compared to the uninsured, the publicly insured are less 
educated and the privately insured are more educated. Both insured groups are more 
likely to reside in an urban area, are more likely to have been bom in Canada, and are 
less likely to be a student than the uninsured. Because the large majority of private 
insurance is employment-based, and those aged 65 or over are eligible for public 
insurance, the privately insured have higher rates of employed, and the publicly insured 
lower, than the uninsured. Mean income differences are also significant, with a spread 
of about $20,000 between the publicly insured and the privately insured. The 
distribution of income by prescription dmg insurance category is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
It shows a clear income gradient for both government-sponsored insurance, which 
disproportionately covers the lower income groups, and employer-sponsored insurance, 
which disproportionately covers high-income groups.
Table 4.2 shows the majority (60%) of the Ontario population is covered by employer- 
based prescription dmg insurance, with an additional 11% covered through the 
government plan and 5% with individually purchased insurance. This leaves over 23% 
of the population with no dmg coverage. This estimate is relatively high compared to 
other studies; thus some people who may be eligible for public coverage are not aware 
of their eligibility, while others may be unaware of their employer-based coverage, as 
discussed above.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the total sample and sub-samples defined by
drug insurance status
No drug Public drug Private drug
Total sample insurance insurance insurance
(N=33161) (N=7606) (N=5176) (N=20379)
Variable mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd)
Utilisation
Total number o f GP visits 3.28 (5.17) 2.91 (4.66) 5.16* (8.02) 3.10* (4.64)
Probability o f a GP visit 0.80 (0.4) 0.75 (0.43) 0.87* (0.34) 0.81* (0.39)
Conditional number o f GP
visits 4.09 (5.47) 3.90 (5.02) 5.96* (8.35) 3.82 (4.87)
Total number o f specialist visits 1.57 (4.5) 1.22 (3.21) 2.25* (4.59) 1.58* (4.83)
Probability o f a specialist visit 0.56 (0.5) 0.48 (0.50) 0.69* (0.46) 0.57* (0.50)
Conditional no. specialist visits 2.81 (5.72) 2.56 (4.27) 3.25* (5.21) 2.80* (6.16)
Needs variables
Excellent SAH 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.14* (0.34) 0.24* (0.42)
Very good SAH 0.39 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.29* (0.45) 0.42* (0.49)
Good SAH 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) 0.31* (0.46) 0.27* (0.44)
Fair SAH 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.17* (0.37) 0.07* (0.25)
Poor SAH 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.11* (0.31) 0.02* (0.13)
Moderate limitations in daily
activities 0.14(0.34) 0.12(0.33) 0.17* (0.38) 0.14* (0.34)
Severe limitations 0.10(0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.25* (0.43) 0.08* (0.26)
No limitations 0.77 (0.42) 0.79 (0.41) 0.58* (0.49) 0.79 (0.41)
At least one chronic condition 0.72 (0.45) 0.67 (0.47) 0.87* (0.34) 0.71* (0.46)
Female 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.51* (0.36) 0.49 (0.50)
Age 43.83 (17.19) 42.24(17.67) 58.52* (20.1) 41.91* (15.2)
Female age 18-45 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.46) 0.15* (0.36) 0.30 (0.46)
N on-need variables
Income $41,781 $32,863 $28,636.85* $47,069.55*
(29,032) (26,815) (24,829.13) (28,973.61)
Less than secondary education 0.17(0.38) 0.21 (0.41) 0.36* (0.48) 0.13* (0.34)
Secondary education 0.17(0.37) 0.19(0.39) 0.17* (0.37) 0.16* (0.37)
Some post-secondary education 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.26) 0.09 (0.28)
Post-secondary education 0.57 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 0.465* (0.49) 0.62* (0.49)
Urban residence 0.86 (0.35) 0.84 (0.37) 0.863* (0.34) 0.87* (0.34)
Employed 0.69 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) 0.249* (0.43) 0.78* (0.42)
Student 0 .14(0.35) 0.14(0.34) 0.11* (0.31) 0.02* (0.36)
Bom in Canada 0.69 (0.46) 0.61 (0.49) 0.67* (0.47) 0.72* (0.45)
Insurance fo r prescription  drugs
Public insurance 0.11 (0.31)
Private Ins- Group 0.62 (0.49) 0.93 (0.25)
Private Ins - Individual 0.05 (0.21) 0.07 (0.25)
Note: SAH is self-assessed health; sd is standard deviation; * represents significant difference
with uninsured (p<0.05)
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Figure 4.2 Income quintile (Q1 is lowest) distribution by prescription drug 
insurance category
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4 .5 .2  D e te rm in a n ts  o f  p h y s ic ia n  se rv ic e  u se
A s expected, the m ost im portan t determ inan ts o f  physic ian  serv ice u tilisa tion  are 
ind icators o f  health  care need, nam ely  se lf-assessed  hea lth  (T able 4 .3). F or bo th  GPs 
and specialists, and for each o f  the likelihood o f  a v isit and the conditional nu m b er o f  
v isits, a g rad ien t is observed  in use by  self-assessed  hea lth  status, ac tiv ity  lim itation , 
and chronic d isease status. W om en are m ore likely  to  m ake a physician  v isit, b u t the 
conditional num ber o f  v isits does no t d iffe r betw een m en  and w om en. A ge is positive ly  
associa ted  w ith  the likelihood  o f  a G P v isit but no t the conditional num ber o f  v isits; it is 
positive ly  associa ted  w ith  both  the p robab ility  and  conditional specia list v isits.
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Table 4.3 OLS analysis of the probability of a physician visit and the conditional
number of visits, GPs and specialists________________________________________
GP Specialist
Probability Conditional no. Probability Conditional no.
visits visits
Coef SE Coef SE C oef SE Coef SE
N eeds variables
Very good SAH 0.042 0.009 0.433 0.080 0.031 0.011 -0.019 0.118
Good SAH 0.044 0.010 1.156 0.098 0.047 0.012 0.256 0.118
Fair SAH 0.076 0.013 2.591 0.220 0.077 0.017 1.075 0.226
Poor SAH 0.110 0.013 5.370 0.464 0.133 0.023 3.937 0.822
Moderate limitations 0.034 0.009 0.923 0.137 0.097 0.012 0.611 0.135
Severe limitations 0.063 0.008 2.367 0.201 0.119 0.013 1.823 0.225
Chronic condition 0.102 0.009 1.115 0.075 0.079 0.010 0.593 0.108
Female 0.059 0.008 0.189 0.119 0.091 0.011 0.071 0.138
Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.027 0.020
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female 18-45 0.064 0.011 0.862 0.160 0.032 0.014 0.787 0.208
N on-need variables
Income (In) 0.029 0.007 -0.420 0.080 0.047 0.008 0.351 0.148
Secondary education 0.014 0.011 -0.024 0.150 0.020 0.014 0.363 0.139
Some post-secondary
education 0.008 0.015 0.102 0.175 0.083 0.018 0.432 0.152
Post-secondary
education 0.037 0.010 0.071 0.133 0.082 0.012 0.679 0.118
Urban 0.018 0.008 0.152 0.103 -0.001 0.010 0.209 0.112
Employed 0.005 0.009 -0.479 0.135 -0.034 0.011 -0.376 0.152
Student 0.033 0.012 -0.699 0.145 0.081 0.015 -0.122 0.338
Bom in Canada -0.020 0.008 -0.035 0.096 0.006 0.010 0.277 0.114
Insurance f o r  prescrip tion  drugs
Public insurance 0.048 0.011 0.943 0.191 0.074 0.015 0.212 0.170
Private Ins- Group 0.052 0.009 0.267 0.107 0.074 0.011 0.120 0.119
Private Ins -
Individual 0.044 0.017 0.560 0.302 0.061 0.022 0.063 0.215
Constant 0.199 0.075 6.292 0.857 -0.283 0.091 -3.316 1.569
R2 0.063 0.131 0.0915 0.054
F 51.97 79.34 82.21 14.46
N 33161 26671 33161 19283
Notes: Bold is significant at p<0.05; SAH is self-assessed health; SE is standard error.
Non-need factors are also associated with physician visit rates. Consistent with the 
findings from Chapter 3, higher-income earners are more likely to have at least one GP 
visit and also to a specialist. Conditional on visiting a physician, however, lower- 
income earners make a greater number o f GP visits than higher-income earners but the 
reverse association is seen for the number o f specialist visits. A person’s level of
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education exhibits only a weak relationship with GP visits but is positively associated 
with both the probability of a visit and the number of visits to a specialist. Living in 
urban areas, where physicians are in greater supply, is associated with an increased 
likelihood of GP visit. The employed use fewer services than the retired and 
unemployed, and students are more likely than the unemployed and retired to report a 
GP or specialist visit but have fewer visits conditional on positive use, keeping all else 
constant. Finally, individuals bom in Canada are less likely to visit a GP and, 
conditional on seeing a specialist, have more visits than immigrants.
Individuals with prescription dmg insurance make more physician visits than do those 
without dmg insurance. Irrespective of the source of dmg insurance, those with 
insurance are more likely than the uninsured to visit a GP and to visit a specialist, with 
similar effect sizes across the insurance groups. Those with public insurance and 
private group insurance also have a greater conditional number of GP visits (with a 
larger estimated effect for public insurance), while dmg insurance is not associated with 
the conditional number of specialist visits. Overall, relative to those with no dmg 
insurance, the insured make more use of physician services after controlling for need 
and the relationship is most consistent for the probability of seeking care. These results 
are consistent in both linear and non-linear models (see Appendix 4A).
The findings are consistent with Stabile (2001) who found a significant marginal effect 
of prescription dmg insurance on the likelihood of visiting a GP. He argued that such 
an insurance effect could either be due to moral hazard, over-consumption of the 
insured in the absence of price signals, or adverse selection, whereby individuals who 
purchased coverage did so because they knew they would require more services. 
Because he controlled for adverse section, Stabile attributed the observed insurance 
effect to moral hazard. However, with the data available, empirically it is not possible
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to disentangle the insurance effect into that which is attributed to moral hazard, or over­
consumption beyond the clinically appropriate level among the insured, as opposed to 
under-consumption among the uninsured. From an equity perspective it is important to 
consider the possibility that a large part of the effect is due to under-consumption 
among those without prescription drug insurance.
Table 4.4 presents a summary of the analyses stratified by chronic condition. As 
hypothesised, the impact of drug insurance on the likelihood of a GP is larger for those 
who do not have a chronic condition than it is for those with a chronic condition19. 
Furthermore, there is no relationship between insurance and the likelihood of a 
specialist visit among those with no chronic condition. The impact of insurance on the 
likelihood of a visit among the healthier individuals (with no chronic condition) remains 
significant, but the effect on the conditional number of visits is no longer significant. 
This provides some support for the hypothesised complementary relationship between 
prescription drugs and physician services. For those with a chronic condition, the 
results also indicate that the complementary relationship dominates any substitutive 
relationship: those with insurance are more likely to visit both a GP and a specialist and 
to have more GP visits.
19 The level o f  reported insurance coverage among those with chronic conditions is only modestly greater 
than those with no condition (78% compared to 74%), in spite o f  the existence o f  some public insurance 
programmes in Ontario to protect individuals with chronic conditions.
Table 4.4 Impact of drug insurance on physician visits: analysis stratified by 
presence of chronic conditions_________________________________________
Total Sample No Chronic Chronic
Conditions Conditions
Coef SE Coef SE C oef SE
GP: Probability
Public insurance 0.048 0.011 0.085 0.038 0.036 0.011
Private Ins- Group 0.052 0.009 0.071 0.018 0.042 0.009
Private Ins - Individual 0.044 0.017 0.063 0.044 0.032 0.018
GP: Conditional visits
Public insurance 0.943 0.191 0.457 0.304 1.006 0.220
Private Ins- Group 0.267 0.107 0.132 0.111 0.318 0.142
Private Ins - Individual 0.560 0.302 0.221 0.256 0.642 0.376
Specialist: Probability
Public insurance 0.074 0.015 0.069 0.044 0.079 0.016
Private Ins- Group 0.074 0.011 0.060 0.020 0.081 0.012
Private Ins - Individual 0.061 0.022 0.066 0.053 0.059 0.023
Specialist: Conditional visits
Public insurance 0.212 0.170 0.203 0.230 0.242 0.193
Private Ins- Group 0.120 0.119 0.111 0.129 0.147 0.153
Private Ins - Individual 0.063 0.215 -0.256 0.183 0.132 0.265
Notes: These models also control for all other covariates listed in Table 1. Bold is significant at 
p<0.05.
4 .5 .3  In c o m e -re la te d  in eq u ity  in p h y s ic ia n  u tilisa tio n
The analyses o f income-related inequity reveal small, but statistically significant, “pro­
rich” inequity in the probability of a GP visit, and greater “pro-rich” inequity in the 
probability and conditional number o f specialist visits as also shown in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 3). In contrast, there is “pro-poor” distribution of the conditional 
number o f GP visits (see Figure 4.3). These results are consistent with non-linear 
models, as shown in Table 4.520.
20 In the previous chapter the results o f income-related inequity analyses for the province o f  Ontario were 
conducted using a previous year o f the survey (CCHS 2.1, 2003) and relied on the public used microdata 
file (PUMF); therefore, some differences can be seen. While the estimates o f  inequity in the probability 
o f GP and specialist visits remain unchanged, the estimates o f  inequity in the conditional number o f  both 
GP and specialist visits is reduced here compared to the previous chapter. For GP visits inequity was - 
0.023 in the previous analysis compared to -.05 here, and for specialist visits it was 0.007 in the previous 
analysis and 0.04 here. The direction o f inequity (pro-poor for GP and pro-rich for specialists) are the 
same however the difference that is seen only for the conditional number o f visits may in part be 
explained by the measurement o f physician utilisation: in the PUMF the number o f visits for both types o f
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Table 4.5 Comparison of H I  with linear and non-linear models
Non-linear Linear
GP Probability 0.017 0.017
Conditional number o f visits -0.044 -0.051
Specialist Probability 0.041 0.041
Conditional number o f visits 0.049 0.045
Note: all H I indices are significant at p<0.05.
Figure 4.3 Horizontal inequity in GP and specialist probability and conditional 
number of visits (and 95% confidence intervals)
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Figure 4.4 presents the results o f the decomposition analysis, depicting the contribution 
to income-related inequity o f the non-need factors: income, education, private 
(combining employer-based and individual) and public prescription drug insurance 
coverage, other factors (combining employment status, education, urban residence and 
being bom in Canada), and an error component. Income makes a positive contribution
physicians is capped at 31 visits whereas the master data has a much longer right-hand tailed distribution 
for both. This implies that lower income individuals are disproportionately representing the extreme right 
o f the GP distribution whereas higher income earners represent higher users o f  specialist care.
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to inequity in all areas except for the conditional number of GP visits, because higher 
income is associated with an increased likelihood of visiting a GP and specialist, and a 
greater number of specialist visits, yet it is associated with a reduction in the number of 
GP visits. The most important contributors to inequity in both GP and specialist care 
are income and private insurance. Private prescription drug insurance contributes to the 
observed income-related inequality in physician visits because higher income earners 
are both more likely to have private prescription drug insurance and to visit a GP or 
specialist. In contrast, government-sponsored public insurance covering mostly low 
income and over-65 populations has a “pro-poor” effect because of the negative 
concentration index and a positive marginal effect on utilisation.
Figure 4.4 Components of horizontal equity in the probability and conditional 
number of GP and specialist visits
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Notes: The sum o f all the components provides an estimate o f  horizontal inequity (HI); “Other” 
includes employment, education, urban residence, and bom  in Canada; the error component 
measures the difference between inequality in actual utilisation (CIunadj) and the sum o f all need 
and non-need components.
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If prescription drug insurance coverage is provided to the entire population, then both 
the association between income and insurance status and the net contribution of public 
and private prescription drug insurance to inequity in physician visits would be 
eliminated. Using the estimates from the decomposition, such full coverage is predicted 
to reduce the observed index of inequity in the probability of a GP visit by 24% (HI 
falls from 0.017 to 0.013) and inequity in the probability of a specialist visit by 21% (HI 
falls from 0.038 to 0.03) though with little effect on the estimate of inequity in the 
conditional number of GP and specialist visits.
4.6 Discussion
This chapter’s estimates of income-related inequity in physician service use in Ontario 
are consistent with the findings from Chapter 3 showing a mild pro-rich inequity in the 
probability of a GP visit, pro-poor inequity in the conditional number of GP visits, and 
larger pro-rich inequity with respect to both the probability of and conditional number 
of visits to specialists. These findings are also consistent with previous studies (Asada 
& Kephart, 2007; Jimenez-Rubio, Smith, & van Doorslaer, 2008; van Doorslaer, 
Masseria, & Koolman, 2006).
Of particular policy interest is the causes of this inequity. Some may be rooted in 
demand-side behaviour beyond the design of the health care system. For example, even 
if the system of free public insurance for physician visits has equalised access to 
physicians, Grossman’s model of the demand for health and health care predicts that 
higher income individuals will both demand higher levels of health and, conditional on 
a given health status, demand more health care (Grossman, 1972). Of greater policy
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concern to policy makers is the extent to which the inequity is rooted in system design. 
This research demonstrates that the income-related inequity that we observe in Canada 
derives in part from its heavy reliance on private finance for prescription drugs, which 
are complementary to publicly financed physician visits. Higher income individuals are 
both more likely to hold private drug insurance and, in the absence of such insurance, 
can more easily afford out-of-pocket costs. Hence, they are less deterred from 
physician visits because of the expected costs of drugs that are often prescribed by 
physicians during a visit.
Drug insurance has a significant impact on the likelihood of a physician visit, the aspect 
of utilisation over which patients have the most discretion; the effect on the conditional 
number of visits is reduced. Also, the effect of insurance on the likelihood of a GP visit 
appears to be stronger for individuals without any chronic conditions than for those with 
at least one condition. This finding suggests that these otherwise healthy individuals are 
more likely to be deterred from visiting a GP by the expected cost of prescription drugs 
than individuals with chronic conditions who likely have regular physician contacts, 
more experience with their health problems, and are more likely to substitute drugs for 
physician care. With an estimated 30% of physician visits exclusively for acute 
conditions, even though not all acute conditions require medication a lack of 
prescription drug insurance coverage is a non-trivial policy concern (Katz, Hofer, & 
Manning, 1996). It was also expected that there would be a weaker influence of drug 
insurance on specialist than GP physician utilisation because specialist visits require a 
referral and are less under the control of patients; however, insurance remained 
important for the likelihood of a specialist visit.
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The low rates of self-reported prescription drug insurance coverage among the over-65 
population are surprising. Individuals turning 65 should receive, via mail, notification 
of their upcoming eligibility to the public benefit programme. From the first day of the 
month following an individual’s 65th birthday, he or she is automatically enrolled in the 
Ontario Drug Benefit Programme, and needs only to tell the pharmacist (and present the 
Health Card) when filling a prescription. Therefore it is possible those who are 
underreporting have not filled a prescription. However, using the previous wave of the 
same survey (CCHS 2.1 from 2003), among individuals aged 65 and older from Ontario 
who responded to the subsection of the survey on medication use (N=l 105), almost all 
had taken at least one medication in the past month (94%) and visited a physician in the 
last year (89%). This reference period of one month differs from that for physician 
visits, the question does not distinguish medications that are prescribed and over-the- 
counter (in some cases they could be both, such as pain relievers, allergy medicine, cold 
remedies, etc.), and the survey asked whether or not the medicine was used and not the 
number of medicines taken; therefore, more refined survey questions that are better 
integrated with questions of health care utilisation could address some of the questions 
that arise from this analysis. With Ontario data used in this study, it appears that 80% 
of seniors (who are eligible for public coverage) reported having insurance for 
prescription drugs. An earlier study based on the Ontario Health Survey showed that 
turning 65 in Ontario, hence becoming eligible for full prescription drug coverage in 
1990 when there was no patient cost sharing, was associated with an increase in the 
number of medicines consumed primarily among those with lower levels of health 
(Grootendorst, O'Brien, & Anderson, 1997). Updating this analysis after almost 20 
years could assess the impact of turning 65 in Ontario and other provinces with 
comprehensive coverage for this age group on their use of medicines and other health
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services, in particular among vulnerable groups such as those who previously had no 
insurance and who have low income.
To conclude, these analysis point to the role of private insurance for prescription drugs 
in explaining part of the inequity that we observe in the use of physician services by 
income, because private insurance is concentrated among the higher income groups, and 
has a positive effect on physician utilisation. Since public insurance covers the lower 
income groups and older people, and has a similarly positive effect on utilisation, its 
contribution to the estimate of inequity is negative. From a policy perspective, since 
there is evidence that insurance for prescription drugs increases the use of physician 
services, if this effect is explained by the removal of financial barriers to access (due to 
the cost of these complementary services) and not the moral hazard effect of insurance, 
then inequity in physician services by income may be reduced if coverage were 
extended to the uninsured populations.
Both the Honourable Roy Romanow (Canada, 2002a) and Senator Kirby (Canada, 
2002b) advocated a movement towards a more universal and integrated approach to 
prescription drug coverage (these proposals are discussed in Section 6.2.2 and Appendix 
6A). Such a policy change would not only improve equity in access to prescription 
drugs (Evans, 2005), it would reduce the income gradient in both insurance and 
utilisation of publicly financed physician services ( Section 6.2.2 offers more in-depth 
policy discussions). In light of the vital role prescription drugs play in the prevention 
and treatment of illness, Romanow in his final report reiterated the statement from the 
National Forum on Health from 1997 that “a strong case can be made that prescription 
drugs are just as medically necessary as hospital or physician services” (Canada, 2002a, 
p. 190); this study supports this argument not only because of the value of medicines
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themselves but in light of the evidence that they are also complementary with physician 
services. To the extent that services not included in the public insurance plan are 
complements to the use of publicly insured sources, as exemplified by prescription 
drugs and physician visits, efforts to improve equity in access to and use of public 
services must account for interactions with privately funded services.
Another possible area where the equity implications of the interaction between public 
and private services could be investigated is long-term care. The public/private mix in 
long-term care is evident in both the delivery and financing, moreover there are 
significant variations in these arrangements across the provinces (Greb, Chambers, 
Gafni, Goeree, & Labelle, 1994; Stabile, Laporte, & Coyte, 2006). The trend in the past 
decade of shifting care out of hospital has seen an increase in the extent of care provided 
in the home. Although public funding of home care has increased significantly over this 
period (which has led to greater use of home care services and a reduction in the 
reliance on informal care; (Stabile, Laporte, & Coyte, 2006)), there is substantial 
variation across the country in the level of public subsidy for these services and a 
continued reliance on private contributions (Coyte & McKeever, 2001; Stabile, Laporte, 
& Coyte, 2006). Future research could empirically assess the equity implications of the 
mixed funding and delivery features along with the extent of provincial variations in 
equity of access to long-term care services.
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C h a p t e r  5: Su b je c t iv e  u n m e t  n e e d  a n d  u t il is a t io n  o f  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e r v ic e s  
in  C a n a d a : im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  e q u it y 21
5.1 Introduction
As we have seen, most health systems in high-income countries endorse equity goals in 
health care. One widely used approach to measure inequity in the receipt of health care 
is to determine whether factors other than need for health care, such as socioeconomic 
status, affect health care utilisation, or as I will refer to it within this chapter, the 
“conventional method”. Inequity arises when individuals in higher socioeconomic 
groups are more likely to use, or are using a greater quantity of, health services after 
controlling for their level of ill-health (approximating need). This conventional method 
may be biased for at least three reasons. First, differences in (needs-adjusted) utilisation 
patterns by socioeconomic status may not necessarily imply inequity because these 
differences may be explained in part by individuals’ informed choices or preferences 
(Le Grand, 1991; Oliver & Mossialos, 2004). Second, utilisation is usually measured as 
visit rates or in some cases expenditure levels, so that an apparently equal or pro-poor 
distribution of needs-adjusted utilisation by socioeconomic status may not be equitable 
if the services being used are inappropriate (Thiede, Akweongo, & McIntyre, 2007).
21 This chapter extends the following manuscript: Allin, S., Grignon, M., and Le Grand, J. Subjective 
unmet need and utilisation of health care services in Canada: what are the equity implications? 
Unpublished manuscript. Michel Grignon contributed to the paper through discussions of the 
methodology in addition to reviewing previous versions. Julian Le Grand played a supervisory role, 
contributed to the conceptualisation of unmet need and discussions of equity. The origination of the 
research question, drafting of the chapter, review of the literature, statistical analysis and writing 
constitutes my own work.
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Third, standard approaches to needs-adjustment rely on measures of ill-health (or risk of 
ill-health) to approximate need. Such indicators may overestimate need if some 
conditions have no effective treatments available or if an individual’s capacity to benefit 
is low (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993) or if the indicators are too crude they may 
underestimate need. Therefore, the direct measurement of “unmet need”, or any need 
for health care that remains because health care was not received or was inadequate, 
may complement conventional methods to measuring equity and shed some light on the 
possible biases therein.
Two possible approaches to measuring unmet need in a population include “clinical” 
and “subjective” methods. The former relies on a clinical assessment of whether an 
individual received less than the amount of resources required to restore his or her 
health (Carr & Wolfe, 1976). The latter relies on individuals’ subjective assessments. 
This approach is preferred because it is more technically feasible with numerous 
existing surveys including questions pertaining to unmet need; and arguably individuals 
are better able to estimate their health status as well as their health care needs (Idler & 
Benyamini, 1997). The RAND study, for instance, considered subjective assessments 
of health as opposed to clinical assessments to predict health care expenditures 
(Newhouse & the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). Subjective assessments of 
unmet need may also include information on the reasons for unmet need, which can 
then be useful for focusing policy actions.
This chapter therefore examines the relationship between subjective unmet need (SUN) 
for health care and residual utilisation from conventional utilisation models. It will 
assess to what extent SUN can inform our understanding of equity in the receipt of 
health care and can provide insight into possible biases with the conventional method of
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measuring equity. This chapter has two objectives. The first is to draw existing work 
together to establish meaningful definitions of unmet need, with a focus on how SUN 
differs from the conventional method to measuring equity. The second is to empirically 
assess the relationship between different types of SUN and health care utilisation in the 
Canadian context by measuring any systematic association between reporting SUN and 
the error term (the “residual”) from a conventional model of health care utilisation. The 
second aim addresses the questions: do individuals with SUN have systematically 
higher or lower unexplained utilisation than those who do not report SUN, and does this 
association differ across the different types of SUN?
The next section proposes a conceptual framework of unmet need, followed by a review 
of the existing evidence and a discussion of the relationship between unmet need, 
utilisation and equity. The data and methods are reviewed in the following sections, 
and the results are presented and discussed in the final sections.
S.2 Conceptualising unmet need
Need for health care is an elusive concept that is difficult to define and measure, as 
shown in Chapter 2. Although, the definition of need commanding the widest approval 
is that it measures the care that is required to bring about the maximum possible health 
improvement (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993; Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 2004; Stevens & 
Gillam, 1998). Unmet need therefore arises when an individual does not receive an 
available and effective treatment that could have improved her health. It has been 
referred to as a measure of “the differences, if any, between those services judged 
necessary to deal appropriately with defined health problems and those services actually 
being received...an unmet need is the absence of any, or of sufficient, or of appropriate
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care and services” (Carr & Wolfe, 1976, p.418). The potential for unmet need to arise is 
described in the categories below.
Category 1. Unperceived unmet need. An individual does not perceive that she actually 
needs health care; for example, she has hypertension without symptoms, or 
denies having a mental health problem. Unperceived unmet need may also 
arise from non-adherence to treatment, e.g. a patient does not perceive the 
need to complete the full course o f a prescription. Since this type of unmet 
need is not perceived, clinical investigations would be required to detect it. 
This type o f unmet need would be missing from the conventional method 
since it relies on self-reported ill-health to measure need. The following 
analyses do not include ‘unperceived’ unmet need, although from a public 
policy perspective, we would be concerned with individuals who are either 
unaware of potentially serious health conditions or do not feel the need for 
(and so do not adhere to) prescribed treatments.
Category 2. Subjective, chosen unmet need. An individual perceives himself as in need 
of some form of health intervention but chooses not to demand the health 
services available. For example, individuals may prefer to self-treat, to 
seek complementary or alternative medicine, or may decide not to seek any 
care. The possibility that under- or non-use is a function of individual 
choices and preferences is not accounted for by the conventional method. 
Category 3. Subjective, not-chosen unmet need. An individual perceives herself as in 
need of some form of health intervention, but does not receive health 
services because o f access barriers beyond her control. These perceived 
access barriers may or may not be important from a policy perspective, for 
example, it is of less concern if individuals who are wealthy choose to live
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in a remote area and then find it difficult or time consuming to access 
health care. Other examples are more policy relevant: some who live in 
remote areas may not be able to afford to travel to a health care facility 
when needed; others without any access to a regular source o f primary care 
may not be able to access preventive or emergency services. In equity 
analyses following the conventional method, this type of unmet need may 
be captured by individuals using fewer services than would be predicted on 
the basis of their need. The stated reasons for this non-chosen unmet need 
may therefore inform our understanding of the drivers o f inequitable 
utilisation.
Category 4. Subjective, clinician-validated unmet need. An individual perceives a need 
for health care, but does not receive the treatment that a clinician would 
judge as adequate22. For example, a patient is referred to a specialist, but 
the waiting time for an appointment is considered by both the patient and 
the referring doctor to be too long and thus posing a health risk. Analyses 
of equity based on the conventional method would not capture this type of 
unmet need because there is no information about the adequacy o f the care 
that an individual received, simply whether an individual used a service or 
not (and how much). Conventional methods o f measuring equity by 
income may underestimate the level of inequity if lower socioeconomic 
groups are more likely to receive inadequate care.
Category 5. Subjective unmet expectations. An individual perceives himself as in need 
of some form of health intervention who accesses health care, but in his
22 The complexity of medical care is well known, and of course different clinicians may have different 
views of treatment plans. For example, some illnesses have multiple treatment options, such as minor 
angina, for which different providers may prescribe preventive options such as physical activity or dietary 
changes, others medications, and even others surgical treatment.
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own perception did not receive the most suitable treatment; the care 
received did not meet his expectations. As above, this information is not 
available in conventional methods, nor is it available in clinical 
assessments of unmet need, since individuals’ assessments o f the adequacy 
of treatment can only be elicited directly. The equity implications of this 
type of unmet need, however, are unclear; information on the validity of 
these unmet expectations would be needed to make equity judgments.
5.3 Existing research on subjective unmet need
To date research on SUN has focused on measuring its prevalence and investigating its 
individual- and system-level predictors. Most studies have presumed that SUN 
represents access barriers (as in Category 3 above) . Indeed many survey questions are 
phrased in order to measure that SUN which arises through access barriers (mostly 
costs). Most studies do not disaggregate analyses of unmet need into the different 
categories, although, as this chapter will go on to argue, a disaggregated approach is 
needed in order to generate policy-relevant findings.
Most existing studies of unmet need have been carried out in the US. They have 
measured unmet need with survey questions referring to the past 12-month period24.
23 A wide literature also investigates the level of unmet need for personal assistance for disabilities (Allen 
& Mor, 1997; Desai, Lentzner, & Weeks, 2001; Quail, Addona, Wolfson, Podoba, Levesque, & Dupuis, 
2007).
24 Common questions include: “Was there any time that someone in the family needed 
medical/dental/prescription/eye glasses care but could not get it?” “Were you unable to get medical care 
due to costs?” “Was there any time that you thought you should get medical care, but did not?” “Was 
there any time when you needed medical care, but did not get it because you couldn't afford it?” and “Did 
you have a problem getting any health care such as medical, mental or dental care that you needed?”
172
Especially when the wording of the question relates directly to costs, one would expect 
a strong relationship between SUN and having lower income and/or being uninsured or 
underinsured. And indeed, this is borne out in a number of US studies which identify 
two of the strongest correlates of unmet need as being uninsured and low income, both 
among children and adolescents (Ford, Bearman, & Moody, 1999; Newacheck, Hughes, 
Hung, Wong, & Stoddard, 2000; Newacheck, Hung, Park, Brindis, & Irwin, 2003) and 
adults (Cunningham & Kemper, 1998; Diamant, Hays, Morales, Ford, Calmes, Asch et 
al., 2004; Hendryx, Ahem, Lovrich, & McCurdy, 2002; Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 
1995; Litaker & Love, 2005; Pagan & Pauly, 2006; Shi & Stevens, 2004; Strunk & 
Cunningham, 2002).
Two US studies provide some support for the validity of self-reports of unmet needs in 
general population surveys. One study investigated the medical symptoms and medical 
consequences of not receiving needed care and found that the majority (70%) of 
individuals who reported unmet need had “very serious” or “somewhat serious” 
symptoms, and half continued to have “pain or disability” (Donelan, Blendon, Hill, 
Hoffman, Rowland, Frankel et al., 1996). Another study that compared unmet need 
among different insurance categories (those enrolled in a health maintenance 
organisation, HMO, or not) found no significant difference in utilisation rates or the 
likelihood of reporting unmet need by insurance category, but consistent with the 
authors’ expectations, HMO members were less likely to report unmet need due to 
financial barriers to access, but more likely to report unmet need due to organisational 
arrangements of the HMO, such as wait times, denial, or lack of available professionals 
(Reschovsky, Kemper, & Tu, 2000).
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Few studies have explicitly addressed the question of how unmet need relates to 
patterns of health care utilisation. A study drawing on two years of the National Survey 
of America's Families investigated the association between self-reported unmet need 
and service use at a hospital emergency department. People with unmet needs were 
found to be significantly higher users of emergency care: individuals reporting unmet 
need had increased odds of occasional (one or two) emergency department visits 
(adjusted odds ratio of 1.67) and even higher odds of frequent (three or more) visits 
(2.38) compared to not reporting an unmet need (and adjusting for health status, 
socioeconomic and insurance status) (Zuckerman & Shen, 2004). That individuals with 
an unmet need are higher users of emergency care may reflect the poorer health status 
(beyond the variables included in the model) of those reporting unmet need, or it could 
reflect inadequate primary care. The relationship between SUN and utilisation of health 
services other than emergency care, however, was not examined, though a positive 
association between SUN and the number of physician visits (also controlling for health 
status, socioeconomic and insurance status) has been shown elsewhere (Mollbom, 
Stepanikova, & Cook, 2005).
In countries with universal health care coverage such as in Europe and Canada, research 
on unmet need has been less developed than in the US, perhaps because of the relative 
lack of direct cost-based barriers to physician and hospital care. Prevalence estimates of 
unmet need experienced in the past year in Europe based on the recent Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions range from 1% in Denmark to 13% in Sweden 
(Koolman, 2007) . Other Swedish studies of the 20-65 age group identified higher 
rates of unmet need in relation to physician visits in the past three months, with 24% of
25 In France, 4%  of adults reported unmet need due to financial reasons for general health care services 
over the past 12 months -  in 1998, but 12% for dental care (Bocognano, Dumesnil, Frerot, Le Fur, & 
Sermet, 1999).
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those surveyed having refrained from a visit when needed (Westin, Ahs, Persson, & 
Westerling, 2004), and higher estimates among the unemployed population of the same 
age (42%) (Ahs & Westerling, 2006). The latter clearly reflects the relationship 
between being unemployed and in poorer health. Similarly, an earlier Swedish study 
found a high proportion (22%) of individuals who reported to have forgone primary 
health care due to the cost (Elofsson, Unden, & Krakau, 1998) . Among the over-50 
population included in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, the 
proportion who reported care foregone due to costs, unavailability or care that is not 
easily accessible ranged from 2.5% in the Netherlands to 9.3% in Greece, with a higher 
likelihood of care foregone among individuals with lower income in all countries 
studied (Mielck, Kiess, van den Knesebeck, Stirbu, & Kunst, 2007).
In Canada, the ongoing National Population Health Survey and the Canadian 
Community Health Survey (CCHS) include questions about unmet need. Research has 
shown a growth in reported SUN from 4% to 12% during the period 1994 to 2001 
(Sanmartin, Houle, Tremblay, & Berthelot, 2002). The most substantial increase was 
seen between 1998 to 2001, when unmet need doubled from 6-12%; the largest increase 
was due to reasons related to waiting times, personal choice, and “other” reasons 
(Sanmartin, Houle, Tremblay et al., 2002). Studies from Canada have identified that the 
population groups with a greater likelihood of reporting any unmet health care need 
were women, people in worse health, non-elderly, higher educated, and non-immigrants 
(Chen & Hou, 2002; Kasman & Badley, 2004; Law, Wilson, Eyles, Elliott, Jerreta, 
Moffat et al., 2005; Wu, Penning, & Schimmele, 2005). Reported unmet need was also
26 Descriptive analyses revealed little relationship between foregone care and the number of physician 
visits made in the past year, though a slightly higher proportion of people forgoing a physician visit was 
found among those with no previous physician contact (Elofsson, Unden, & Krakau, 1998).
175
significantly associated with previous GP, specialist and physiotherapist visits, after 
adjusting for health status and demographics (Kasman & Badley, 2004).
Chen and Hou (2002) investigated the factors associated with SUN separately for the 
following three groups defined on the basis of the stated reason for unmet need: 
availability, including lengthy waits and insufficient supply; accessibility, including 
cost, language or transportation barriers; and acceptability, including attitudes, 
preferences and choices. Individuals with all three types of unmet need were, not 
surprisingly, found to be in poorer health than the general population (Chen & Hou, 
2002). They also found an association between reporting an unmet need due to 
“availability” and “acceptability” and previous GP or specialist utilisation; an 
association with utilisation was not found with SUN due to “accessibility”. A similar 
approach was also taken with regards to mental health services (Nelson & Park, 2006), 
where a positive association was found between reported unmet mental health needs and 
previous mental health care utilisation across all groups.
5.4 Unmet need, utilisation and equity
Overall, the literature on unmet need suggests that the relationship between SUN and 
utilisation is not straightforward. It depends upon how SUN is defined, upon the 
framing of the questions, and upon the possible reasons for unmet need that are 
included. Previous health care utilisation among individuals who report any unmet 
need, which was shown in some studies, is expected given that they are in poorer health 
(having some need for health care in the first place). One would expect, and studies that 
focus on cost-related unmet need suggest, that after adequately controlling for ill-health, 
there will be a negative association between service use and ‘not-chosen’ SUN due to
barriers (Category 3). One would also expect that individuals who have chosen not to 
seek needed care (Category 2) would exhibit a negative association with service 
utilisation. When SUN is related to perceptions that care was inadequate or did not 
meet their expectations (Categories 4 or 5), the association with utilisation could be 
positive, because of the implied contact with the health system, or negative, for example 
if the perception of inadequate care left the individual unsatisfied and less likely to seek 
care (Kravitz, 2001). For any type of SUN, a positive marginal effect on utilisation 
could arise because of unobserved needs in the underlying utilisation models.
As discussed in Chapter 2, research on equity in health care use in Canada has 
predominantly focused on measuring the extent to which health care utilisation varies 
by socioeconomic status, namely income, after adjusting for variations in need (health 
status). I made use of this conventional method in Chapters 3 and 4 and found that, 
consistent with previous research, there is significant but modest ‘pro-rich’ inequity (a 
distribution of health care use that favours higher income groups) in the probability of 
visiting a GP, and a pro-poor or equitable distribution of the total and conditional 
number of GP visits. This research has also identified pro-rich inequity in specialist 
care, both for the likelihood of a visit and for the conditional number of visits, but pro­
poor inequity in inpatient care, consistent with previous studies (Jimenez-Rubio, Smith, 
& van Doorslaer, 2008; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research 
Group Members, 2004). As mentioned at the outset, these analyses may be biased for a 
number of reasons.
Information on SUN may complement conventional methods and may provide some 
insight into the extent and type of the bias with these methods. An association between 
the different types of SUN and “residual” (or unexplained) utilisation, as calculated as
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the error term from a conventional utilisation model, would suggest that either there is 
some bias with this method, that there is bias with reported unmet need, or that there is a 
combination of these two possibilities. Systematic positive residual utilisation across all 
SUN categories would imply that reported unmet need captures additional dimensions 
of health care need that are unaccounted for in conventional utilisation models.
Negative “residual” utilisation for individuals with SUN, whereby they report unmet 
need and also use fewer services, would suggest that the stated reasons for unmet need 
could be used to inform the drivers of inequity in utilisation. An upward bias in 
inequity (i.e. more pro-rich inequity) with the conventional method could arise from 
utilisation patterns being driven by differing preferences and choices. For example, 
individuals with lower income or socioeconomic status may choose not to seek ‘needed’ 
care to a greater extent than individuals with higher income (Category 2). A downward 
bias (more pro-poor inequity) is possible if utilisation patterns mask important 
information on the adequacy of care received, for example, individuals with lower 
income who are high users may disproportionately receive less optimal care (Category 
4) (Health Disparities Task Group of the F/P/T Advisory Committee on Population 
Health and Health Security, 2004). I propose to explore the link between SUN and 
conventional methods by examining the relationship between SUN and residual 
utilisation.
5.5 Methods
This chapter addresses the third research question of this thesis. To what extent can 
subjective unmet need inform our understanding of equity in the Canadian health 
system?
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To investigate empirically the association between SUN and conventional methods of 
measuring equity, I employ a three-step approach. First, I model utilisation on a 
comprehensive set of needs-related and socioeconomic factors, in addition to the 
different types of unmet need. Second, I obtain the predicted values from the utilisation 
models. Third, I analyse the relationship between unmet need and the “residual” 
between actual and predicted utilisation.
For the first step, I model health care utilisation separately for GP visits, specialist 
visits, and hospital nights. For each utilisation variable, the probability of a visit or 
night spent in hospital is estimated with a probit, and the number of visits/nights 
conditional on having had at least one visit is estimated using OLS on the full set of 
explanatory variables
(1) y  = a  + X'/1 + Z 'S  + e  ,
where y  is the utilisation variable, a  , /?, S , and r are the regression coefficients, X  is 
a vector of health and demographic variables to approximate need, and Z is a vector of 
socioeconomic variables that have been shown to be associated with health care 
utilisation, but do not reflect clinical need, and province dummies (these variables are 
described in Table 5.2).
For the second step, needs-predicted utilisation ( y ) is calculated for each individual,
(2) y  = a  + X  p  + Z ' S .
The “residual” ( s *) is then calculated as the difference between actual and predicted
utilisation for each individual,
(3) e '  = y  - y  .
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This “residual” is taken to define unexplained “under” and “over” utilisation. This is 
then used as the dependent variable in the second-stage equation (4). This equation 
attempts to explain over or under utilisation based on the different types of SUN (V), 
which were not originally included in the utilisation models (equation 1) and 
socioeconomic (2) variables, which were included in the original models.
(4) e* = a  + U ' 0  + Z 'S  + £ .
To explore the possibility that any observed systematic association between the 
different categories of SUN and residual utilisation is driven by personal preferences, I 
recalculate residual utilisation including indicators of preference,
(5) y  =cc  + X'/3 + Z'5 + P ' t  + £  ,
where y  is the utilisation variable, a  , f t , 5 , and r are the regression coefficients, X  
and Z are the same vectors of needs and socioeconomic variables, respectively, and P  is 
the vector of preference variables (including general levels of satisfaction with life and 
the likelihood of reporting unmet need for home care services). Then the residuals are 
recalculated as in equations 2 and 3 above, and subsequently they are used as dependent 
variables as in equations 4 and 5.
The residual between actual and predicted utilisation is taken to indicate under- or over­
utilisation compared to the empirical norm. A systematic negative association with 
residual utilisation would imply that individuals with SUN are using less than an 
expected amount of health services. On the contrary, if the marginal effect of SUN on 
residual utilisation is positive, this suggests that, for individuals with the same 
measurable characteristics, those with SUN use more health care. Because individuals 
may be in a better position to estimate their level of health care need than estimates
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based solely on reported health status, a positive association with residual utilisation for 
individuals with SUN could reflect unobserved needs in the conventional method.
5.6 Description of the data and variables
In this chapter, the analyses draw on the Public Use Microdata File of the 2005 CCHS. 
The Northern Territories, Yukon and Nunavut were excluded due to under-sampling in 
these regions, and only the adult population aged 18 and over was included27. The total 
sample for the ten provinces was 132,947 (ages 12 and above), and the sample for this 
study included 116,263 individuals aged 18 and over.
Measures o f unmet need
SUN is measured by the following question: “During the past 12 months, was there ever 
a time when you felt you needed health care but you didn't receive it?” Respondents 
were provided with the following possible reasons for not getting care (choosing all that 
applied):
• not available in the area
• not available at the time required (e.g. doctor on holidays, inconvenient hours)
• waiting time too long
• felt would be inadequate
• cost
• too busy
• didn’t get around to it/didn’t bother
• didn’t know where to go
• transportation problems
• language problems
• personal or family responsibilities
27 Due to the subjective nature of the variable of interest -  unmet need - 1 decided to exclude the under-18 
population; this is consistent with the literature in this area that mostly separately investigates unmet need 
among adolescents and adults.
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• dislikes doctors/afraid
• decided not to seek care
• doctor didn’t think it was necessary
• unable to leave the house because of a health problem
• other.
I created separate categories of unmet need based on the stated reasons for unmet need.
I then mapped the stated reasons for unmet need to the categorisation outlined at the 
outset (see Table 5.1, below). Some difficulty surrounds that SUN which is related to 
‘waiting times’; they do not clearly fit into one of the proposed categories. They could 
be considered access barriers (Category 3) (as suggested by (Gulliford, Figueroa- 
Munoz, Morgan et al., 2002)), such that waiting lists prevent the individual from using 
the needed service. Though they could also be conceptualised as ‘inadequate’
(Category 4) or ‘unmet expectations’ (Category 5) depending on the extent to which the 
waiting time would be judged to be clinically inadequate (Category 4), or perceived to 
be so by the individual but not necessarily by a clinician (Category 5). Because of the 
uncertainty surrounding this group, I considered it separately as ‘wait-related’ unmet 
need. Also the final group could not be categorised because they simply responded to 
the question with “other” reasons. Since respondents could choose multiple reasons for 
unmet need, the four groups add up to more than the total of 12%, about 10% of those 
reporting unmet need fall into more than one category, and the proportions of 
individuals in the four groups add up to more than 1.
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Table 5.1 Categorisation of sub jective unmet need using CCHS
C ategory of unm et need Stated  reasons fo r unm et need P roportion  of the 
sam ple
(s tan d a rd  deviation 
abou t the m ean)
Category 2 (Personal • felt would be inadequate 2.65%
choice) • too busy
• didn’t get around to it
• dislikes doctors
• decided not to seek care
• doctor didn’t think it was necessary
(0.16)
Category 3 (Barriers) • unavailable in the area 2.4%
• cost
• didn’t know where to go
• transportation problems
• language problems
• personal/family responsibilities
• unable to leave the house because
o f a health problem
(0.15)
Category 4 (Clinician - -
validated)
Category 5 (Unmet - -
expectations)
Wait-related • not available at the time required 5.36%
• waiting time too long (0.23)
“Other” • “Other” 2.7%
(0.16)
5.6 .1  D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s
Utilisation o f GP, specialist and inpatient hospital services in the past 12 months are 
estimated separately, first as the probability of a visit/night and then as the number 
conditional on one visit/night. These variables are defined as in the previous chapters.
5 .6 .2  In d ep en d en t v a r ia b le s
A comprehensive set o f health and demographic variables is included in the analyses 
with the aim to minimise any bias associated with unobserved needs. These include:
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• Age and sex dummy variables, with age measured in the following groups: 18- 
34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 years and over;
• Self-assessed health (excellent, very good, good, fair and poor);
• Fair or poor self-assessed mental health (compared to good, very good or 
excellent mental health);
• Worse general health status than the previous year (compared to improvement or 
no change);
• Any chronic condition;
• No, moderate or severe activity limitations due to health;
• Obesity, defined as having a body mass index of 30 or above; and
• Two dummy variables to capture missing information on chronic conditions and 
weight/height (to calculate body mass index).
Socioeconomic variables that have been demonstrated to influence health care 
utilisation are included in the models . These include:
• The highest level of education attained: less than secondary, secondary, and 
post-secondary education;
• Whether the individual was bom in Canada;
• Marital status (married, widowed, and not married);
• Current cigarette smoker, and past cigarette smoker;
• Heavy drinking (5 or more drinks at least once a week); and
• Two dummy variables that capture missing information on education and 
immigrant status.
28 Supply variables were originally included in the models- the number of GPs and specialists per capita 
in the health region of residence -  however these were shown to be non-significant, and also introduced 
problems with multi-collinearity as evidenced by a variance inflation factor greater than 10. Therefore 
these variables were not included in the final estimations.
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Province dummies are also included in the models to capture some of the supply 
differences across the country.
Income is measured as gross annual household income aggregated from all sources. In 
this dataset, income is only available in five income categories: <$15,000, $15,000- 
$29,999, $30,000-$49,999, $50,000-$79,999, $80,000 or more. I also include a dummy 
variable to indicate that the estimate of income is missing, because of a relatively high 
item non-response rate of about 15% . The non-respondents are disproportionately 
elderly, lower educated and in poorer health. Since the estimates of household income 
are not adjusted for household composition, five dummy variables of household size (1, 
2, 3 ,4  or 5 or more persons) are included in the regression models. The independent 
variables are described in Table 5.2.
5.7 Results
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.2 reports the means of the utilisation, demographic, health status and 
socioeconomic variables that are described above. Health status appears to be worse 
among individuals with SUN than those without. Self-assessed health (SAH) is 
reported as poor in 3% of the total population, 2% for those with no SUN, compared to 
6% among those with SUN due to waiting, 10% among those with SUN due to barriers 
(Category 3), 5% among the personal choice-based SUN (Category 2), and 8% among
29 The proportion of the sample missing income information is slightly lower that this in the 2003 CCHS 
(wave 2.1) used in Chapter 3. The approach of including a dummy for those with missing income has also 
been taken elsewhere (Deri, 2005).
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those with SUN for “other” reasons. Health limitations, chronic conditions, and general 
health that is worse than in the past year follow similar trends.
Socioeconomic characteristics also differ across these groups. People with SUN due to 
waiting appear to have higher income and education than the total population and those 
with SUN for barriers or other reasons. The proportion of individuals with SUN due to 
waiting that is in the highest income category ($80,000 or more) is 31%, compared to 
29% in the total population, and only 18% for those in Category 3 (barrier-related 
unmet need). Education follows a similar trend, with prevalence of post-secondary 
education at 56% of the total population, 66% for those with SUN due to waiting, 58% 
for SUN due to barriers (Category 3), 57% for choice-related SUN (Category 2), and 
62% for SUN for other reasons.
Rates of health care use vary across the different population groups. Individuals with 
SUN due to wait, barriers, and ‘other’ reasons have higher rates of GP and specialist 
visits than both the total population and those with choice-related SUN (Category 2). 
For inpatient care, all categories of unmet need have higher utilisation than the total 
population, although those in Category 2 (choice-related SUN) are using less than the 
other categories.
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Table 5.2 Mean utilisation, demographic and socioeconomic variables by total 
sample, unmet need subgroups_________________________________________
T otal No SUN
SUN:
choice
SUN:
w ait
SUN:
b a rrie rs
SUN:
“ o th e r”
N 116,113 102,357 3148 6347 2960 3094
Utilisation
GP total visits (mean) 3.08 2.91 3.61 4.56 4.80 4.60
GP visit probability 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.86 0.81 0.80
GP visits (conditional) 3.93 3.73 4.73 5.33 5.93 5.77
Specialist total visits (mean) 1.30 1.22 1.41 2.14 1.81 2.05
Specialist visit probability 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.68 0.58 0.62
Specialist visits
(conditional) 2.37 2.27 2.68 3.17 3.11 3.28
Inpatient probability 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.15
Inpatient total nights (mean) 0.48 0.44 0.68 0.75 0.89 1.07
Inpatient nights
(conditional) 6.07 5.95 7.19 6.18 7.48 7.11
D em ographics
Male 35-44 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
Male 45-54 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Male 55-64 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
Male 65+ 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
Female 18-34 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.19
Female 35-44 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.13
Female 45-54 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
Female 55-64 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
Female 65+ 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
Health status
Very good SAH 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.30
Good SAH 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33
Fair SAH 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16
Poor SAH 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.08
Moderate limitations 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.24
Severe limitations 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.26
Chronic condition 0.71 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.86
Chronic (missing) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SAH worse than past year 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.23
Poor mental SAH 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.15
Obese 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
BMI (missing) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Socioeconomic variables
Married 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.67 0.57 0.63
Widow 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.13
Smokes 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.32 0.26
Past smoker 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.44
Drinks 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07
Secondary education 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.24
Post-secondary educ. 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.66 0.58 0.62
Education (missing) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Bom in Canada 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.78
Bom in Canada (miss) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06
Income $15,000-$29,999 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.11
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
Income $50,000-$79,999 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22
Income $80,000+ 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.18 0.28
Income (missing) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13
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Table 5.3 describes the unadjusted association between SUN (as a proportion o f each 
cell) in the different categories and utilisation o f GP, specialist and inpatient services. 
The proportion of the population reporting any type of unmet need increases with 
increasing frequency of GP, specialist and inpatient contacts. Compared to the total 
sample estimate o f 12% who report any SUN, the prevalence o f unmet need is 17% 
among those who had four or more GP visits, 19% of those with three or more specialist 
visits, and 18% of those with at least one inpatient stay. The association between 
Category 2 (personal choice) and utilisation is relatively proportional, although there is 
a slightly positive association between SUN from Category 3 (barriers) and utilisation, 
and a clear positive relationship for wait-related and ‘other’ reasons for SUN.
Table 5.3 Prevalence of unmet need, and SUN subgroups by level of health care 
utilisation
SUN SUN- SUN- SUN- SUN-
(Total) Choice B arrie rs W ait related “O th e r”
(C ategory 2) (C ategory 3)
T otal 11.84 2.81 2.40 5.36 2.70
GP visits
0 9.89 3.40 2.12 3.57 2.55
1 8.32 2.22 1.70 3.77 1.57
2 10.54 2.64 1.82 4.88 2.21
3 11.80 2.72 2.29 5.47 2.55
4+ visits 16.90 2.96 3.58 8.23 4.06
Specialist visits
0 10.05 2.96 2.21 3.84 2.25
1 10.34 2.53 2.01 4.57 2.30
2 14.28 2.57 2.54 7.46 3.07
3+ visits 18.86 3.10 3.76 10.29 4.73
H ospital inpatien t
0 11.34 2.80 2.30 5.11 2.49
1+ nights 17.65 2.91 3.63 8.26 5.18
5 .1 .2  A n a ly s is  o f  re s id u a l u tilisa tio n
From the utilisation models it is possible to calculate “residual” utilisation as the 
difference between actual and predicted utilisation for all individuals; Appendix 5A
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presents the results of the full utilisation models that are used to calculate residuals. 
Table 5.4 shows the estimates of the effects of each of the four categories of SUN on 
“residual” utilisation, after controlling for socioeconomic and provincial variables (the 
full results of the models are shown in Appendix 5B).
The first row of Table 5.4 reports the effects of the different categories of SUN on the 
residual probability of a GP visit (i.e. the difference between the actual probability of a 
GP visit and the predicted probability). Reported wait-related SUN is associated with a 
4.4% increase in residual utilisation, compared to not having reported wait-related SUN. 
Reported unmet need due to perceived barriers to access is associated with a 2.4% 
reduction in residual utilisation. Choice-related unmet need is also associated with a 
reduction in the residual probability of a GP visit, by about 6%. Finally “other” SUN is 
associated with a reduction in the residual probability of a GP visit by 4%.
In general, individuals with wait-related SUN have systematically higher unexplained 
use than individuals with the same measured characteristics but who do not report this 
type of SUN. On the contrary, for SUN due to personal choice, there is a negative 
association with residual utilisation. Reported SUN due to barriers significantly reduces 
the residual probability of a GP visit, though the opposite is seen for the conditional 
number of GP visits and the likelihood of an inpatient admission. For “other” SUN, 
there is a negative trend in the residual likelihood of a GP visit, and a significant 
positive association with residual utilisation of the other services.
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Table 5.4 Estimates of the effects of SUN on residual utilisation
SUN category M arginal effect (M E) on the residuals
(s tan d ard  e rro r)
GP: Probability
Wait 0.044 (0.007)
Barriers -0.024 (0.012)
Choice -0.059 (0.012)
Other -0.038 (0.012)
GP: Conditional number o f  visits
Wait 0.602 (0.104)
Barriers 0.391 (0.194)
Choice -0.254 (0.122)
Other 0.559 (0.154)
Specialist: probability
Wait 0.081 (0.009)
Barriers -0.022 (0.014)
Choice -0.039 (0.013)
Other 0.012 (0.014)
Specialist: conditional
number o f  visits
Wait 0.392 (0.071)
Barriers -0.021 (0.110)
Choice -0.090 (0.104)
Other 0.310 (0.114)
Inpatient: probability
Wait 0.013 (0.006)
Barriers -0.003 (0.008)
Choice -0.017 (0.006)
Other 0.035 (0.009)
Inpatient: conditional number o f  nights
Wait -0.361 (0.372)
Barriers 0.054 (0.626)
Choice -0.007 (0.731)
Other 0.193 (0.489)
Note: Regression coefficients are adjusted for socioeconomic variables and province dummies. 
Bold indicates statistically significant effects at the p<0.05 level. Full results are in Appendix 
5B.
It is possible that the significant association between SUN and the residuals from the 
utilisation models could be explained by personal preferences and psychological traits, 
such as higher levels o f dissatisfaction and complaints in general. It is also possible that 
the association could be explained by unobserved health care needs. In an attempt to 
disentangle these two possibilities, I incorporate two “preference”-related variables into 
the calculations o f the residuals. Reporting unmet need is significantly associated with 
both subjective unmet home care needs and satisfaction with life in general (Appendix
5C)30. Those reporting unmet home care needs have between twice to three times the 
odds o f SUN; lower levels o f satisfaction also increase the odds o f SUN.
Table 5.5 Association between SUN and residuals of models of total and 
conditional number of specialist visits including a) only need and socioeconomic
variables, b) need, socioeconomic and preference variables__________________
M odel a M odel b
Total number o f  specia list visits___________________________________________ % difference
ME Standard error ME Standard error
SUN- Wait 0.473 (0.027) 0.461 (0.027) -2.6%
SUN- Barrier -0.065 (0.040) -0.108 (0.040) -64.9%
SUN- Choice -0.160 (0.037) -0.173 (0.037) -8.3%
SUN- Other 0.231 (0.038) 0.204 (0.038) -11.6%
Conditional number o f  specialist visits
ME Standard error ME Standard error
SUN- Wait 0.392 (0.071) 0.380 (0.071) -2.9%
SUN- Barrier -0.021 (0.110) -0.064 (0.110) -200%
SUN- Choice -0.090 (0.104) - 0.111 (0.104) -22.9%
SUN- Other 0.310 (0.114) 0.289 (0.114) -6.7%
Notes: Bold is significant at 5% level. Full results are reported in Appendix 5D.
To determine whether these personal characteristics attenuate the relationship between 
SUN and residual utilisation, the indicators of satisfaction and unmet home care needs 
are entered into the utilisation models, and new residuals are calculated. Table 5.5 
reports the marginal effects o f SUN on residual utilisation. Using the example o f the 
total number o f specialist visits, there appears to be some change, though quite modest, 
in the association between SUN and the residual utilisation. As expected, the inclusion
30 Greater unmet home care needs could be an indicator of personal characteristics associated with an 
increased tendency towards complaints and dissatisfaction, it could reflect unobserved health care needs, 
or it could be a combination of both. I believe that this variable captures characteristics unrelated to 
health care need because this question is asked separately to that for health care, and the majority (60%) 
of those who report unmet home care needs indicate these services were required for “meals”, 25% for 
“shopping” and 22% for housework, compared to less than 10% for “health services”. Other measures of 
satisfaction such as those specifically directed towards the health care system (e.g. rating the availability 
and quality of health care in the province and community) were available in optional modules that only 
half of the sample contributed, therefore these were not used here. Also, more detailed, questions about 
satisfaction were included in an optional module that was completed by only 10% of the sample.
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of identifying factors related to personal preferences, including a predisposition towards 
dissatisfaction and non-health care related unmet needs, leads to a reduction in the 
strength of the effect of SUN due to waiting and SUN due to “other” reasons on residual 
utilisation. However, the effects of these two categories of SUN on the residual remain 
positive and, in most cases, significant.
5.8 Discussion
Directly measuring unmet need for health care may inform our understanding of equity 
in the use of health services. This chapter links the different reasons for unmet need and 
conventional models of utilisation. One might assume that unmet need arises when an 
individual is using fewer health services than an expected amount (hence her needs are 
not being met). However, this assumption depends on unbiased models of health care 
utilisation that accurately measure both individuals’ experience with health care and 
their need for care. It also depends on the validity of reported unmet need, meaning it is 
not simply measuring individual preferences and psychological traits such as a tendency 
towards dissatisfaction in health service provision alongside a preference for frequent 
health care consumption. In this chapter, I find that for some types of SUN (wait- 
related and “other” SUN), after controlling for socioeconomic differences, there is a 
tendency towards over-utilisation of physician services; these types of SUN are 
significantly associated with positive ‘residual’ utilisation. On the contrary, for the 
other types of SUN (Categories 2 and 3), there is the expected under-utilisation.
It is possible that SUN captures unobserved needs, whereby individuals have more 
information about their health care needs than can be gleaned from self-reported health
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status and demographics. These unobserved needs may explain part of the ‘over- 
utilisation’ that was found for some types of SUN, which implies that there may be a 
bias in the conventional method of assessing equity. However I do not find that there is 
systematic ‘over-utilisation’ across all categories of SUN; therefore, it is likely that 
factors other than unobserved needs explain this finding.
I propose four explanations for the positive residual utilisation among the two 
subgroups of people reporting unmet need. First, as already stated, individuals who 
report wait-related and “other” SUN may have a greater degree of unobserved needs 
than those reporting other types of unmet need. Second, these subgroups may have 
unobserved individual characteristics, such as psychological traits that lead to 
declaration biases in surveys, preferences for more health care, and a predisposition 
towards dissatisfaction with care. Third, since utilisation is measured in terms of 
volume and does not capture information on the quality of care an individual received, 
individuals may have used many services, and yet they still report their needs as not 
having been met because the care they received was inadequate. This third explanation 
was also proposed by the authors of a Canadian study that found higher rates of 
utilisation among those who reported any unmet need (Kasman & Badley, 2004); the 
authors also suggested that reported unmet need could relate to the fact that there is a 
lack of effective treatments for some conditions. Fourth, and perhaps the most likely, 
there could be a combination of these three explanations.
In an attempt to control for individuals’ preferences that may explain the observed 
‘over-utilisation’ (the second explanation above), I included some indicators of 
‘preference’ in the utilisation models: reported unmet home care needs and 
dissatisfaction with life in general. After including these variables there was a modest
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reduction in the positive effect of SUN on residual utilisation. This suggests that 
possibly there are some individual (unmeasured) characteristics that reflect an 
individual’s predisposition toward dissatisfaction with care alongside a tendency to use 
more services. This has also been suggested elsewhere (Kasman & Badley, 2004). 
Further research using longitudinal data could address the hypothesis that unobserved 
individual characteristics explain the ‘over-utilisation’. Moreover, additional survey 
questions would be needed to distinguish between unmeasured characteristics related to 
need as opposed to preferences.
Given that there appears to be a systematic association between some types of SUN and 
‘residual’ utilisation and that it is possible that SUN captures unobserved needs (the first 
explanation above), it can be argued that SUN should be included in the utilisation 
models in the calculation of equity. I performed an additional test to examine whether 
the inclusion of SUN as a needs variable in utilisation models affected the estimates of 
income-related inequity in the use of specialist services (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed 
description of the methods to calculate inequity). I found a positive concentration index 
(Cl) for SUN due to wait, which means that there is a positive correlation between this 
type of SUN and income; and the other types of SUN have negative correlations with 
income (negative CIs). The contribution of SUN to inequity, which is calculated on the 
basis of each variable’s Cl, its marginal effect on utilisation and its prevalence, is very 
close to zero. Finally, the inclusion of SUN into the utilisation model does not change 
the estimate of income-related inequity in needs-adjusted utilisation (see Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6 Contribution of unmet need to income-related inequity in the total
num ber of specialist visits______________________________________________
M ean
C oncen tra tion
index
M arginal
Effect
C o n tribu tion  
to H I
SUN-wait 0.055 0.015 0.457 0.0003
SUN-barriers 0.024 -0.206 -0.094 0.0004
SUN- choice 0.028 -0.008 -0.204 0.0000
SUN-other 0.027 -0.041 0.257 -0.0002
Income-related inequity index 0.060
As an alternative to including SUN in the utilisation models, the different reasons for 
SUN could complement studies of equity measured in the conventional way. It appears 
that individuals with SUN due to barriers (Category 3) make fewer physician visits than 
expected, and they disproportionately represent lower income groups (there is a 
negative C l, Table 5.5). For these reasons, the specific barriers that individuals report 
may help to explain inequity in health care use.
Individuals who report unmet need, but who have in fact chosen not to seek health 
services (Category 2), are also using fewer services than expected. This is unlikely to 
violate equity goals if  it is considered to be acceptable for utilisation patterns to vary 
according to different preferences and individual choices. Conventional methods of 
measuring inequity may overestimate inequity if  individuals who choose not to seek 
needed health care are disproportionately drawn from the lower socioeconomic groups; 
although this does not appear to be the case.
The greatest proportion o f SUN relates to waiting times, a complaint that has been 
shown previously (Wilson & Rosenberg, 2004), and “other” reasons; these types o f 
SUN also have a positive association with residual utilisation. This finding suggests 
that it is unlikely that individuals with “other” SUN face barriers to the receipt o f care 
(Category 3), but, instead, they are more likely to have experienced ‘inadequate’ care
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(Category 4) or unmet expectations (Category 5). It is difficult to interpret the wait- 
related SUN, because, without further information on the length of time individuals 
were waiting, and for what services, it is difficult to assess the validity of their 
complaints. However, the categories of SUN are not mutually exclusive; along the care 
pathway, an individual may access primary care and then experience difficulties 
accessing higher levels of care, whether because waiting times are perceived to be too 
long, or for other reasons. The conceptualisation of unmet need, therefore, could be 
further developed to take into consideration the dynamic nature of perceived needs and 
access to health care. The equity implications of these two categories of SUN are also 
unclear. It is possible that these complaints (i.e. reporting unmet need) are legitimate, 
which means that they reflect unobserved needs or inadequate care that was received. If 
this is the case, then this type of SUN can be considered inequitable, whereby 
individuals in equal need are not being treated equally. However, if there are reasons 
why we might discount these preferences, because they do not reflect underlying needs 
or inadequacies in care, then there is less evidence of inequity.
Overall, this study has two main contributions to the literature. First, there appear to be 
at least four distinct groups of individuals who report unmet needs; these groups should 
be considered separately, as they each have different equity implications. Second, there 
is a systematic association between SUN and “residual” utilisation from conventional 
utilisation models that is mostly negative for SUN arising from individuals’ choices 
(Category 2) and barriers (Category 3) and mostly positive for SUN due to waiting and 
‘other’ reasons. These significant associations with residual utilisation imply that the 
conventional models of utilisation may be biased for two reasons: a) the measures of 
health status, even when comprehensive, do not adequately measure need for health 
care, and b) crude measures of utilisation that only measure the number of visits to a
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provider do not capture the quality and effectiveness of the services received. They also 
imply that unmet need, when measured subjectively, is not easily interpreted.
Further research is needed to increase our understanding of unmet need and its equity 
implications. Longitudinal data would allow us to control for the unobserved individual 
characteristics that may explain the association with residual utilisation. Information on 
the quality of care an individual received, in addition to the intensity of the care 
(measured not only in number of contacts, but amount of services or tests received per 
contact), would help address the question of whether unmet need relates more to quality 
as opposed to quantity. It would also be interesting to make use of clinical data sources 
to measure the prevalence of Category 1, i.e. with unperceived unmet needs, which may 
be important from a public policy perspective; tackling unperceived unmet need may 
yield health improvements. Further analyses could combine administrative data of 
health care utilisation, clinical information, such as diagnoses, and survey data. This 
research could begin to distinguish between the different categories of unmet need, 
could clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding the ‘other’ and waiting-time related 
unmet need groups, and could improve our understanding of the equity implications of 
unmet need. Section 6.2.3 in the proceeding chapter provides a discussion of the policy 
challenges associated with waiting times and unmet need, and suggests some additional 
avenues for future research.
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C h a p t e r  6: D is c u s s io n  o f  f in d in g s , p o l ic y  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g ic a l
IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has examined three aspects of equity in the Canadian health system. The 
findings of these three analyses build upon the empirical literature of equity in the use 
of health services in Canada. The findings also have policy implications and they raise 
some methodological questions; these implications highlight areas for future empirical 
investigation. This chapter begins with a broad summary of the results from the three 
empirical chapters (Section 6.1), then it will discuss the key policy implications 
(Section 6.2), and finally, it will review the main methodological strengths and 
limitations (Section 6.3). Suggestions for future research are integrated into the in- 
depth discussions of policy and methodological implications, because future research in 
this area should not only be relevant to current policy debates, but it should also go 
some way towards addressing the existing methodological challenges.
6.1 Summary of the empirical results
Equity goals in health care are espoused by most countries’ governments, including 
Canada’s. In Canada, the concern for equity appears at both the federal and provincial 
level. Motivated by the egalitarian belief that health care is a right, not a privilege, 
policy makers have been concerned with the distribution of health care in the 
population. They have also been motivated by the belief that if  utilisation patterns are 
equitable, there will be a reduction in health inequalities across social and other 
population groups. Translating this policy goal into a measurable objective is not 
straightforward, because there is no consensus on how to define some of the key
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concepts, such as equity, health care need, and access. Neither has a consensus been 
reached about the most appropriate, or accurate, way to measure equity in health care. 
Equitable access is often stated as a policy goal in national and provincial policy 
documents and in public consultations, although the measurable endpoint or proof of 
access is the actual receipt of health care. There appears to be some agreement among 
policy makers and researchers that equity should be assessed according to the extent 
that individuals receive health care on the basis of their level of need and not on their 
ability to pay.
In this thesis, inequity is identified when patterns of utilisation differ across individuals 
with the same level of health care need across income groups. For these analyses, I 
used two releases of a representative national health survey from Canada with 
information on socioeconomic status, health status and utilisation to examine three 
aspects of equity in the Canadian health system. Each of the three empirical studies is 
discussed in turn below.
6.1.1 Provincial variations in equity
An examination of equity in Canada must recognise that the provinces hold a large 
share of responsibility over the planning, management and funding of their individual 
systems; hence provincial system characteristics, health care reforms, and policy 
developments vary across the provinces. The provincial systems are guided by the 
federal Canada Health Act which enables the federal transfer payments to support 
provincial programmes. This Act serves as one of the main instruments of federal 
oversight in the system. Given that each provincial health system endorses equity
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objectives, the first empirical analysis in this thesis investigated the extent to which 
variations could be found across the provinces in the level of, and reasons for, income- 
related inequity in the use of GP, specialist, inpatient and dental services. Physician and 
hospital services are almost wholly publicly funded, whereas dental care is mostly 
privately funded; hence, income-related inequity was expected to be much higher in this 
sector. A recent international study showed this to be the case in Canada and most other 
countries (van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the OECD Health Equity Research Group 
Members, 2004). Therefore, I calculated inequity separately for each province and 
separately for each health care sector, and then I statistically decomposed the observed 
inequity into its measurable contributing factors.
For the different health care services, I considered two stages of health care use. The 
first stage was the initial contact with the provider, which can be viewed as mostly 
patient-led; and the second stage referred to the number of subsequent contacts, which 
can be viewed as largely provider-led (Evans, 1983). (Total utilisation was also 
measured, which captures the combined effect of the above two stages). In Canada, a 
referral from a GP is needed in order for a patient to access specialist care, and a 
specialist consultation precedes non-emergency inpatient admissions. However these 
higher level, or more specialised, services were also considered separately for the initial 
contact and for further contacts. Patients play less of a role in deciding whether to seek 
specialised care, because GPs serve a gatekeeping function, although patients can exert 
pressure on their GPs for referrals.
I first conducted a national-level analysis of recent survey data which confirmed some 
of the findings of previous studies. I found that there was a statistically significant, but 
modest, ‘pro-rich’ inequity in the probability of a GP visit, and ‘pro-poor’ inequity in
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the total number of GP visits and in the number of visits conditional on being a user. 
Specialist care was found to be more concentrated among the rich, although for the 
number of specialist visits made among those who had at least one visit, the level of 
pro-rich inequity was reduced. Hospital care was found to be more concentrated in the 
lower end of the income distribution. In contrast, inequity in dental care was 
significantly pro-rich; utilisation of dental services was much more concentrated in the 
upper end of the income distribution (although the level of inequity was reduced for the 
number of visits conditional on having one visit to a dentist).
Variations in the level of income-related inequity across the provinces were seen,
although there was no clear pattern across all of the health care sectors. Such a clear
pattern across the sectors would not necessarily be expected, since the potential factors
that give rise to inequity would be different in each of the sectors. The clearest
distinction is between dental care and the other sectors, since the former is mostly
privately financed and the latter is publicly financed. As a result of these differences in
financing, an individual’s ability to pay (measured by income) was expected to have a
much stronger effect on the decision to visit a dentist. In the more sparsely populated
1 1
provinces, I also expected to find a stronger effect of living in the capital city on 
utilisation, and I did find this effect was stronger in New Brunswick and Newfoundland 
than in the other provinces.
The level of variation across the provinces was the lowest in the extent of inequity in 
the use of GP services. At the stage of the initial contact with a GP, all provinces 
except one -  Prince Edward Island -  had an index of inequity that was close to, but
31 This is a proxy for supply of health care, given the capital cities have a disproportionate supply of 
providers (per capita), especially in the case of highly specialised care.
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significantly greater than, zero, which signals pro-rich inequity. This implies that, in all 
provinces, conditional on their need, individuals with higher income are slightly more 
likely to visit a GP than those with lower income. In contrast to the likelihood of a visit 
to a GP, the conditional number of GP visits had a distribution that was more 
concentrated among the lower income groups (the index of inequity was negative or 
close to zero). The total number of GP visits represents a combination of both of these 
stages of utilisation, the initial pro-rich inequity in the likelihood of a visit, and the 
subsequent pro-poor distribution. As a result, inequity in the total number of visits to a 
GP in most provinces was slightly negative or near zero.
The distinction between inequity in the initial contact with a GP and the subsequent 
contacts is important. It is possible that there is a greater acceptance by GPs of new 
patients who are among higher socioeconomic groups in the context of oversubscribed 
GPs, many of whom with closed patient lists (Glazier, 2007). The difference in inequity 
in these two stages of utilisation could also relate to different patterns of utilisation of 
preventive and curative care, whereby individuals with relative socioeconomic 
advantage may be more likely to schedule annual physical check-ups and engage in 
other preventive services. Evidence from both Canada and England suggests that there 
is a socioeconomic gradient in preventive service use (Dixon, Le Grand, Henderson et 
al., 2007; Glazier, Creatore, Gozdyra et al., 2004; Snider, Beauvais, Levy et al., 1997). 
Overall, it appears that, although individuals with higher income are more likely to visit 
a GP, there is no evidence of pro-rich inequity in accessing further GP services. This is 
an important achievement in the provincial health systems since GPs serve as the initial 
point of contact in the system for the majority of people. Moreover, GPs ensure 
continuity of care as the patient moves through the system. The finding that
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complementary insurance is one of the contributors to pro-rich inequity is important and 
one that I return to later.
I found that there was some variation across the Canadian provinces in the level of 
inequity in specialist care. In all provinces, specialist visits were more concentrated 
among higher income groups (with the exception of the index of inequity for the 
conditional number of specialist visits in Alberta, Manitoba, and New Brunswick which 
was negative, but not significant). This pro-rich inequity mostly could be explained by 
the direct effect of income, although higher education, residing in the capital city 
(capturing supply), and complementary insurance for prescription drugs also played a 
role. The highest level of inequity in specialist care was in Newfoundland (the inequity 
index was 0.08 for the probability and total number of visits, though much lower, 0.03, 
for the conditional number of visits). In this province, living in the capital city had the 
largest contribution to inequity, which implies that characteristics that are related to 
supply and geographical barriers explain some part of this relatively high level of 
inequity.
On the whole, individuals with higher income, higher education, holding prescription 
drug insurance and in some cases living in the capital city appear to have better access 
to specialist care, as indicated by their high rates of utilisation after controlling for 
needs. However, once the initial contact has been made, the level of inequity is reduced 
considerably, implying there may be difficulty gaining initial access to specialists which 
takes place through GP referrals. Indeed, one survey of GPs and specialists found that 
‘patients’ wishes’ was the most frequently cited non-medical factor accounting for a 
referral (Langley, MacLellan, Sutherland, & Till, 1992); the more vocal and demanding 
patients may have a greater likelihood of getting referred to specialists. In addition,
203
using physician claims data for Ontario in 1996, another study identified that referral 
rates were higher in lower income neighbourhoods; however, after controlling for 
disease prevalence which is also higher in low-income communities, the wealthiest 
neighbourhoods had a modest but significantly higher referral rate (Chan & Austin, 
2003). (Similar evidence was found in the United States; (Kikano, Schiaffino, & 
Zyzanski, 1996). Also, although the large part of specialist care is entirely publicly 
funded, some services do require payment, which may limit the accessibility of these 
services for those less able to pay . The delisting of some services in the past decade 
from the provincial insurance programmes would also have had the effect of introducing 
financial barriers to their use (Charles, Lomas, Giacomini et al., 1997; Fuller, Fuller, & 
Cohen, 2003; Stabile & Ward, 2005). If surveys included information on the type of 
specialist patients consulted, then inequity in specialist care could be disaggregated by 
medical speciality.
The explanations for inequity in specialist care are not straightforward, and clearly are 
not simply a function of ability to pay. It has been suggested that for specialist services 
with long waits, such as diagnostics, individuals with socioeconomic advantage may be 
able to game the system “through purchase of diagnostic tests that could allow them to 
jump the queue” (Canada, 2002a, p.8). Likewise, Kirby argued that better-off and more 
powerful individuals are better able to access services due to the fact that “they 
understand how the system works and have appropriate contacts in hospital service 
delivery and administration” (Canada, 2002b, p.xvi). Overall, people from higher 
socioeconomic groups appear to have an advantage over lower socioeconomic groups in 
availing themselves of needed services across the country.
32 For example some diagnostic services may not be covered, e.g. bone mineral density tests in the 
province of Ontario are only reimbursed once every three years and annually for high-risk patients, and 
most cosmetic services including those delivered by dermatologists.
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As expected due to its predominantly private funding, dental care exhibited significant 
inequity across all provinces. As seen with specialist care, in Newfoundland, the level 
of inequity in dental care was higher than in the rest of the country (inequity index is 
0.16), although high levels of inequity were also seen in two other Atlantic provinces: 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In all of the provinces, inequity appeared to mostly 
be driven by the direct income effect, but also by dental care insurance. With regards to 
the latter, individuals with dental insurance are both more likely to be higher income 
and are more likely to visit a dentist and visit more frequently. In Newfoundland, both 
income and insurance contributed to the high level of inequity, as did living in the 
capital city, where dentists are in greater supply. In this province, less than half the 
population is covered by dental insurance, much lower than the national average of 62% 
(though not as low as in Quebec where it is 46% and inequity is not quite as high), and 
the marginal effect of holding such insurance on the likelihood of a dentist visit was 
higher in Newfoundland than in the other provinces.
There were quite different patterns of inpatient hospital utilisation than those found in 
the other health care sectors. Also, wide variations in the levels of inequity in inpatient 
hospital care were found across the provinces. In some provinces, there was a 
significant pro-poor distribution in both the probability of admission and the total 
number of nights spent in hospital, although in most provinces, there was a non­
significant trend in this direction. The estimates of inequity in hospital inpatient service 
utilisation were more sensitive to the assumption of linearity than the estimates of 
inequity in the other sectors. Moreover, due to methodological limitations with 
measuring inequity in inpatient care, these results should be interpreted with caution 
(see Section 6.3.3 for further discussion of these limitations). However, this aggregate
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level examination of the utilisation patterns showed little evidence of inequity in the 
direction of the rich.
Overall, the trends that I observed in this analysis suggest that the value of equity is 
embraced across the country, and health systems have been broadly organised and 
managed in ways that are consistent with this shared value. However, there remain a 
few challenges with respect to the use of specialist and dental services, in addition to the 
initial contact with a GP.
6.1.2 Prescription drug insurance as a contributor to inequity
The causes of inequity in a publicly-funded system that consistently supports equity 
goals relate to a complex array of individual and system-level factors. It is likely that 
individuals with personal connections to health care professionals, high levels of health 
literacy, and confidence in expressing their demands for treatment will be able to secure 
better and even timelier services than those without these advantages. However, policy 
makers are interested in the factors contributing to inequity that can be attributed to 
system characteristics and that are mutable to policy, as opposed to individual 
characteristics or preferences.
Physician services are almost completely publicly funded; however, this thesis found 
some evidence of an inequitable distribution of utilisation favouring higher income 
groups. Moreover, in the previous study of provincial variations, complementary 
insurance appeared to be one of the contributors to inequity. Data did not permit the 
separation of type of insurance into public (government programme), private employer-
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based plan, and individually purchased plans; though the relative role of these three 
plans in explaining inequity likely differ. It was possible to investigate this relationship 
in greater depth in one province of Canada, Ontario, by examining the effect of the 
different types of insurance an individual had on the use of physician services and the 
level of inequity therein.
Prescription drugs outside hospital represent a unique component of health care in 
Canada because of the mixed model of financing for this sector that draws on out-of- 
pocket payments and private insurance, although with some variations across the 
provinces (more discussion can be found in Section 6.2.2). The federal government 
assists in the financing of physician and hospital services in the provinces under the 
legal framework of the Canada Health Act. However, for services outside physician 
and hospital sectors, notably ambulatory prescription drugs and long-term care services, 
each province can decide the level of public subsidy at their own discretion. 
Considerable harmonisation of the provincial plans for these services can be seen. In 
the case of prescription drugs, all provinces provide public insurance for low-income 
individuals receiving social assistance, and most provinces also provide public 
insurance for the population aged 65 and over (either the whole older population or just 
those with lower income). Private health insurance covers about two-thirds of the 
population, and this funds about one-third of the total cost of prescription drugs.
Chapter 4 therefore explored the equity impact of prescription drug insurance on 
publicly-funded physician service utilisation. Due to the complementary nature of 
prescription drugs and physician services, whereby prescription drugs can only be 
obtained through physicians, individuals who face the full cost of prescription drugs 
may be deterred from visiting a physician. It is likely that awareness of the cost of
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prescription drugs would have the strongest impact on the initial decision to contact a 
physician, as shown previously (Stabile, 2001). It is also likely that the impact would 
be greater for an acute condition. Thus, the stage of utilisation at which the greatest 
effect of insurance coverage on utilisation would be expected was for the likelihood of a 
GP visit, and this effect likely would be stronger among individuals without any chronic 
condition. It was also expected that, due to the institutional arrangements for the 
financing of prescription drugs, private insurance would be held disproportionately by 
individuals with higher income, and public insurance by those with low income. 
Therefore, it was expected that the former would be an important contributor to pro-rich 
inequity in physician (especially GP) care, and the latter would contribute negatively, 
thereby reducing inequity.
The results provide some support for these hypotheses, as I found a positive and 
significant effect of holding any type of prescription drug insurance on the likelihood of 
visiting a GP, and the effect was stronger for those with no chronic conditions than for 
individuals with one or more conditions. However, I also found a positive and 
significant effect of prescription drug insurance on the conditional number of GP visits 
and the likelihood of a specialist visit, and I demonstrated that insurance also 
contributed to inequity in these areas, though to a less extent. Indeed, the contribution 
of private insurance to inequity in the probability of a GP visit was almost 40%. For the 
conditional number of GP visits, private insurance also had a positive contribution to 
inequity (i.e. made it less pro-poor) by 15%, for specialist care it contributed about one- 
third to the inequity in the probability of a visit, and it increased the level of inequity in 
the conditional number of visits by about 8%. This empirical analysis showed that 
individuals appeared to be affected by the cost of complementary goods, and this effect 
was seen not only at the point of initial contact with the system but also in subsequent
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contacts. Private insurance had the expected positive contribution to inequity, while 
public insurance reduced this inequity. Policies to improve equity in the receipt of 
health services, therefore, need to look beyond the public system to explore possible 
interactions with privately funded services.
6.1.3 Subjective unmet need
The first two empirical chapters investigated equity in the Canadian health system using 
methods of regression and concentration indices, whereby differences in needs-adjusted 
utilisation across socioeconomic groups signalled inequity. The three main limitations 
associated with this conventional method of measuring equity are: that it does not 
account for potentially acceptable variations in utilisation such as those driven by 
individuals’ informed choices; that it relies on reported ill-health to measure need for 
health care, which may or may not be accurate; and that it does not capture the 
qualitative aspects beyond the number of contacts. Therefore, an alternative, or 
complementary, metric of equity could derive from the measurement of unmet need. In 
the literature, unmet need that is measured subjectively through surveys is typically 
interpreted as representing barriers to accessing care; thus, unmet need could be seen to 
violate equity goals. Little effort has been made to understand the link between unmet 
need and conventional methods of analysing equity in utilisation. This thesis’s third 
empirical analysis advanced the empirical research in the following ways: a) by 
developing a conceptualisation for different types of unmet need, b) by exploring the 
relationship between these different types of unmet need and unexplained utilisation, 
and c) by discussing the implications for analyses of equity.
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The conceptual framework distinguishes different types of unmet need, each with 
different potential equity implications. These include unmet need which is chosen (an 
individual may decide not to seek needed care) or not chosen (an individual may face 
insurmountable barriers to access), and unmet need that is related to inadequacies with 
the care that was received (an individual received care that was of poor quality, was 
ineffective in improving health, or was perceived to be unsatisfactory). The equity 
implications of these types of unmet need differ, as do their hypothesised associations 
with utilisation. When unmet need arises from individuals making a choice not to seek 
needed care, it may not be considered inequitable. However, when individuals face 
barriers to accessing needed care, this can be considered as in violation of the equal 
goal. Moreover, to the extent that this type of unmet need is disproportionately 
affecting lower socioeconomic groups, it may also contribute to income-related or 
socioeconomic inequity in health care use. The other types of unmet need have 
implications for equity that are less clear. When needed care that was received was 
ineffective or of poor quality, then the resulting unmet need could be considered 
inequitable. However, the perception that the health services that were received were 
unsatisfactory may or may not be inequitable; this depends on whether that perception 
was based on actual clinical inadequacies or whether it could be attributed to personal 
preferences and tendencies towards complaint.
By modelling health care utilisation with the conventional method, I examined the 
association between different types of unmet need with “residual”, or unexplained, 
utilisation (measured as the difference between actual and predicted utilisation). 
Negative residual utilisation would imply that individuals who report an unmet need use 
fewer health services than the amount that would be predicted on the basis of their 
measurable characteristics; such under-use would be expected for individuals who faced
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barriers to accessing care. A positive association with residual utilisation could arise 
from unobserved need characteristics in the utilisation model, such that individuals 
reporting unmet need actually need more health care services than is captured by the 
available health and demographic variables. Alternatively, a positive association may 
reflect unmeasured personal preferences for more care alongside personal tendencies to 
be dissatisfied with care that was received (in this way, subjective unmet need could be 
seen as a measure of dissatisfaction; (Kasman & Badley, 2004). Finally, a greater 
degree of unexplained utilisation among people who reported unmet need could reflect 
inadequacy in the measurement of utilisation that does not capture the quality of the 
care that was received.
The results of this empirical analysis revealed different associations with residual 
utilisation across the different types of unmet need. For two types of unmet need, that 
which was chosen, and that which arose from barriers to access, there was a negative 
association with residual utilisation, as hypothesised; these types of unmet need were 
associated with a reduction in the ‘unexplained’ part of utilisation. However, the other 
types of unmet need, owing to “other” reasons or waiting too long, were associated with 
increased residual utilisation. I provided some empirical support for the theory that 
personal preferences explained some of this ‘overuse’, although the associations 
between SUN and unexplained utilisation suggest that there may be limitations in the 
underlying utilisation models.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the equity implications of unmet need depend on the 
type of unmet need reported. The majority of individuals who reported unmet need 
could be grouped into the wait-related unmet need and unmet need due to “other” 
(unspecified) reasons; a minority reported unmet need due to barriers and personal
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choices. The equity implications of these different types of unmet need vary. For 
individuals who chose not to seek needed care, although they appear to be have less- 
than-expected level of utilisation, it can be argued that equity goals are not being 
compromised. In contrast, when unmet need arose due to barriers to access, there was 
also lower unexplained utilisation, yet there is a strong case for this type of unmet need 
to constitute inequity. However, the equity implications of the other two groups, which 
have a positive association with residual utilisation, are less clear. Provided these 
complaints can be viewed as legitimate and representing some degree of unmeasured 
need, then this type of unmet need is inequitable. However, if there are reasons why 
these complaints would not be viewed as legitimate (for instance if they are not 
supported by clinical assessment of need), there is less evidence of a violation of equity 
goals.
6.2 Implications for policy
The empirical analyses conducted in this thesis demonstrated that the magnitude of 
income-related inequity in health service utilisation in Canada was not great; however, 
there were some specific areas that deserved some attention. This section will describe 
some of the key policy themes that emerge from the findings of this thesis, and it will 
outline some of the areas that are needed for future research.
First, it is important to ask what level of inequity would be considered significant from 
a policy perspective. In a recent editorial the authors asked two questions: “How much 
inequality of access and/or outcome is acceptable? Indeed, how much is addressable by 
public policy?” (Deber & Lewis, 2007, p. 118) The same questions could be posed of
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these analyses of equity in health care utilisation: how close to a zero index of inequity 
should we strive for, and to what extent can policies effectively reduce any existing 
inequity? The first is a normative question that can be addressed on the basis of the 
political processes that lead to the setting of policy objectives in light of the trade-offs 
associated with potentially conflicting objectives. One such trade-off is between equity 
and efficiency objectives. There are some reasons why inefficiencies may result from 
the pursuit of equity goals. One example relates to the allocation of specialist services 
in an equitable way, such that individuals would face the same distance and time costs 
of access. In a country the size and low population density of Canada, this goal would 
be extremely inefficient and, on any reasonable calculation of social welfare, would 
almost certainly outweigh any equity gains. Alternatively, some have argued that 
depending on how equity and efficiency are defined, these goals do not necessarily have 
to conflict. By taking a weighted utilitarian perspective based on weighted quality- 
adjusted life years, for example, then social welfare could be maximised taking account 
of both equity and efficiency objectives. Moreover, Culyer has repeatedly argued that 
there is no conflict between equity and efficiency objectives if  equity is defined on the 
basis of the consequentialist approach with the end goals being the maximisation of 
health and minimisation of health inequality and efficiency is defined as the maximising 
of health with available health care resources (Culyer, 1988; Culyer, 2006; Culyer,
2007). However, the second question that asks what policies can do to reduce inequity 
is an empirical question that this thesis goes some way to address.
The first empirical analysis identified that dental insurance enabled dental service use, 
whereby insurance increased both the likelihood of a visit to a dentist and the number of 
visits made in a year. Moreover, insurance was found to be one of the main 
contributors to the pro-rich inequity in dental care, and it explained some of the
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provincial variations. This section will begin with an exploration of the policy context 
of dental care financing, and will identify some research areas that are needed to inform 
policy (Section 6.2.1).
The first two empirical analyses investigated, first, provincial variations in equity and, 
second, the role of prescription drug insurance in explaining inequity. These analyses 
underscore the pressing issue facing policy makers in Canada that is to decide how to 
fund prescription drugs in a way that is consistent with the broader equity objectives in 
the system. Therefore, Section 6.2.2 will discuss the current state of prescription drug 
coverage across the provinces to identify some policy options to improve equity and 
reduce provincial variations. Moreover, it will suggest areas for future research that 
would help to inform these policy decisions.
The third empirical analysis raised important questions about the current approaches 
that are used to measure equity in the system. It highlighted the need to look beyond 
crude measures of need and utilisation to capture the quality of individuals’ health care 
contacts, including the length of time patients had to wait for care. The important 
policy challenge to reduce waiting times is currently a high priority in Canadian 
provinces. Section 6.2.3 will explore the association between perceived waiting times 
and dissatisfaction, and will identify some of the gaps in our knowledge on unmet need 
and waiting times that could be addressed with additional research.
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6.2.1 Dental care- what is the role for public funding?
6.2.1.1 Policy context
In Chapter 3 of this thesis I found that the greatest level of income-related inequity in 
Canada was in the use of dentist services; the index of inequity was at least twice that of 
specialist service use in almost all of the provinces. Dental insurance, which is nearly 
always private (employer or group-based), not only significantly and substantially 
increased the likelihood of a visit to a dentist and the number of visits, but also 
contributed to pro-rich inequity almost as much as income itself. In other words, 
individuals with insurance and higher income used more dental services, after adjusting 
for demographic and other socioeconomic variables; these findings are consistent with 
previous studies (Bhatti, Rana, & Grootendorst, 2007; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & the 
OECD Health Equity Research Group Members, 2004).
Inequity in dental care is not surprising given that dental health services have been left 
to the market in Canada. Dental care services are provided by self-regulated private 
practitioners, they are paid for almost wholly privately through private insurance or 
direct payments out of pocket, and dental fees are not regulated. With regards to 
financing, in 2007, 95.5% of dental costs were paid for privately; out-of-pocket 
payments made up 45% of private dental expenditures and private insurance made up 
the remainder (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007b). The organisational 
features of the dental sector stand in sharp contrast to those health services provided in 
hospital and by ambulatory physicians.
To the extent that dental care contributes to health improvement, and the equity goals 
that are clearly supported for other health improving services can be extended to dental
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services, a case can be made for ensuring individuals in need of dental care do not 
confront financial barriers to their access. There is evidence that, although oral health 
problems are not life threatening, they can have a significant impact on health and well­
being (Petersen, 2003), and that dental care can improve oral health (Guay, 2006; 
Sintonen & Linnosmaa, 2000). Furthermore, studies have consistently demonstrated 
that there exist inequalities in oral health: lower income groups, new immigrants and 
those without dental insurance consistently report poorer oral health status than those 
with higher income, dental insurance, and non-immigrants (Brodeur, Payette, & Bedos, 
1998; Leake & Main, 1996; Locker & Matear, 2001). These findings imply that there is 
some reason to be concerned with dental utilisation patterns among these population 
groups.
Dental costs may prevent individuals with low income from using services. Studies 
have documented the effects of dental costs on utilisation, in particular among those 
with lower income. In the United States, the Rand study demonstrated that individuals 
were sensitive to the price of dental services; there was a strong negative effect of co- 
insurance on dental expenditures (Manning, Bailit, Benjamin, & Newhouse, 1985). 
Since then, studies from high-income countries have also shown a strong income effect 
on dental service utilisation, for example, in Sweden (Wamala, Merlo, & Bostrom,
2006), Greece (Zavras, Economou, & Kvriopoulos, 2004), the United Kingdom 
(McGrath, Bedi, & Dhawan, 1999), Finland (Nguyen & Hakkinen, 2004), the United 
States (Manski & Goldfarb, 1996), and Canada (Bedos, Brodeur, Benigeri, & Olivier, 
2004; Kosteniuk & d’Arcy, 2006; Millar & Locker, 1999).
The concentration of dental service use among the rich, coupled with the significant 
effect of insurance on dentist utilisation, to some extent reflects recent trends in
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financing dental care in Canada. The level o f the public contribution to finance dental 
care has declined since its peak in 1982, yet total dental costs have risen as a proportion 
of total spending on health (Figure 6.1). The peak in public funding corresponds to the 
introduction of programmes to subsidise dental costs for school children in the 1970s 
and 1980s in most provinces (the first such programme was in Saskatchewan, followed 
by British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island), and 
for seniors (in Alberta and the Northwest Territories) (Leake, 2006; Marchildon, 2005). 
The subsequent decline in the public role reflected the dismantling or reduction o f such 
programmes; cost containment was prioritised in a time when provinces were faced 
with struggling economies and reduced federal funding.
Figure 6.1 Trends in dental expenditure in Canada, 1975-2007: total expenditure 
on dental care as a proportion of total health expenditure, and public expenditure 
on dental care as a proportion of total dental expenditure
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Currently, much of the public funding for dental care comes in the form of tax 
exemptions for employment-based dental insurance premiums 33. This regressive
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system of tax exemptions for private insurance contributions rewards the most affluent. 
Therefore, substantial subsidies for dental care are directed to the higher income earners 
(which has the effect of enabling utilisation for these groups), although there is little 
support for those on lower income. This public support for dental services for the 
higher income groups is inequitable; arguably, it is also inefficient, because the subsidy 
does not account for the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness, of the services that are 
being subsidised.
In addition to this public subsidy through the tax system, the remainder of public 
funding is directed to a patchwork of programmes subsidising dental costs for children 
and low-income families. These programmes are fragmented, for example, in one 
health region in Alberta, there are 17 different options for public subsidy for children, 
social assistance recipients, veterans and Aboriginals34.
Would a national publicly funded dental programme reduce the level of inequity in 
dental care? A proposal such as this is not new. For example the 1964 Royal 
Commission on Health Services recommended the incremental implementation of 
children’s and maternal dental programmes in addition to funding dental care for social 
assistance recipients (Canada, 1964). Also, Evans and Williamson advocated for a
33 Estimates of the public expenditure on services covered by private insurance (mostly dental costs and 
prescription drugs) in the form of foregone taxes were roughly £3 billion in 1994 (Smythe, 2001), which 
is equivalent to about 4% of total health spending that year.
34 For example the Alberta Child Health Benefit covers routine dental services for children under the age 
of 18 in low-income families, Calgary Health Region Community Dental Clinics offer reduced dental fees 
for children and adults with limited income and no insurance based on income and family size, and 
Alberta Adult Health Benefit covers basic services for pregnant women, disabled people with eligibility 
based on income. More information can be found here:
http://www.calgarvhealthregion.ca/programs/dental/pdf/how to get dental tx guide2007Qct.pdf 
(Accessed June 2008)
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public school-based children’s dental programme on the basis that this programme 
would not only have the greatest potential for increasing utilisation rates among the 
non-users and hence improving oral health, but it would also enable the increase in the 
use of dental auxiliaries to improve efficiency in delivery (Evans & Williamson, 1978). 
They contrasted this proposal to a universal plan that they argued would have little 
impact on utilisation, it would perpetuate the existing inefficiencies, and it would 
increase the public subsidy for the relatively higher income groups who consume the 
largest proportion of dental care. Some evidence suggests that the targeted use of public 
funding, such as in the case of Nova Scotia’s children’s programme, can achieve a more 
equitable distribution of dental service utilisation (Ismail & Sohn, 2001). Municipal 
programmes that are in place in other provinces, such as in Ontario in the city of 
Toronto, have not been systematically evaluated, although apparently they have been 
unsuccessful in meeting the needs of the uninsured population (Toronto Public Health, 
2008). Therefore, some proposals have been put forward to develop a province-wide 
policy on access to dental care in order to standardise the services covered under the 
current government-funded programmes, and to include dental services in the list of 
primary health care services that are provided by community health centres and by other 
agencies that deliver services to the working poor and other marginalised groups 
(Toronto Public Health, 2008). To provide some evidence to support these and other 
policy recommendations, additional research could empirically assess the potential 
impacts of the different policy options, it could identify the causes of inequity, and it 
could improve the measurement of needed dental care.
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6.2.1.2 Future research on equity in dental care
Inequity is higher in dental care utilisation than the other three health care sectors; this 
relates to the heavy reliance on private funding for dental services. It also relates to the 
nature of the services themselves, since many could be characterised as cosmetic or not 
clinically essential. However the data that are currently available do not enable us to 
distinguish between essential and non-essential dental services.
There is evidence that dental care improves health (Guay, 2006; Sintonen & Linnosmaa, 
2000); therefore, there are reasons to be concerned with the distribution of dental 
services in the population. However, not all dental services are health-improving.
Since the widespread fluoridation of the water supply in urban areas and the use of 
fluoride toothpaste, oral diseases have declined significantly over recent decades in 
high-income countries (Nandanovsky & Sheiham, 1995). This decline has led to a 
corresponding decline in the need for dentists; to some extent, dentists have responded 
by redefining dentistry towards more cosmetic care. Since these cosmetic services are 
not clinically essential, policy makers are not concerned with the extent to which 
utilisation is determined by ability to pay. (Similar arguments have been made for 
health services that are not needed or effective in improving health; e.g. (Culyer, 1993)). 
Further research is needed to determine the level of inequity in needed services versus 
cosmetic services; research is also needed to measure the contribution of non-essential 
services to the current estimates of inequity in overall utilisation.
The design of the relevant questions in the available surveys currently does not permit 
such analyses. The question in the CCHS that was asked of all respondents, and that 
was analysed in this thesis (in Chapter 3), referred to the number of visits that were
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made to a dentist or orthodontist in the past 12 months. Visits to a dentist and to an 
orthodontist should be separated; arguably, orthodontic services more often are directed 
towards cosmetic, and less clinically essential, services (e.g. expensive braces to correct 
imperfections in the alignment and appearance of the teeth). It is possible that the 
orthodontic services increased the estimate of inequity. Supplementary survey modules 
on dental care and oral health were available in the CCHS from 2003 (wave 2.1) only 
for two provinces (British Columbia and Ontario). These supplementary questions to 
some extent allowed the separation of preventive services and emergency services, but 
they did not include information on the use of cosmetic services, such as tooth 
whitening. Also, there is no information on how much money was spent on dental care. 
If the Survey of Household Spending, which includes information on the amount of 
money a household spent on dental services, could be linked to the CCHS, it would be 
possible to measure the average intensity of the visits.
Since dental services are not publicly funded (with the exception of emergency dental 
care delivered in hospitals), it is not possible, as it is with hospital and physician 
services, to link survey with administrative claims data. Collaboration with insurance 
companies to access claims data would be one possible route to addressing some of 
these questions.
A final concern with the policy relevance of the current research on dental care is that 
the ability to measure individuals’ need for dental care is limited with the existing 
surveys. Some services are preventive, and, therefore, would be needed by the entire 
dentate population. For other services, self-assessed poor oral health may not 
necessarily indicate need for dental care. For example, an individual with fewer teeth 
may have less need for dental care, but would report his oral health as poor. In this
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thesis I relied on self-assessed oral health that was measured in five categories (as for 
self-assessed health) to approximate need for dental care. However, this indicator does 
not always appear to be a prompter of dental service use: poor self-assessed oral health 
is negatively associated with the probability of visiting a dentist, and it is positively 
associated with the conditional number of dentist visits. There has been very little 
investigation of the validity of this indicator, as has been done extensively with its 
health counterpart. The supplementary oral health component of the CCHS completed 
by respondents in Ontario and British Columbia included a greater number of potential 
needs indicators, such as mouth pain, bleeding, and ability to chew. However, even the 
inclusion of a wider range of needs indicators did not affect the estimates of inequity 
(Grignon, Hurley, Wang et al., 2008). Therefore, it may be more useful to disentangle 
the preventive or emergency dental care from the measures of dental utilisation as 
opposed to developing better indicators of need. This approach will enable us to 
identify the population groups who receive fewer needed services than other, likely 
more socioeconomically advantaged, groups. Public subsidy of needed dental care 
could then be directed towards these groups.
6.2.2 Prescription drug coverage in Canada
6.2.2.1 Policy context
The findings from this thesis have implications for the policy debates about funding 
prescription drugs in Canada. First, the analyses demonstrated that there was a 
significant independent effect of holding either public or private prescription drug 
insurance on individuals’ decisions to visit a physician, in particular for those visits that 
were likely to have arisen from an acute condition. Second, I found that inequity in the 
likelihood of visiting a GP partly could be explained by private insurance; individuals
with higher income were more likely to have private prescription drug insurance and 
were also more likely to have visited a GP. Third, some jof the variations in income- 
related inequity in physician use across provinces appeared to be related to differences 
in the contribution of prescription drug insurance. This evidence raises the question: 
would better integration of prescription drugs into the public insurance system help 
policy makers to achieve equity goals?
The funding of prescription drugs is unique; unlike the funding of hospital and 
physician services, there is a significant private role in funding prescription drugs, 
which comes in the form of private insurance and out-of-pocket payments. The 
reimbursement of the costs of prescriptions drugs outside hospital is not mandated by 
any federal legislation, such as the Canada Health Act; this Act refers to physician and 
hospital costs, and the provinces are, therefore, left to establish and fund their own 
public programmes. The lack of a comprehensive national pharmaceutical strategy can 
be attributed to long-held fears of rapid cost increases. There is relative consistency in 
the breadth and depth of public plans for prescription drugs across the provinces, 
although, there are some differences in the eligibility criteria and the cost sharing 
arrangements. Moreover, there is a lack of portability of public prescription drug plans 
across the country. Individuals who are covered by a provincial prescription drug plan 
likely would lose their benefits if they moved to another province, and they would face 
a three month wait period before they would become eligible for public coverage in the 
new province (Applied Management in association with Fraser Group and Tristat 
Resources, 2000a).
This policy context gives rise to at least three potential sources of inequity. One is the 
possibility that individuals are uninsured. The uninsured face the full cost of
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prescriptions (up to a certain limit, since in most provinces there is some form of 
catastrophic coverage), which could deter both the use of and adherence to prescription 
medicines, and also the decision to visit a physician. The second source of inequity is 
the possibility that individuals are under-insured, such that the cost sharing 
arrangements of their public or private insurance plans act as financial barriers to these 
same services. The third source of inequity is the potential for individuals to face 
different cost barriers depending on which province they reside in, because of different 
eligibility requirements for public plans and different levels of cost sharing.
With regards to the problem of un- and under-insurance, there have been some studies 
that have estimated the proportion of Canadians who are not well insured against the 
cost of prescription drugs. One such study suggested that 2% of the Canadian 
population had no protection against severe drug expenses (as defined by expenses that 
exceeded $5000 per year), and 10% were only partially protected (Fraser Group/ Tristat 
Resources, 2002; Paris & Docteur, 2007). Another study estimated that 10% of the 
population were without insurance for prescription drugs and a further 10% had 
inadequate coverage (Applied Management in association with Fraser Group and Tristat 
Resources, 2000b). The lack of financial protection was found to be disproportionately 
in the Atlantic provinces. Even though the majority of Canadians have some form of 
insurance for prescription drugs, the average Canadian family is estimated to spend over 
$1200 per year on prescription drugs (Canada, 2002a). This estimated out-of-pocket 
expenditure likely is closer to zero for the young and healthy population groups, but it 
would be considerably higher for those with chronic diseases that are not included in a 
provincial disease-based public insurance plan. Also, a study of pharmaceutical 
expenditures showed that in the second half of the 1980s, at a time when public 
insurance programmes were more generous than at present, per capita out of pocket
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drug expenses of higher income households were actually lower than those of lower 
income households, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of income (Lexchin, 
1996).
Inadequate insurance for prescription drugs disproportionately harms the more 
vulnerable population groups who are less able to pay for the costs of medicines in the 
case of being uninsured, and less able to cover the co-payments in the case of being 
under-insured. The public health system in Canada that provides universal first-dollar 
coverage of the population to a comprehensive basket of physician and hospital protects 
the majority of the population from the costs of falling ill. However, there are some 
groups that may disproportionately face barriers to accessing health care, such as the 
homeless, Aboriginal peoples, and the ‘working poor’. The working poor refer to those 
who have incomes that are too high to qualify for full public subsidisation of 
prescription drugs (through qualification for social assistance) but are not employed in 
sectors that offer drug insurance benefits. There appears to have been a growth in ‘non- 
standard’ employment and ‘vulnerable workers’ in Canada in recent years, which may 
have increased the number of uninsured. Vulnerable workers are characterised by low 
pay (less than 10$/hour in 2005 prices), and poor access to rights, benefits and supports 
(Saunders, 2008). They are unlikely to be covered by any extended insurance plans 
(covering prescription drugs outside hospital, rehabilitative services outside hospital, 
vision care, and dental care). Non-standard employment, i.e. not being a full-time 
employee with a single employer of indefinite duration, has increased to almost 40% of 
total employment; and some of these may include vulnerable workers (Saunders, 2008). 
These are the populations who likely would benefit from an extension of public 
prescription drug insurance programmes; the potential benefits would include an 
improvement in adherence, a removal of indirect barriers to physician care, and a
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reduction of the financial burdens of ill health. Moreover, extended public coverage 
would reduce the perverse incentives that some individuals currently face, whereby they 
may choose not to seek employment in order to maintain their drug coverage (the 
‘benefits trap’). The challenges facing the more vulnerable workers likely would 
increase in periods of economic recession and high levels of unemployment.
The third source of inequity is the potential for individuals to be treated differently 
across provinces. The mix of public and private funding for prescription drugs and the 
arrangements for public insurance plans differ across the country. The lowest reliance 
on private funding is in Alberta (41% of total prescription drug expenditure was private 
in 2005) and the highest is in the Atlantic provinces: 56.5% in New Brunswick, 54% in 
Newfoundland and PEI, 51% in Nova Scotia (Canadian Institute for Health Information,
2008). These differences in spending correspond to variations in the systems of public 
coverage for prescription drugs, including different levels and types of cost sharing; the 
Atlantic provinces provide the least generous public coverage in the country (Anis,
Guh, & Wang, 2001; Coombes, Morgan, Barer, & Palgliccia, 2004; Demers, Melo, 
Jackevicius et al., 2008; Gregoire, MacNeil, & Skilton, 2001; Grootendorst, 2002; 
Grootendorst, Palfrey, Willison, & Hurley, 2003; Millar, 1999). One study that 
examined the variations across provinces in the level of out-of-pocket payments 
required for individuals in different health and demographic scenarios led the authors to 
conclude that “prescription drug reimbursement in Canada is manifestly unequal” 
(Demers, Melo, Jackevicius et al., 2008, p.409). In sum, not only do individuals in 
similar income and age groups face different levels and options for coverage across the 
country, but also there is considerable heterogeneity in coverage within provinces.
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These equity implications are compounded by the increasing importance prescription 
drugs are playing in the health system. Pharmaceuticals currently represent the second 
largest category of health spending in Canada, the first is hospital spending (Canadian 
Institute for Health Information, 2008). Drugs constituted 9.5% of total health care 
expenditure in 1985 compared to 16.8% in 2007. The rising cost of prescription drugs 
has been attributed to increased utilisation (accounting for over half of the rise in 
spending) in addition to changes in therapeutic choice, and less attributed to increases in 
drug prices (Morgan, 2004), similar to analyses from the province of British Columbia 
(Morgan, 2002; Morgan, Agnew, & Barer, 2004). Also the majority of prescription 
drug expenditure is concentrated among five therapeutic classes (Morgan, 2004). At the 
margin, however, it is important to consider the implications of high-cost hospital- 
administered cancer drugs for both cost concerns and also equity (Richards, 2008).
The variability across provinces and fragmentation of funding within provinces has 
prompted calls for a national approach to “pharmacare” to establish uniform standards 
of coverage across the country (see Appendix 6A for more information). A programme 
to fund prescription drugs that was parallel to Medicare would arguably improve equity 
in access to medicines in addition to distribute the burden of costs more equitably 
(Evans, 2005). The policy options are not straightforward; though some lessons can be 
learned from the experiences in provinces that have introduced ‘universal’ prescription 
drug programmes, further research is needed to assess the potential benefits and 
challenges to equity goals that would be associated with the different options.
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6.2.2.2 Future policy-relevant research on prescription drugs and equity
The challenge of reforming the system for financing prescription drugs is one of the 
mostly widely discussed policy issues in Canada at present. In recent years, several 
proposals have been put forward to provide better protection for Canadians from the 
financial burden of prescription drug costs, and to harmonise the funding arrangements 
across the provinces (see Appendix 6A). Studies have documented a significant effect 
of insurance status on prescription drug expenditure and utilisation (Gemmill, Thomson, 
& Mossialos, 2008; Lexchin & Grootendorst, 2004a; Stabile, 2002). This thesis 
supports previous research by demonstrating an enabling effect of prescription drug 
insurance coverage on the decision to see a physician (Stabile, 2001), an effect that 
appears to be stronger among those with lower income (Stabile, 2002), and with no 
chronic conditions.
As outlined above, this policy context gives rise to at least three sources of inequity: the 
possibility of being uninsured, the possibility of being underinsured, and the provincial 
variations in financial burden. There are some questions that remain unanswered that 
can be empirically tested in order to inform the policy debate surrounding the funding 
of prescription drugs and equity in the health care system. What population groups are 
uninsured or under-insured? What would the equity impact be of extending current 
insurance plans to additional population groups or of reducing cost sharing for those 
with insurance?
Studies have been conducted to identify the population groups who are at greater risk of 
being uninsured. However, further evaluation of the existing provincial plans that aim 
to be universal in Quebec, British Columbia and Manitoba could provide some insight
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into the possible methods to increase coverage. These experiences of implementing 
universal prescription drug insurance have been evaluated, however further research is 
needed to assess the equity impacts of these reforms. Quebec was the first province to 
implement a prescription drug programme that covers the entire population with the aim 
“to ensure that all persons in Quebec have reasonable and fair access to the medication 
required by their state of health” (Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1996). It has been 
described as a public-private social insurance scheme (Marchildon, 2006). The law 
states: that all residents are legally obligated to have some form of drug insurance 
coverage, either through the public insurance agency or a private insurer; that all 
insurance plans must cover the drugs listed in the provincial formulary; that no insured 
can pay more than $881 per year for drug costs; and co-insurance cannot exceed 29% of 
drug costs (Pomey, Forest, Palley, & Martin, 2007). With the exception of low-income 
seniors, social assistance recipients and children, all publicly insured share the cost of 
medicines through income-rated premiums, deductibles and co-payments. As in 
Quebec, all residents of Manitoba are eligible for the public drug benefit programme 
(although take-up is not legally mandated) with an income-based deductible (except for 
social assistance recipients who have full coverage). Most recently, British Columbia 
shifted from an age-based to an income-based prescription drug insurance programme, 
called “Fair PharmaCare”. This reform aimed to reduce programme spending, to 
improve fairness by allocating subsidies on the basis of ability to pay, as opposed to 
age, and to improve equity in finance and access (Morgan & Coombes, 2006).
In Quebec, even ten years after the programme had been introduced, “many Quebecers 
are still unaware that they have to sign up for public prescription drug insurance 
coverage” (Pomey, Forest, Palley et al., 2007, p.486). Also, registration in the British 
Columbia income-based public plan has not reached 100% of the population, with early
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figures showing that, by the end of 2004, 78% of households had registered, and 
enrolment was much higher for seniors (95% of senior households) than for non-seniors 
(73%) (Hanley, Morgan, Hurley, & van Doorslaer, 2008). Further research is needed in 
at least three areas: a) to determine which population groups continue to remain 
uninsured in these provinces, b) to assess the effectiveness of initiatives to increase 
enrolment; and c) to measure the impact of an increase in registration with the public 
programmes on equity in access to medicines and other health services.
If residents in these provinces completed the optional insurance module of the CCHS, 
or if insurance questions were again included in the NPHS, as in past years, some of 
these questions could be empirically tested. Also, more in-depth analysis of existing 
data sources could also provide an indication of which population groups who are 
eligible for public insurance are not aware of this eligibility. A study based on the 1996 
NPHS found that where deductibles or premiums were in place in public plans for 
seniors, there was a greater misreporting of insurance coverage (Grootendorst,
Newman, & Levine, 2003). In the context of less generous pubic drug insurance, 
therefore, some individuals may behave as though they were uninsured. In Ontario, not 
all seniors, who are automatically eligible, reported having insurance for prescription 
drugs in the national surveys. Further research is needed to investigate who these 
individuals are. One possibility would be to use linked survey data and administrative 
data from the public insurance programme to investigate the medicine consumption 
patterns among those who are aware of their coverage (and hence report themselves as 
covered) versus those who are not. Not only is it important to identify who these 
individuals are, but also to evaluate different approaches of informing the population 
(e.g. media campaigns, mailings). Moreover, studies could investigate whether 
informing individuals of their eligibility would increase their use of medicines and
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whether it would also increase the likelihood of visiting a physician when they 
experience illness.
With regards to the question of the equity impact of increasing or decreasing coverage, 
there is some existing evidence on the impact of such changes on some population 
groups. In particular, the literature that has estimated the effects of costs on the demand 
for medicines has been extensive (Alan, Crossley, Grootendorst, & Veall, 2002; 
Gemmill, Thomson, & Mossialos, 2008; Lexchin & Grootendorst, 2004b). However, 
further research could be undertaken to examine the equity impacts of the different 
policy options for provincial or national prescription drug plans. For example, what are 
the equity impacts of restricting coverage for previously comprehensively covered 
populations? The process of universalising prescription drug plans in some provinces 
did not remove financial barriers, and co-payments and deductibles have undermined 
the equity gains. Provinces that introduced universal insurance programmes faced the 
usual trade-off between the policy objectives of equity and cost containment; therefore, 
instead of providing first-dollar coverage for the population, there was a sharing of costs 
between individuals (with premiums, deductibles, etc) and the provinces. For some 
groups, there was actually a move away from first-dollar coverage.
Literature reviews have demonstrated that, in general, individuals are sensitive to the 
price of medicines; few studies have also shown some negative effects on health as a 
result of reduced consumption of medicine (Gemmill, Thomson, & Mossialos, 2008; 
Lexchin & Grootendorst, 2004b). In the Canadian context the effect of increased cost 
sharing among social assistance recipients and seniors in Quebec, who had previously 
contributed very little (a maximum annual ceiling of $0 rose to $81 for the former and 
$100 to $240 for the latter), was to lower expenditure on medicines (Contoyannis,
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Hurley, Grootendorst, Jeon, & Tamblyn, 2005), to lower consumption of prescription 
drugs by the poorer and sicker populations, and to increase rates of emergency hospital 
service use and adverse events (Tamblyn, Laprise, Hanley, Abrahamowicz, Scott, Mayo 
et al., 2001). However, another study of this same policy change found that there was 
no impact of this increased cost sharing on mortality or readmissions for complications 
among a specific population group that was over 64 years and who had experienced a 
heart attack (Pilote, Beck, Richard, & Eisenberg, 2002). Studies of the impact on equity 
in use of medicines and other services, however, have not been conducted.
Also, in Manitoba individuals appeared to remain sensitive to the cost of drugs after the 
introduction of an income-based prescription drug insurance programme. After the 
change in policy from a fixed annual deductible plus 40% co-insurance to income-based 
deductible and no further cost sharing, analyses showed that children in all income 
groups but the lowest income quartile significantly decreased their use of inhaled 
corticosteroids for the treatment of asthma, but those with full coverage (i.e. receiving 
social assistance or part of a treaty First Nations prescription programme) had no 
change (Kozyrskj, Mustard, Cheang, & Simons, 2001). Also, rates of treatment 
remained lower for children from lower-income families than for children from 
wealthier families (Kozyrskj, Mustard, & Simons, 2001); and an individual’s perceived 
adequacy of income was found to be an important predictor of filling at least one 
prescription among older people living in urban (but not rural) areas (Carrie,
Grymonpre, & Blandford, 2006). However, the extent to which individuals who 
perceive the costs of drugs to be too high are also not visiting a physician when needed 
has not been studied.
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The design of a cost sharing policy will have an impact on consumption patterns. One 
study of seniors in Nova Scotia, who were all beneficiaries of the public prescription 
drug programme, found that the effect of an increase in costs (a shift from a $3 co­
payment to a 20% coinsurance) diminished as they became closer to reaching their 
annual out-of-pocket spending limit (Kephart, Skedgel, Sketris, Grootendorst, & Hoar,
2007). Also, they found that the increased cost to the patient had a greater effect on the 
quantity of medications consumed, and not on the likelihood of consumption.
In light of the evidence that even modest cost sharing could prevent some individuals 
from accessing needed care, policy makers recently sought to remove cost barriers for a 
greater number of more vulnerable populations in Quebec. In this province, in 2007, 
they extended the 1999 law that had exempted all of those who are “unfit to work” from 
user charges to protect a greater number of low-income individuals who were insured 
by the public programme (an estimated 13% of the total population) . Research is 
needed to assess the impact of this expansion on use of medicines and other services.
One study found that in British Columbia the change in prescription drug insurance 
policy had apparently little measurable impact on access to medicines (Caetano, 
Raymond, Morgan, & Yan, 2006), unlike the effect of increasing cost sharing for 
certain population groups in Quebec on the use of medicines. The authors measured 
access as the proportion of the population that was dispensed medication before and 
after the policy change, and they focussed on commonly prescribed medicines that 
would be used over long period and indicated for sub-clinical risk factors (Caetano,
35 The purpose of this bill is to provide free access to medication for all recipients under a last resort 
financial assistance program, all persons 60 years of age or over and less than 65 years of age who hold a 
claim booklet, and all persons 65 years of age or over receiving 94% or more of the maximum amount of 
the guaranteed income supplement.
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Raymond, Morgan et al., 2006). They did not find statistically significant changes in 
access after the policy change; there was no difference in the rates of treatment initiation 
across the different age and income groups in 2002 and 2003. However, this study only 
tackled one dimension of access; further analyses of equity in the use of medicines 
(including adherence) are needed to empirically assess the effect of the pharmaceutical 
insurance reforms on access to medicines across different age, income, and other 
population groups.
Studies of the impact of the reform in British Columbia on equity in financing showed 
that, although overall regressivity decreased36 (Hanley, Morgan, Hurley et al., 2008), 
average private payments for drugs as a proportion of income rose for all households, 
across all age and income groups, and even for low-income seniors and non-seniors 
(Hanley, Morgan, & Yan, 2006). These findings would suggest that there may be a 
possible effect of the policy change on medication and physician use among those who 
are sensitive to price.
The evidence above highlights the importance of protecting individuals who are most 
sensitive to the price of medicines, even if that price is relatively low. These individuals . 
may not visit their family physician when they fall ill because of the expected costs of 
these medicines. These costs may stem from a lack of insurance, or they may result 
from explicit cost sharing arrangements in the form of deductibles, co-payments or co- 
insurance. Moreover, if patients do visit their physician they may be less likely to fill a 
prescription or follow the full treatment course because of the costs (Brand, Smith, &
36 Payments are regressive if they represent a greater proportion of income for lower-income earners than 
for those with higher income. The authors measured regressivity based on the Kakwani Index and found 
that this index changed from -0.118 to -0.087 (less regressive), due to the fact that out-of-pocket 
payments became more closely linked to ability to pay (Hanley, Morgan, Hurley et al., 2008).
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Brand, 1977). Along with a comprehensive insurance plan that does not require 
administrative hurdles to registration, information campaigns are needed to ensure 
individuals are aware of the benefits they are entitled to, in addition to waiving co- 
payments for the most vulnerable groups as is the case in Ontario . Even when co­
payments are relatively small, there may be negative impacts on equity, for example, 
with regards to reduced adherence to treatment (Poirier, LeLorier, Page, & Lacour, 
1998).
In addition to the above suggestions, such as extending the prescription drug insurance 
questions of existing surveys to all the provinces, including additional survey questions 
would help address some of the research questions identified in this section. For 
example, surveys could include questions about the previous GP visits they report 
having made, whether they received a prescription, how many, and for what conditions 
(specific illnesses, acute versus chronic). Furthermore, additions to the existing 
questions of unmet need could disaggregate by the specific health care contact that was 
needed, and then ask the reason for not visiting a physician when needed. Among the 
possible answers could be the cost of medication. These suggestions would go some 
way towards improving our understanding of the mechanisms behind inequity in the 
public system.
37 In Ontario, individuals aged 65 or over who are not on low income (with a household income greater 
than $16,000 if  single and $24,000 if a couple) have an annual deductible of $100 and co-payment up to 
$6.11 per prescription. If low income, they may have to pay  $2 per prescription and no deductible (to get 
this status they have to fill out a form at the pharmacy).
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6.2.3 Waiting times: a source of unmet need and dissatisfaction
6.2.3.1 Policy context
Lengthy waiting presents an important policy challenge. International evidence 
suggests that Canada has relatively long waiting times compared to other OECD 
countries (Siciliani & Hurst, 2004), although, recently, some efforts have been made 
across the provinces to reduce waiting times. For example, following the First 
Ministers’ Health Accord of 2004, waiting time reduction was prioritised, and 
benchmarks were established, in five clinical areas: cancer, cardiac care, diagnostic 
imaging, joint replacement, and sight restoration. This Accord was accompanied by 
substantial federal funding that was earmarked for waiting time reduction in the specific 
areas of hip/knee replacement, cataract removal, radiation therapy, MRI and CT 
scanning, and coronary bypass surgery. Some progress has been made in these areas, 
although more needs to be done to ensure that the methods of collecting and reporting 
waiting times data are more consistent across provinces (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, 2006b). The most visible outcome of lengthy waits was the recent 
Supreme Court challenge by a Quebec resident, who had waited for 12 months for a hip 
replacement, and his physician, Dr Jacques Chaoulli. The Supreme Court ruled (by a 
four-to-three majority) that the Quebec government’s ban on private health insurance 
for hospital and physician services violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms. The legal and policy implications of this Supreme Court decision have been 
extensively debated (Flood, Roach, & Sossin, 2005).
Patients can be required to wait for care at several possible stages in the care pathway. 
One conceptualisation of waiting times suggests the following stages (Thind, Thorpe, 
Burt, M, Reid, Harris et al., 2007). A patient who develops symptoms and decides to
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see a family physician will have to wait for an appointment (wait #1). After a 
consultation with a family physician, a patient may be referred for specialist care, and, 
thus, will have to wait for the appointment with a specialist (wait #2). Following the 
consultation with a specialist, the patient may need to undergo surgery or other 
specialised procedures (wait#3). Also, for emergency care, individuals must wait to be 
treated in the emergency room of a hospital.
Waiting to access health care interventions can be detrimental for several possible 
reasons. In some cases, waiting too long can increase the risks of adverse clinical 
events and it can reduce an individual’s capacity to benefit from future interventions. 
Waiting can also increase a patient’s stress, and can prolong pain and disability. Prior 
research has documented that there are numerous adverse effects that patients can 
experience while waiting for care, including pain and limited mobility (Hajat, 
Fitzpatrick, Morris, Reeves, Rigge, & Williams, 2002; Mahon, Bourne, Rorabeck, 
Feeny, Stitt, & Webster-Bogaert, 2002; Williams, Llewelleyn-Thomas, Arshinoff, 
Young, & Naylor, 1997), and stress (Bengston, Herlitz, Karlsson, & Hjalmarson, 1994).
From an equity perspective, it is important to assess whether there are differential 
waiting times across socioeconomic groups. It is possible that individuals with the 
same clinical diagnoses and level of severity, but in different socioeconomic groups, 
may have different waiting times. The evidence of inequity in waiting times, however, 
is limited. Measuring and analysing waiting time data is fraught with difficulties, not 
least because of the variability in the estimates of waiting times in Canada. This 
variability stems from a lack of a standard definition of when waiting starts, such as at 
the first GP visit, at the time the treatment decision was made, at the time the facility 
was booked, or at the time of the last consultation before surgery (Sanmartin, Shortt,
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Barer, Sheps, Lewis, & McDonald, 2000). Most research on waiting times has relied on 
subjective reports using survey data, although some disease-based analyses (for 
example, studies of patients who suffered from stroke) using administrative data have 
found some evidence of longer waits for patients residing in lower income 
neighbourhoods (Kapral, Wang, Mamdani, & Tu, 2002).
One study that made use of the health care access survey supplement to the CCHS 
found that there were some variations in reported waiting times across provinces, 
although they found that there was no relationship between income and reported waiting
38time for specialist visits (Sanmartin, Pierre, & Tremblay, 2006) . A study on the 
delivery side found that waiting times to see a family physician appeared to vary across 
physicians (Thind, Thorpe, Burt et al., 2007). Waiting times were reported to be longer 
for physicians who were female, involved in teaching, working part-time, and serving a 
population in a small town or rural and isolated communities. Some preliminary results 
of a study of patients who were recently diagnosed with congestive heart failure pointed 
to some variations in waiting times, and the frequency of specialist consultations, across 
socioeconomic groups: referrals to cardiologists were greater, and waiting times were 
shorter, for the higher socioeconomic groups (Feldman, 2008).
One potential source of inequity in waiting times is the system of workers 
compensation. If an employee is injured at work, the associated health care costs may 
be borne by the parallel insurance system, and the waiting times may be lower, than if 
someone is injured outside of work and hence the costs are covered by the provincial 
system. The workers compensation board is a system of social insurance that has
38 The finding that waiting times do not differ across socioeconomic groups has also been found outside 
Canada, for example in Norway (Amesen, Erikssen, & Stavem, 2002), and for elective surgery in the 
United Kingdom in 2006 (Cooper, McGuire, Jones, Hart, & Le Grand, 2008).
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financed health care for employed individuals who have work related injuries or illness 
since the early 1900s (Hurley, Pasic, Lavis, Culyer, Mustard, & Gnam, 2008). The 
boards finance health care to restore an employed person’s health so that he or she can 
return to work. They also pay for disability benefits and vocational rehabilitation to 
help the employee find alternative employment, if needed. The boards provide some 
services directly, such as rehabilitation, in their own facilities; however, for physician 
and acute hospital care, the boards usually contract with providers in the public 
insurance system (Hurley, Pasic, Lavis et al., 2008). Lower waiting times for patients in 
this parallel system may result from the stronger incentives that are faced by the 
workers compensation boards to provide expedited care for their workers (Hurley,
Pasic, Lavis et al., 2008). Further research is needed to evaluate the impact of this 
parallel system of funding on the achievement of equity goals.
Lengthy waiting times may not compromise clinical outcomes; however, they may 
reduce public confidence in the system and may lead to increased feelings of 
dissatisfaction (Lewis & Sanmartin, 2001). Waiting times have been identified as a key 
factor in determining patient satisfaction with care (Levesque, Bogoch, Cooney, 
Johnston, & Wright, 2000; Thompson & Yamold, 1995). The Ontario Minister of 
Health recently recognised that access and waiting times were important sources of 
public dissatisfaction: “Reducing ER wait times and connecting patients to family 
health care will improve patient satisfaction and enhance confidence in Ontario’s health 
care system” (Government of Ontario, 2008).
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I found that the most prevalent type of subjective unmet need 
was related to waiting (either waiting times that were too long, or care was not available 
when needed). This reason for unmet need appears to have increased over the past
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decade (Chen & Escarce, 2004; Wilson & Rosenberg, 2004). As I discussed in Chapter 
5, it is not possible to separate this type of unmet need into that which would also be 
deemed unmet need by a clinician (i.e. the waiting time was longer than the clinical 
standards) and that which reflects an individual’s dissatisfaction or unmet expectations. 
People who report wait-related unmet need are also using more than an ‘expected’ 
amount of health services; below, I suggest some areas for future research than can help 
us to understand the equity implication of this type of unmet need. The difficulty arises 
in the attempt to distinguish between unmet “needs” versus “wants” (Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2006). I would argue that subjective unmet need that relates to 
waiting can be considered inequitable if a) the unmet need is not only perceived by the 
individual but also is clinically validated, and b) any observed ‘over-utilisation’ can be 
considered to be legitimate (i.e. if such overuse reflects unobserved needs in the 
utilisation models as opposed to personal preferences).
There are some reasons why we might presume unmet needs and ‘overuse’ are driven 
partly by individuals’ preferences. In the empirical analyses of Chapter 5, there was a 
reduction in the extent of overuse after adjustment for some personal characteristics, 
such as the tendency for reporting unmet need that was unrelated to health care and 
general dissatisfaction with life. In addition, there appeared to be a positive correlation 
between reported wait-related unmet need and income; previous studies also showed 
these people were more educated. However, there may be some reasons to view 
subjective unmet need as clinically valid, because the underlying utilisation models 
cannot perfectly capture individuals’ needs for health care and they lack information on 
the quality of health care that was received. Further research is needed to explore these 
possibilities.
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Some support for the link between reporting lengthy waiting times and personal 
characteristics, such as higher education and dissatisfaction, can be found in the 
literature. Among patients (in Saskatchewan) who had undergone a hip or knee 
replacement within the past 12 months, the maximum length of time that they thought 
would be acceptable increased if they believed that they had been treated fairly, and 
increased as the actual time they had spent waiting for their surgery increased (Conner- 
Spady, Johnston, Sanmartin, McGurran, & Noseworthy, 2007). An analysis of the 
health care access survey supplement to the 2003 CCHS found that between 17% and 
29% of patients who had waited for a specialist appointment considered their waiting 
time to be unacceptable, and less educated individuals were significantly less likely to 
report their waiting times to be unacceptable (Sanmartin, Berthelot, & McIntosh, 2007). 
Similarly, individuals with post-secondary education were more likely than those with 
less than post-secondary education to report that they faced difficulties in accessing 
routine care provided by a GP and intermediate care (care for minor non-life-threatening 
problems by a GP, walk-in clinic or emergency room) (Sanmartin & Ross, 2006). The 
authors proposed that differential expectations were likely to have played a role in 
explaining the education effect. Dissatisfaction with health care has also been shown to 
be lower among those with lower education (Sitzia & Wood, 1997).
It is likely that that subjective unmet need partly captures dissatisfaction and personal 
preferences, and partly reflects legitimate unobserved needs. To the extent that 
individuals reporting wait-related unmet needs are dissatisfied with the care they 
received, are better educated, and have higher expectations, policy makers need to 
ensure a clinically appropriate standard of waiting times to which patients can compare 
their experiences, and possibly also can adjust their expectations. These efforts may 
have the effect of increasing satisfaction, reducing ‘unmet need’ and increasing public
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support for the system. More research is needed to better understand the different 
sources of unmet need and their equity implications.
6.2.3.2 Future research on unmet need and waiting times
In order to analyse the extent of inequity in waiting times (for example, by examining 
variations across population groups), we need to disentangle the mechanisms behind 
subjective unmet need due to waiting. Data are needed that combine administrative 
and survey data. One starting point for research would be to compare self-reported 
waiting times, and perceptions that waiting times are unacceptable, with actual waiting 
time data and clinical benchmarks.
Subjective reports of waiting times are currently available. One of the supplements to 
the CCHS incorporated some questions on perceived waiting times and perceived 
difficulties in accessing health care; however, this was only contributed by a subset of 
the population. Among these questions included: “How long did you have to wait 
between when you and your doctor decided that you should see a specialist and when 
you actually visited the specialist?” For those who had not yet seen the specialist, the 
question begins with: “How long have you been waiting?” Similar questions were 
asked with reference to non-emergency surgery and diagnostic scans. To assess the 
validity of patients’ complaints, we need to have better information, such as from 
administrative data, about the patients’ health care contacts.
Administrative data would enable researchers to measure utilisation more accurately 
than the crude indicators of utilisation that are available in surveys. Analyses that have 
relied on existing utilisation measures have neglected the unmeasured features of the
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health care contact such as quality or appropriateness. Administrative data would also 
permit the measurement of the quantity of use for physician and hospital services with 
the dollar value of the services that were used. Besides dollar values, administrative 
records provide information on the specialty of the provider and the procedure that was 
delivered.
Linked administrative and survey data could extend the analyses to increase our 
understanding of the meaning of reported unmet need and its equity implications. By 
applying the methods that I used in Chapter 5 to linked administrative and survey 
(CCHS) data, it would be possible to examine whether positive residual utilisation (or 
more-than-expected utilisation) remains when more accurate measures of utilisation are 
available. This approach would empirically test the hypothesis that the increase in 
residual utilisation among those reporting wait-related (and “other”) unmet need could 
be driven by inadequate utilisation measures in the underlying models. Moreover, 
since administrative data includes information on individuals’ diagnosed health 
conditions and the services they received, we can investigate the extent to which higher 
‘unexplained’ utilisation arose from the greater use of clinically necessary services 
(which would support the hypothesis of “unmeasured need”) as opposed to the use of 
non-essential services (which would lend support to the “preference” hypothesis). 
Empirical support for the “unmeasured need” hypothesis would then suggest that 
subjective unmet need conveys some unmeasured information on health that is not 
directly observable through standard measures, such as general health status and 
reported chronic conditions.
Longitudinal analyses of linked administrative and survey (NPHS) data could also 
provide insight into the mechanisms that underlie reported unmet need. The analyses
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that were conducted in this thesis suggest that there is a possibility that subjective 
unmet need captures unobserved characteristics of individuals; these unobserved 
characteristics may be related to need or to preferences. Longitudinal data would allow 
us statistically to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. These data would 
also enable us to examine the dynamics between changes in individuals’ health states 
on health care utilisation and the reporting of different types of unmet need. Further 
discussion of data issues and some suggestions for future research can be found in 
Section 6.3.
6.3 Methodological strengths and limitations
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis applied the now well-established econometric methods 
based on the concept of the concentration curve to the investigation of inequity and its 
contributors in the Canadian health system. Calculating a concentration index to 
measure inequity allows for, not only the identification of inequity, but a quantification 
of its extent, which permits comparisons across health care sectors and jurisdictions 
(Wagstaff, Paci, & van Doorslaer, 1989; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Paci, 1991). The 
concentration index is a relative measure of inequality. This index measures the 
socioeconomic dimension of inequalities and it includes information on the whole 
socioeconomic distribution (i.e., the income distribution). This empirical approach also 
allows for a quantification of the contributors to inequity based on the variables 
included in the utilisation models, as I used in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 of this thesis 
explored the complementary role that subjective unmet need could play in 
understanding the reasons for inequity in the receipt of health services. It also revealed 
some of the limitations associated with the conventional methods to analyse inequity.
244
In addition to the limitations that were discussed in the separate empirical chapters, 
there are some general limitations with the methods that were used in this thesis that 
should be acknowledged. Many of these limitations relate to the use of survey data, 
such as the exclusion of some populations and potential recall bias (Section 6.3.1), the 
difficulties that are associated with the measurement of income (Section 6.3.2), the 
limitations with analyses of inequity in the hospital sector (Section 6.3.3), the 
challenges with the measurement of health care needs (Section 6.3.4), and the 
challenges associated with measuring the effect of supply and geographical barriers to 
access on utilisation (Section 6.3.5). I will discuss these limitations and I will also 
highlight some of the possible directions for future research that would build on the 
strengths of this research and would address some of the limitations. In this thesis, I 
chose to focus on measuring equity in the receipt of health care, as opposed to the more 
consequentialist view of equality of health outcomes; therefore, the final section 
explores some potential avenues for future research that would link these two equity 
goals (Section 6.3.6).
6.3.1 Limitations with survey data: excluded populations and recall bias
The analyses in this thesis were based on nationally representative survey data to 
examine three key aspects of equity in the Canadian context. I restricted the analyses to 
the ten provinces; therefore, the results of the empirical analyses cannot be generalised 
to the three Canadian “territories”. Not only were the surveys that I relied on less 
representative of these regions, but also the challenges that policy makers in the
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territories must face in achieving equity objectives are, arguably, different from the
provinces.
Most surveys, by design, exclude certain population groups. Unless they are 
specifically targeted, these groups include homeless people, individuals living in 
institutions such as nursing homes and other long-term care facilities, those without a 
telephone, and Aboriginal people who live on reserves. These excluded populations 
represent a relatively small proportion of the Canadian population, however studies 
suggest that they would be more likely than the general population to experience 
barriers accessing health care (Hwang & Bugeja, 2000; Newbold, 1997; Shah, Gunraj,
& Hux, 2003; Stark, 1992; Wright & Tompkins, 2005). The institutionalised population 
is comprised of older people in long-term care facilities, individuals in psychiatric 
institutions, and prisoners; these groups constitute a higher risk, typically lower 
socioeconomic profile population. Income-related inequity in the use of health services, 
as estimated in this thesis, may have been underestimated as a result of these exclusions. 
Also, the exclusion of institutionalised populations may have lead to sample selection 
bias toward healthier individuals with lower levels of health care utilisation. Again, this 
possible bias would have the effect of producing more conservative estimates of 
inequity.
Self-reported utilisation may be biased because of difficulties associated with recall. 
Surveys ask individuals to recall their experiences and contacts with health care during 
a period of time; in this study, the time period was the past 12 months. The accuracy of 
these self reports may be limited because of problems with recall. Some researchers 
argue that the self-reporting of physician visits may be unreliable (Jobe, White, Kelley, 
Mingay, Sanchez, & Loftus, 1990; Roberts, Bergstralh, Schmidt et al., 1996). It has
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been suggested that recall accuracy for hospital visits is generally better than for 
physician contacts (Barer, Manga, & Shillington, 1982). Also, the RAND study showed 
that outpatient dental out-of-pocket expenditures were estimated more accurately with a 
12-month recall than were physician expenditures (Marquis, Marquis, & Newhouse, 
1976). However, using a one-year recall period is a common limitation of survey data. 
Problems with recall may be elevated for older age groups. One study found that 
reporting error in self-reported physician visits was relatively minor, although older 
people were more likely to underreport utilisation (Cleary, 1984). Another study that 
examined the recall of utilisation among people in their 60s found very little error in 
self-reported contact with a physician (i.e. the likelihood of a visit); they found a greater 
discrepancy between self-reported and archival data in the number of visits, in particular 
among the higher users (Glandon, Counte, & Tancredi, 1992).
What are the data requirements for future research on equity? Research on equity in the 
health care sector relies on the availability of comprehensive and reliable data. Ideally, 
there would be available survey and administrative sources that are linked at the 
individual level. Population health surveys should include information on the following 
indicators:
• health status, including general self-assessed health, specific questions on 
conditions, symptoms, and activities of daily living, and other quasi-objective 
measures such as diagnoses, weight, and height;
• objective health indicators through clinical examinations (these could be used to 
test the validity of self-reported indicators of health (Thomas & Frankenberg, 
2000)
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• ‘vignettes’ of health states to test for reporting bias (Section 6.3.4 discusses the 
methodological challenges that are associated with the measurement of need for 
health care);
• socioeconomic status, including all income sources, assets (e.g. home ownership 
and financial assets), educational attainment, employment status;
• details of individuals’ health care contact (see below); and
• residence (post code), which would allow the researcher to calculate an
individual’s distance to the nearest health care facilities, and to include local- 
level supply characteristics.
Survey questions on utilisation could be improved in the following ways:
• by disaggregating the type of service, such as by asking the individual which 
type of specialist he consulted, whether the service was private or public, and 
where the contact took place;
• by capturing dimensions of an individual’s subjective experience with health 
care, including indicators of accessibility, acceptability, waiting times, 
satisfaction, perceived quality, direct costs and non-use of health care, i.e. unmet 
need; and
• by including details of insurance status and benefits entitlements.
Survey data have the potential to provide comprehensive information on all these levels; 
however, administrative data may provide more accurate information on utilisation. 
Administrative data include information on the intensity of use, measured not just by 
number of visits, but by total expenditure; they also differentiate the types of services 
used (e.g. diagnostic tests received, day surgeries, referrals). Administrative data of 
utilisation also address the problems of recall bias (Palin & Zumbo, 2003), and cover
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the entire population using health care, including those groups typically excluded or 
underrepresented in surveys.
However, administrative data have some important limitations. Information on an 
individual’s need for health care (health status) is often based on physicians’ diagnoses, 
and, therefore, it depends on the individual having had prior contact with the system. 
One assumption that underlies this approach is that individuals who did not contact the 
system did not have any need for health care. This is an important assumption that 
could easily be violated. Also administrative data provide a less comprehensive source 
of socioeconomic information than that which can be collected through surveys; 
typically socioeconomic status is inferred on the basis of geographical measures of 
income or deprivation (Section 6.3.2 discusses the challenges associated with the 
measurement of income with survey data). A recent study shows area-based income 
information has poor validity as measured by comparison to actual tax-validated income 
(Hanley & Morgan, 2008). The authors underscore that results of analyses such as 
those undertaken in this thesis are, indeed, sensitive to the choice of income variable. 
Moreover there is a possibility of ecological fallacy, where associations (e.g. between 
income and health care use) found at the aggregate level may not represent the 
associations at an individual level. Also measures of the experiences with health care, 
such as perceptions of quality and barriers to access, are only available through surveys. 
There is little or no information from administrative data sources on health care 
utilisation (or expenditure) outside of the public system, such as dental care, home care, 
and the large part of ambulatory prescription drugs.
Linked administrative and survey data, as used by Finkelstein (2001) to measure 
physician utilisation, benefits from the improved accuracy and detail of utilisation
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information from administrative data with the comprehensiveness of socioeconomic and 
health indicators and subjective experiences from survey data. Administrative data 
would also permit some evaluation of clinical appropriateness (comparing diagnoses 
with treatments that were received. This would enable us to better understand the 
potential differences in the quality of care received by different population groups, even 
when the volume of care consumed is apparently equitable.
Data that are available on a longitudinal basis would permit an investigation of the 
trends and dynamics of inequalities over time. A long-term perspective provides useful 
information on links between outcomes and earlier experiences and behaviours, and on 
the dynamics between individual and family characteristics, the take-up of insurance, 
accumulation of assets, health status and health care consumption. With regards to the 
measurement of inequalities in health, it has been shown that using longitudinal data 
captures the mobility of individuals in their ranking according to their socioeconomic 
level (Hemandez-Quevedo, Jones, Lopez-Nicolas, & Rice, 2006; Jones & Lopez- 
Nicolas, 2004). Longitudinal data also allows us to consider the possible endogeneity 
of needs variables in the health care utilisation models (Sutton, Carr-Hill, Gravelle et 
al., 1999). The distinction between an initial state of health and the final state of health 
after receiving health care is most often ignored (due to limitations of survey data to 
cross-sections) (Culyer, 1993). If the relationship between morbidity and utilisation is 
bi-directional, then the endogenous and exogenous effects could be corrected, to some 
extent, by including past health status. The bias of reciprocal causality that stems from 
the causal impact of health care contacts on current health status, however, appears to be 
minimal (Bago d’Uva, Jones, & van Doorslaer, 2007; Windmeijer & Santos Silva,
1997). I would argue that the way forward in this area of research is with combined
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survey and administrative data, preferably on a longitudinal basis in order to test for 
some of these possible biases.
6.3.2 Limitations with measuring income, potential solutions
Measuring income is fundamental to the methods employed in this thesis to quantify 
and explain income-related inequity in the use of health services. Measures of income 
are needed that are reliable and comparable across individuals. However, as I noted in 
the empirical chapters, there are high rates of item non-response for income information 
in surveys: the CCHS has about 15-20% missing data on income. It is possible that 
there is income-related response bias, such that individuals with different levels of 
income have different likelihoods of responding. I would hypothesise that individuals 
on the lowest and highest ends of the income distribution would be less likely to report 
their income than individuals with levels of income that are near the population average. 
A study that compared the estimates of income yielded from survey, census and tax data 
in Canada showed that in the lower end of the distribution, the census (with a higher 
response rate) more closely resembled the tax data estimates of income than did the 
survey data (Frenette, Green, & Picot, 2004). Therefore, the results of the empirical 
analyses in this thesis may not be generalised to the lowest income groups. This 
limitation is most relevant in Chapter 3, because I excluded observations with missing 
income information for these analyses. Since I used the full microdata for Chapter 4 ,1 
was able to impute income in cases where this was missing. In Chapter 5, the analyses 
did not require the ranking of the sample by income, and, therefore, I was able to 
include a dummy variable to indicate that the estimate of income was missing.
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When studies measure the effects of income on patterns of health care service use, there 
is an underlying assumption that variations in income reflect differing living standards. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I attempted to adjust household income by the composition of 
the household. As income is held constant and the number of household members 
increases, ability to pay does not decline proportionately; two people can live with 
about the same standard of living as one (Aronson, Johnson, & Lambert, 1994). One 
way to account for these differences in living standards is to apply the modified OECD 
scale, which counts the first individual as 1, each subsequent person aged 14 and over as 
0.5 and each child under age 14 as 0.3. I made use of this approach in Chapter 4 that 
drew on the full microdata file.
In the Public Use Microdata file that is available to researchers outside of the designated 
Research Data Centres, which were used in Chapters 3 and 5, the data are recoded to 
preserve confidentiality and anonymity. For this reason, in the 2003 data release 
(Chapter 3), income data were grouped into five categories, depending on the size of the 
household. This equivalisation method presumes, for example that a household of 
between one to four individuals earning less than $10,000 is equivalent to a larger 
household with over four members earning less than $15,000, and that a household of 
one or two people earning more than $60,000 is equivalent to a household with three or 
more members earning more than $80,000. There are two limitations with this 
approach: first, the five categories reduce the level of variability in the information of 
income distribution; and second, the crude method of equivalisation may not accurately 
reflect living standards. In the 2005 public data release, (Chapter 5), income data were 
not equivalised, but were simply provided in five household income categories.
252
Since the income variable is integral to the measurement o f inequity, it is important to 
test the sensitivity o f the estimates of income-related inequity to the different income 
variables. Table 6.1 shows the estimates o f inequity for three measures o f income. The 
first is a continuous income measure that assigns the mid-point o f the reported 
categorical income for individuals with missing continuous income; the second is a 
continuous income measure that predicts income based on a regression model on 
individual characteristics and reported income category (as in Chapter 4, Table 4.1); the 
third is a categorical income variable that is adjusted for household size following 
Statistics Canada methods (as above). There appears to be very little variation in 
estimates o f inequity across the different income measures, although there are some 
exceptions. Analyses based on categorical income may overestimate the level o f pro­
poor inequity in hospital inpatient care by about 20%, and may underestimate the level 
o f pro-rich inequity in the conditional number o f specialist visits by about 50%.
Table 6.1 Comparison of estimates of income-related inequity in GP, specialist,
Income rank ing  variable
Continuous: 
assigned based 
on mid-point o f 
income 
category
Continuous: 
predicted based on 
categorical income 
and individual 
characteristics
Categorical: 5 
groups adjusted by 
household size
GP Total -0.020 -0.020 -0.021
Probability 0.018 0.018 0.018
Conditional -0.035 -0.036 -0.036
Specialist Total 0.076 0.076 0.055
Probability 0.046 0.047 0.041
Conditional 0.034 0.033 0.017
Hospital Total nights -0.041 -0.044 -0.055
inpatient Probability -0.035 -0.038 -0.047
Dentist Total 0.113 0.115 0.110
Probability 0.106 0.107 0.101
Conditional 0.007 0.008 0.008
Further difficulties may arise due to the nature o f the income question. The survey asks 
an individual to report their gross income before taxes and deductions. Therefore, it is
253
possible that an individual, who earns a certain amount of income (I) before taxes (7), 
would earn less (7-7) after these deductions; therefore, their ranking in the income 
distribution may change. To the extent that the ranking would not change after 
accounting for taxes and deductions, the results of this thesis would remain unchanged.
To what extent might there be differences in purchasing power and living standards 
across the country? It is common in international studies that measure inequalities in 
health and health care use by income for income estimates to not only be net of taxes 
and deductions, but also adjusted for differences in purchasing power across the 
countries. This is a relatively straightforward exercise, since national consumer price 
indices are available in order to adjust income; however, for sub-national analyses such 
as in Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is possible that purchasing power does differ, although 
these differences are more difficult to take into account. It is, therefore, worth 
acknowledging that the failure to adjust income for purchasing power in sub-regions, 
for example, in urban versus rural areas, may bias the income estimates. It is unlikely 
that this bias would have a significant impact on the empirical findings of this thesis; 
however, future research could explicitly measure this potential bias.
6.3.3 Limitations o f analyses o f equity in hospital care, potential solutions
An important limitation with the analyses of equity in the use of hospital inpatient 
services that were conducted in this thesis relates to the aggregate nature of the 
utilisation variable. The survey question refers to the number of nights that an 
individual spent as an inpatient in a hospital, nursing or convalescent home. This 
variable captures a wide variety of services, including acute, chronic, rehabilitative, and
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long-term care services. The relevance of the evidence of inequity for policy makers in 
such a broad sector is limited.
Existing health surveys do not provide information on whether an individual received 
surgical day care, a type of intervention that represents a rapidly growing area of health 
care services. In the ten-year period from 1995-2005, there was an increase of 30% in 
the number of day surgery visits in Canada (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 
2007a), and in 2002-2004 almost 100% of cataract removals were performed as day 
cases, and over 70% of hernia repairs (Castoro, Bertinato, Drace, & McKee, 2007). 
From an equity perspective, one recent study from British Columbia demonstrated that 
the highest level of income-related inequity in service use was in day surgeries: inequity 
in the probability of undergoing day surgery was more than twice the level of inequity 
in the probability of a visit to a specialist (the index of horizontal inequity was 0.025 for 
day surgery compared to 0.011 for specialists) (McGrail, 2008). An earlier study from 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, also revealed higher rates of surgical procedures, but not acute 
hospital admissions, among higher income neighbourhoods (Roos & Mustard, 1997).
To better understand the nature of inequity in the hospital sector, we need to have 
information on the type of inpatient services an individual received. Since the survey 
question on hospital utilisation that was used in this thesis depended on a patient having 
stayed over night, it excluded day surgeries. Since the available evidence suggests that 
day surgeries may be more concentrated among the higher income groups, it is possible 
that the findings of inequity in the use of specialist services could be driven, in part, by 
inequity in day surgeries.
The available survey data do not include information on the reason for the hospital 
admission. Analyses of hospitalisation rates for ambulatory sensitive conditions (also
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known as preventable hospitalisation) have shown a clear income gradient, with higher 
rates for the lowest neighbourhood income quintile than the highest income quintile 
(Roos, Walld, Uhanova et al., 2005; Sanchez, Vellanky, Herring, Liang, & Jia, 2008). 
This higher rate of avoidable hospitalisations did not appear to be related to lower rates 
of physician visits for these same conditions, since lower income groups had more 
physician contacts (Roos, Walld, Uhanova et al., 2005). Higher rates of hospitalisation 
and physician utilisation would be expected among the lower income groups, since they 
tend to be in poorer health. These studies suggest that some of the observed ‘pro-poor’ 
inequity in hospitalisation may be avoidable, which would reflect sub-optimal 
ambulatory care. Sub-optimal care could result from difficulties in accessing specialist 
care, which is consistent with the evidence of pro-rich inequity in the use of specialist 
services. It could also result from barriers to accessing primary care services from a 
GP, which is consistent with the evidence of slight pro-rich inequity in the probability 
of accessing a GP, and the evidence that indicates a lower uptake of preventive services 
among the lower socioeconomic groups. Therefore, future research is needed to 
explicitly investigate the association between inequity in physician care and inequity in 
hospitalisation: do deficiencies in primary and specialist care contribute to the higher 
concentration of hospital service use among the poorer population groups?
Analysed on an aggregate level, this thesis shows a trend towards higher utilisation of 
inpatient care among the lower income groups, which is consistent with previous studies 
(Glazier, Badley, Gilbert, & Rothman, 2000; Manga, Broyles, & Angus, 1987; Mustard 
& Frohlich, 1995; Newbold, Eyles, & Birch, 1995; Roos & Mustard, 1997). This 
finding could reflect sub-optimal care at lower levels of the system. Alternatively, it is 
possible that the estimates of inequity in hospital use were measured with error due to 
limitations in the measurement of need, income or utilisation data.
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Lower income may capture the effects of unobserved need, which would lead to a 
downward bias in the estimates of inequity. The possibility that unobserved need could 
bias estimates of inequity is discussed in Chapter 5. In a recent study in Ontario, the 
finding that having a regular doctor was associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
a hospital admission of about 20% led the authors to suggest the possibility that 
unobserved needs were correlated with having a regular physician (Hurley, Grignon, 
Wang et al., 2008).
There is some evidence to suggest that the estimates of inequity are sensitive to the 
measure of income that is used for the ranking variable (as shown in Table 6.1). Also, a 
recent study showed that the pro-poor inequity in the likelihood of a hospital admission 
and in the number of hospital admissions was driven, in part, by the use of the 
categorical income measure in the public use file as opposed to the more accurate, 
continuous measure of income (Hurley, Grignon, Wang et al., 2008). However this 
continuous income estimate still suffers from the limitations associated with being 
based on a single question; therefore, it may miss some income sources that are more 
difficult to recall or subject to reporting bias. The sensitivity of the estimates of 
inequity in hospital care to the assumption of linearity in the underlying utilisation 
model also raises some concern as to the appropriateness of these methods for aggregate 
analyses of equity in this sector.
Based on the above observations, there are some additional survey questions that could 
help address the gaps in our current understanding of inequity in hospital care. Survey 
questions could differentiate:
• emergency and elective hospitalisations,
• day and overnight hospital stays,
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• diagnostic testing, surgeries, and re-admissions,
• hospitalisation for childbirth (and whether childbirth was natural or by
caesarean),
• separate hospital admissions an individual has had in the past year as opposed to 
the total number of nights spent in hospital,
• public versus private hospital, and
• acute care and long-term care.
Research on equity in hospital care would benefit from the above information. In 
addition, administrative records linked to survey data would enable the researcher to 
analyse detailed information on the reasons for hospitalisation, the types of services that 
were received, and the outcomes of these treatments (such as re-admissions). Taking 
the research agenda in this direction would provide more support for the development of 
policies to achieve equity-related goals.
6.3.4 Challenges with measuring need, potential solutions
The measurement of need is critical to analyses of equity; an equitable allocation of 
health care is one that varies in accordance with need. Need for health care varies 
across the population; ill-health and disease tends to be concentrated among the lower 
socioeconomic groups (Humphries & van Doorslaer, 2000). This thesis made use of a 
combination of general (e.g. self-assessed health) and specific (e.g. limitations in 
activities, chronic conditions) self-reported indicators of health to approximate need for 
health care. Self-reported health indicators are the most commonly used measures of 
health care needs, as they are available in most health surveys; moreover, it can be 
assumed that, ceteris paribus, individuals with poorer health need for more health care. 
These self-reported measures of (ill-) health may be subject to bias; however, numerous 
studies have shown that they are strong predictors of objective health status and 
mortality (see Section 2.1.3).
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The debates about potential bias in self-reported health and their suitability as indicators 
of health care need have not been resolved. Recently, some studies have noted a 
differential association between self-rated general health and mortality across 
socioeconomic groups, with a weakening association with socioeconomic advantage 
(Jiirges, 2005; Singh-Manoux, Dugravot, Shipley, Ferrie, Martikainen, Goldberg et al., 
2007), while others found the reverse (Dowd & Zajacova, 2007; Huisman, van Lenthe,
& Mackenbach, 2007). Another study assessed the validity of quasi-objective health 
measures -  self-reported chronic conditions- through a comparison with medical records 
(Baker, Stabile, & Deri, 2004). The authors found a considerable degree of reporting 
error, which partly was related to the severity of the reported condition (there was less 
error among the more severe conditions) and partly to employment status (not working 
was associated with greater reporting error in the form of ‘false positives’).
A literature review of studies of equity in the United Kingdom noted that the majority of 
studies paid little attention to the complex concept of need (Goddard & Smith, 2001). 
Studies tended to rely on one of the following assumptions:
• levels of need are equal across the groups being studied (for example, in disease- 
specific studies);
• need is measured using self-assessed health (SAH), assuming there are no 
systematic variations between groups in reporting;
• need is measured with biomedical measures, assuming collection methods are 
standardised and that unmeasured factors are not related to need;
• levels of need are inferred through characteristics of the area people live (e.g. 
levels of deprivation);
• need is approximated with socioeconomic measures; or
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• need is inferred from the results of other studies.
In the majority of studies, in fact, there is widespread acceptance of the second 
assumption (need is measured using SAH). However, most studies control for factors 
that may affect the reporting of health status, such as age and sex. They also 
incorporate measures of an individual’s risk of ill-health in addition to considering a 
broader set of health status variables than solely general SAH.
How can we better measure health care need? In light of the potential problems with 
self-reported indicators of health, the use of diagnostic categories to measure needs has 
been advocated as an alternative approach to measuring need. For example, the 
Adjusted Clinical Group (ACG) system is a validated case-mix grouper for health 
services developed at Johns Hopkins University (Reid, MacWilliam, Verhulst, Roos, & 
Atkinson, 2001). This system classifies individuals into different categories on the 
basis of all diagnoses they have received in the past year in ambulatory or hospital 
settings with the aim to reflect expected health care utilisation. Therefore, individuals 
in the same ACG would have the same expected health care needs. However, such 
information is only available with administrative data, and is contingent upon prior 
contact with the health system.
Combining subjective, quasi-objective and objective measures of health may provide 
the most accurate measure of need. Many surveys collect quasi-objective indicators of 
ill-health, based on respondents’ reporting on more factual items such as specific 
conditions or activity limitations (e.g. presence of chronic conditions, symptoms, and 
specific limitations in activities of daily living). These indicators have proven to be 
useful for building a general index of ill-health that corrects reporting bias across 
countries (Jiirges, 2007). The inclusion of health state vignettes (e.g. in the World
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Health Survey) have also enabled researchers to reduce the bias with subjective 
measures. The availability of objective measures of health, such as biomarkers, is 
restricted to few national, cross-sectional surveys; furthermore, they face 
methodological challenges with regards to the standardisation of data collection 
methods.
6.3.5 Capturing effects o f supply and geographical barriers
The use of health services represents a function of supply-side and demand-side factors 
(Aday & Andersen, 1974; Evans & Stoddart, 1990). A vast literature drawing mainly 
on administrative data from the United States but also from Canada and the United 
Kingdom supports a causal association between supply and utilisation. At an aggregate 
level the relationship between supply characteristics, such a bed availability and number 
of providers, and utilisation patterns can be found; however, studies of variations in 
specific conditions and procedures show that these variations can be attributed to 
variations in medical practice beyond the conventional supply indicators (Bevan, 1995). 
Studies have shown that local workforce conditions and level of supply affect the use of 
physician services (Welch, Miller, Welch, Fisher, & Wennberg, 1993), more beds 
available increase the likelihood of chronically ill patients being treated in hospital 
(Fisher, Wennberg, Stukel, & Sharp, 1994; Fisher, Wennberg, Stukel, Skinner, Sharp, 
Freeman et al., 2000; Wennberg & Gittelsohn, 1973; Wennberg, Freeman, & Culp, 
1987), practice variations are affected by the availability of resources (Pritchard, Fisher, 
Teno, Sharp, Reding, Knaus et al., 1998), and condition-specific analyses reveal large 
practice variations in some conditions and relatively small variations in others (the latter 
having greater professional consensus on treatment) (Wennberg, 1984). Studies from 
Canada (Manitoba and Ontario) have also identified the importance of practice
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variations that cannot be explained by supply, for example in the case of hysterectomy 
rates (Roos, 1984), middle-ear surgery (Coyte, Croxford, Asche, To, Feldman, & 
Friedberg, 2001) and knee replacement (Coyte, Hawker, & Wright, 1996). Although an 
early study from Canada found that supply accounted for a large part of provincial 
differences in surgical procedures (Vayda, Morison, & Anderson, 1976). Significant 
variations in surgical procedures across regions in England and Wales were mostly 
explained by supply and not morbidity characteristics (McPherson, Wennberg, Hovind, 
& Clifford, 1982). Moreover evidence from the United States found that higher 
spending was not associated with improved quality of care or health outcomes (Fisher, 
Wennberg, Stukel, Gottlieb, Lucas, & Pinder, 2003a, 2003b).
These findings suggest that practice-level variations and supply characteristics are 
important to consider in understanding inequity in health care utilisation. They raise at 
least two important policy issues. First, are ‘small-area’ variations stemming from 
supply and practice characteristics unrelated to individual characteristics of the patients 
more important from both a cost and equity perspective than individual-level variations 
in utilisation (e.g. practice differences that vary by income class of the patient)? Second, 
if inequalities in treatment patterns that are explained by supply and practice 
characteristics do not lead to differential quality of care or health outcomes, then at an 
individual level, higher use among higher income individuals (inequity as found in this 
thesis) may not lead to better outcomes. This second issue is addressed in Section 6.3.6.
In this thesis, I included information on individuals’ residence in order to capture some 
of the differences in the availability of health care providers. However, these relatively 
crude indicators of supply may not be sufficient to measure the effect of geographical 
variations and practice variations on patterns of utilisation.
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Research on geographical barriers to access and variations in the supply of health care 
professionals across the country has been extensive. The geographic dispersion of the 
population creates challenges to ensuring access according to need in sparsely populated 
countries such as Canada, but also in the United Kingdom (Haynes, 2003). The 
Romanow Commission reported that “people in rural and remote communities have 
poorer health status than Canadians who live in larger centres. Access to health care 
also is a problem, not only because of distances, but because these communities struggle 
to attract and keep nurses, doctors and other health care providers” (Canada, 2002a, 
p. 159). Therefore, policies have been implemented to reduce barriers to access in 
countries where significant numbers of the population living in rural and remote areas. 
These policies include offering financial incentives to physicians to work in 
underserved areas, locating training facilities in more remote areas, and employing tele­
medicine technologies to establish links between the remote areas and specialised 
medical centres (Healy & McKee, 2004; Simoens & Hurst, 2006). The Canadian 
provinces mostly have relied on financial incentives to address the problems of 
physician undersupply; there has been less consistent emphasis on policy approaches 
that are centred on education and training (Barer & Evans, 2001).
Studies that have investigated the relationship between distance to the nearest hospital 
and the use of hospital services have not been conclusive. Some studies support the 
‘distance decay’ theory (Haynes, 2003), where a negative gradient was found between 
distance and use: the greater the distance, the lower the rates of utilisation (Lin, Allan,
& Penning, 2002). However, the reverse association has also been found. An analysis 
of individual-level data in Manitoba found that residents of the smallest communities 
were more likely to report an inpatient admission (Manga, Broyles, & Angus, 1987).
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Another study in Manitoba found higher utilisation rates in the more remote regions 
(Martens, The Need to Know Team, Fransoo, & Burchill, 2006). This same study also 
found that there were lower rates of preventive services, such as immunisations and 
cervical cancer screening, in the more remote regions. A study of age- and sex-adjusted 
rates of utilisation among older people in British Columbia found that the residents of 
rural and small town areas spent more days in hospital, but had fewer GP and specialist 
visits than those living in urban areas (Allan & Cloutier-Fisher, 2006).
A recent study that investigated distance-related inequity in hospital utilisation in 
Ontario based on concentration indices found some evidence of inequity (Hurley, 
Grignon, Wang et al., 2008). The authors measured distance as the linear distance from 
an individual’s place of residence to the nearest hospital. They found a pro-distance 
bias when they only considered large hospitals with 200 or more beds. When all 
hospitals were considered, the authors did not find any evidence of distance-related 
inequity. However, they found that the characteristics of the hospital had an impact on 
utilisation. The likelihood of a hospital admission decreased with hospital size and 
occupancy rate; individuals whose nearest hospital had a 60% occupancy rate were 
more likely to be hospitalised than those whose nearest hospital had a 90% occupancy 
rate (Hurley, Grignon, Wang et al., 2008).
It is clear that the relationship between supply and utilisation is complex. Future 
research that applies the concentration index approach to measure inequity by distance 
could be employed in other parts of the country. Better measures of supply could be 
incorporated into equity research (Hurley & Grignon, 2006), since crude indicators 
often fail to show any significant effect on utilisation patterns. Also, the inclusion of 
measures of distance to hospitals had little effect on the estimates of income-related
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inequity in hospital admissions (Hurley, Grignon, Wang et al., 2008). Likewise, a study 
from England showed that the contribution of supply variables on income-related 
inequality in probability of use of GP and outpatient visits, day cases, and inpatient 
stays was near zero, even though there was a positive effect of these measures of supply 
on utilisation (Morris, Sutton, & Gravelle, 2003). Crude indicators of supply may not 
be sufficient to capture the supply-side influences on utilisation; however, it is not clear 
what effect this omission has, if any, on estimates of inequity.
6.3.6 Equity in health or health care?
Policy makers seek to achieve an equitable distribution of health services with a view to 
reducing inequalities in health. “If all things are equal, better access is associated with 
reduced disparities.. .Health care financing in Canada, and Medicare in particular, is 
organized to ensure that all [socioeconomic] groups have access to services and hence 
reduce health disparities” (Health Disparities Task Group of the F/P/T Advisory 
Committee on Population Health and Health Security, 2004, p.6-7). Policy makers are, 
therefore, concerned with the distribution of health services under the assumption that 
these services would improve health. Culyer has consistently argued that there is no 
reason for “advocating equality in the provision of ineffective medicine” (Culyer, 1988, 
p.43); and that “equity is a factor in determining resource allocation decisions only in 
respect to health care that is needed” (Culyer, 2007, p.23). This argument is consistent 
with the consequentialist view of equity in health care; the moral concern for equity in 
health care lies in its consequences, which is improved health and improved capability 
to function (Sen, 1992).
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There is strong policy and public support for the goal of ensuring equity in the receipt of 
health care. The research conducted in this thesis, in addition to the majority of studies 
that have investigated equity in health care, measured the receipt of health care, not its 
consequences. However, since a strong moral argument for our concern for equity in 
health care is the consequentialist one that views health care as instrumental in 
improving health, empirical research is needed to investigate the causal relationship 
between the equity in the receipt of health care and equality in health. Pursuing this 
area of research would not only improve our understanding of the processes by which 
health inequalities arise, and could therefore be reduced, but it would also increase 
public and policy support for prioritising equity goals in health policy.
There is a growing evidence base that has identified inequitable treatment patterns in 
most countries. The question of whether inequitable utilisation leads to unequal health 
outcomes has received little attention, partly because it is very difficult to answer with 
the type of datasets typically available to researchers. Research in this area has relied 
on disease-specific approaches, which, although they cannot be generalised to the 
population level, they have the potential to inform specific policy decisions. For 
example, some studies have examined the level of inequity in the treatment and 
outcomes of particular conditions, such as acute myocardial infarction and stroke (Alter, 
Chong, Austin, Mustard, Iron, Williams et al., 2006; Alter, Naylor, Austin et al., 1999; 
Kapral, Wang, Mamdani et al., 2002; Pilote, Joseph, Belisle, & Penrod, 2003; Saposnik, 
Jeerakathil, Selchen, Baibergenova, Hachinski, & Kapral, 2008). Research at the 
population level, perhaps drawing on longitudinal linked administrative and survey 
data, is needed to measure the link between access and outcomes.
266
The policies that are required to reduce inequalities in health extend far beyond the 
health care system; they depend on integrated, multi-sectoral approaches (Mackenbach 
& Bakker, 2002). However, equity in access to health care plays a critical role in the 
inequalities reduction agenda (Dahlgren & Whitehead, 2006). Careful monitoring of 
equity in health care on the basis of robust empirical analyses is vital to measure the 
impact of health care policies and broader reform initiatives on the achievement of the 
health systems’ objectives. Continued research is needed to understand not only the 
causes of inequitable patterns of health care utilisation, but also to identify which policy 
measures are effective in ensuring individuals in need of health care receive high quality 
care. Further attention could also be directed towards empirically assessing the extent 
to which equitable utilisation reduces health inequalities. This thesis goes some way to 
addressing these questions by examining three policy relevant aspects of equity in the 
Canadian context. Further research is needed to support the development of policies 
that help meet the health system’s equity objectives.
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A p p e n d i c e s
C h a p t e r  2: 2A-2C
Appendix 2A. Summary of beliefs associated with “Viewpoints A and B” in the 
debates about equity in health care______________________________________
Libertarian (Viewpoint A) Egalitarian (Viewpoint B)
Basics Freedom o f choice is a good in itself 
Individuals are the best judges o f 
their own welfare 
Social welfare is no more than the 
sum o f individuals’ welfare
All members o f society have equal
rights to basic goods
It is for society to determine what
these basic goods are
Social welfare depends on how these
goods are distributed within the
society
Achievement Personal achievement must be 
rewarded and “nothing unearned 
should be given”.
Committed to linking reward with 
effort but economic failure does not 
equate to moral failure. Lack o f 
achievement must not be punished.
Misfortune Private charity is the proper way to 
show social concern, but under strict 
conditions so as not to undermine 
people’s motivations to assume 
personal responsibility.
Charity is the least desirable avenue to 
showing social concern because it can 
demean the recipient and corrupt the 
donors. Collective mechanisms are 
needed if  people are to be dealt with 
equitably and to create and ensure self- 
sufficiency.
Freedom Freedom is a supreme good in itself 
and should not be sacrificed lightly. 
Government involvement is viewed 
as encroaching on personal freedom.
Freedom is about real opportunities to 
make alternative choices, and these 
may need to be curtailed for some in 
order that they can be enlarged for 
others. Government is seen as the 
m ajor instrument to assure liberties for 
most people.
Equality Equality is defined as equality before 
the law, with freedom dominating 
equality if  ever they conflict
Equality o f opportunity for 
achievement is the key concept. In its 
absence, compensation o f the deprived 
becomes a moral obligation.
Implications 
for health 
care
Health care is not special, thus should 
be considered a good like any other. 
Oppose government involvement; 
compulsory insurance impinges on 
personal freedom. Out o f concern for 
the disadvantaged, charity is 
preferred.
Health care is a right and should be 
removed from the reward system. 
Support centralised health planning 
and compulsory insurance.
Sources: Donabedian, 1971; Williams, 1993; Williams, 2005.
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Appendix 2B. Examples of summary measures of socioeconomic inequalities in 
access to health care
Index Interpretation
Correlation an d regression
Product-moment correlation Correlation between health care utilisation rate and
socioeconomic status (SES)
Regression on SES Increase in utilisation rate per one unit increase in SES (or
Utilisation rate difference between group with lower and
higher-than-average morbidity rates)
Regression on cumulative Utilisation rate ratio (Rll) or differences (SII) between the
percentiles (Relative Index o f least and most advantaged person
Inequality; Slope Index o f
Inequality)
D istributional coefficients
Pseudo-Gini coefficient 0 = no utilisation differences between groups; 1 = all
utilisation is in the hands o f  one person
Concentration index 0 = no utilisation differences associated with SES; -1/+1 = all
utilisation is in the hands o f  the least/most advantaged person
Horizontal inequity index 0 = no utilisation differences associated with SES after need
standardisation; -1/+1 = all need standardised utilisation is in
the hands o f the least/most advantaged person
Generalised concentration index Based on the concentration index, but includes also the mean
distribution o f health care
Source: Mackenbach & Kunst, 1997.
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Appendix 2 C .  Histograms of physician (GP and specialist) and dentist visits by 
province
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Appendix 3A Policy statements related to equity and access to health care across 
Canada’s provinces_____________________________________________________
Province Institution , yea r E quity-rela ted  statem ents
British
Columbia
Ministry o f Health, 199739 Equitable access to needed and appropriate health 
services is a key contributor to our health, and must 
be preserved.
Ministry o f Health, 20 0840 Our government is working to strengthen health care 
to meet the needs o f patients, and ensure that every 
British Columbian can access the care they need, 
when they need it... Access to high quality health 
services also has an impact on health status.
Ministry o f Health, 2008, 
Conversation on Health4'
British Columbian said they believed in a strong and 
sustainable public health care system that delivers 
services to all British Columbians regardless o f 
where they live, their incomes or their backgrounds 
and cultures. Managing access to the system in an 
equitable way that achieves optimal health outcomes.
Alberta Ministry o f Health, 1999 
(Public consultation)42
The health system should reflect basic values and 
principles, including: All Albertans should have 
equal access to health care when they need it.
Alberta Health and 
Wellness (Ministry o f 
Health), 200343
Albertans can be assured o f  access to high quality, 
essential health services no matter where they live.
Minister o f  Health and 
Wellness, 2008
Alberta has a good public health system that needs to 
be made more accessible.
Saskatchewan Ministry o f Health, 200144 Our top priority is improving the quality o f  services 
and access to care, while ensuring our health system 
is sustainable into the future.
Manitoba Manitoba Health 
(Ministry o f  Health), 
200745
One o f the government’s policy objectives is to 
provide quality health care in a cost effective, 
sustainable and equitable manner.
39 Health Goals for British Columbia:
http://www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/librarv/publications/vear/1997/healthgoals.pdf
40 Budget: 2008/09 -  2010/11 Service Plan http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/sp/pdf/ministrv/hlth.pdf
41 http://www.bcconversationonhealth.ca/EN/envisioning a strong and sustainable svstem o f  care/
42 Health Summit '99 Report -  Think About Health: http://www.health.alberta.ca/kev/summit99 health- 
report.html#Executive
43 Alberta Health First: Building a Better Public Health System. Reform Highlights 2003 
http://www.health.alberta.ca/kev/highlights.pdf
44The Action Plan for Saskatchewan Health Care
http://www.health.gov.sk.ca/adx/aspx/adxGetMedia.aspx?DocID=966.94,88,Documents&MedialD:=1013 
&Filename=actionplan-2001 .pdf
45 Manitoba Health and Healthy Living Annual Report 2006-2007: 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/health/ann/200607/annrpt0607.pdf
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Province Institu tion , yea r E qu ity-rela ted  statem ents
Ontario Health Services 
Restructuring 
Commission, 199946 
(advisor to Ministry o f 
Health from 1996-2000)
An issue that is important for moving health system 
reform forward is equity: to ensure equity o f access 
for all communities and regions across the province 
as well as specific populations experiencing barriers 
to service.
Toronto Central Local 
Health Integration 
Network, 20 0847
Aims to: Ensure all receive the high-quality and 
responsive care they need, regardless o f their social 
position and conditions. Reduce language, navigation 
and other barriers to equitable access and high- 
quality healthcare for all.
Quebec Ministry o f Health, 200648 Our health and social-services system symbolizes the 
values o f social justice, compassion and solidarity 
that unite Quebecers. It is founded on the principles 
o f universality, equity and the public nature o f
services.
Ministry o f Health, 200749 Universality, equity and public administration are at 
the centre o f the fundamental principles which have 
guided the evolution o f the health and social services 
system since its beginnings. Thus, health services and 
social services are accessible to all without 
discrimination.
Nova Scotia Department o f Health
200350
Accessible primary care requires equity o f  access for 
those who have historically faced barriers, including 
but not limited to barriers related to illness, disability, 
poverty, culture, race, ethnicity, language, 
geography, and gender.
Department o f Health, 
200751
The Department will support increasing the number 
o f interdisciplinary teams o f primary health care 
providers so Nova Scotians have equitable access to 
high quality, comprehensive care.
46 http://www.health.gov.on.ca/hsrc/Dhase2/NEXTSTEPSFINAL.doc
47 Health Equity Discussion Paper 2008:
http://www.torontocentrallhin.on.ca/uploadedFiles/Home Page/Report and Publications/Health%20Equi 
tv%20Discussion%20Paper%20v 1.0.pdf
48 Guaranteeing Access: Meeting the challenges o f equity, efficiency and quality 
http://publications.msss.gouv.qc.ca/acrobat/fydocumentation/2005/05-721-01 A.pdf
49 The Quebec Health and Social Services System in Brief: 
http://publications.msss.gouv.qc.ca/acrobat/f/documentation/2007/07-731-01 A.pdf 
30 Primary Health Care Renewal: Action for Healthier Nova Scotians:
http://www.gov.ns.ca/health/reports/pubs/Primarv Health Care Renewal Report May 2003.pdf 
51 Department o f Health Annual Accountability Report for the fiscal year 2006-2007: 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/health/reports/pubs/DOH Accountability 2006 07.pdf
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Province Institu tion, yea r E quity-rela ted  statem ents
New
Brunswick
Department o f Health, 
20 0552
One o f  the provincial health priorities is:
Better Access to Care and Services -  safe care and 
efficient use o f health care providers
Newfoundland Ministry o f Health and 
Community Services, 
200553
Every person has a fair opportunity to attain his/her 
full health potential. Policies and services are 
developed to reduce the differences in health status 
that are associated with factors such as 
socioeconomic status, gender, age, ability, and 
culture.
Ensure communities have reasonable access to a core 
set o f primary health care services; Improve the 
quality and accessibility o f secondary and tertiary 
care in the province.
Prince Edward 
Island
Department o f Health and 
Social Services, 2001 54
We are concerned about the ability o f  our health 
system to continue to support equity, access, and the 
core values o f  Medicare.
52 The New Brunswick Health Care Report Card 2005: http://www. gnb.ca/0051 /pub/pdf/3780e-fmal- 
compressed.pdf
53 A Strategic Health Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador:
http://www.health.gov.nl.ca/health/strategichealthplan/pdf/HealthvTogetherdocument.pdf
54 A Strategic Plan for the Prince Edward Island Health and Social Services System, 2001-2005: 
http://www. gov.pe.ca/photos/original/hss stratplan.pdf
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Appendix 3B. Comparison of national samples with and without missing income 
information
Full sam ple
Sam ple missing 
incom e
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Err. Err.
A ge
15-34 0.324 0.002 0.444 0.007
35-44 0.226 0.002 0.121 0.005
45-64 0.321 0.002 0.265 0.006
65-74 0.082 0.001 0.118 0.004
15+ 0.047 0.001 0.053 0.002
m ale 0.501 0.003 0.422 0.007
Self-assessed health
excellent 0.229 0.002 0.209 0.006
very good 0.366 0.002 0.339 0.006
good 0.296 0.002 0.322 0.006
fair 0.085 0.001 0.100 0.004
poor 0.024 0.001 0.030 0.002
health limitations
sometimes 0.150 0.002 0.138 0.004
often 0.098 0.001 0.088 0.003
never 0.752 0.002 0.774 0.005
Education
Less than secondary 0.206 0.002 0.344 0.006
Secondary 0.269 0.002 0.307 0.006
Post-secondary 0.526 0.003 0.349 0.006
Employment
employed 0.629 0.002 0.528 0.007
retired or unemployed 0.245 0.002 0.299 0.006
student 0.055 0.001 0.100 0.004
Utilisation
Hospital inpatient 0.082 0.001 0.076 0.003
GP visit probability 0.778 0.002 0.782 0.006
Specialist visit probability 0.541 0.003 0.533 0.007
Dentist visit probability 0.639 0.002 0.612 0.006
GP visits 3.131 0.013 3.195 0.032
Specialist visits 1.313 0.007 1.398 0.020
Hospital nights 0.496 0.008 0.578 0.022
Dentist visits 1.285 0.005 1.232 0.013
N ote : All differences in mean values between national sample and sub-sample missing income 
are significant at p<0.05 except the probability o f  visiting a GP, and the number o f GP visits, 
probability o f visiting a specialist, and probability o f  hospital admission.
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Appendix 3C. Province-level descriptive statistics (mean) for need and non-need
variables
B.C. A lta. Sask. M an. O nt. Que. N.L. P.E.I N.S. N.B.
Income categories
Income C2 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09
Income C3 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.26
Income C4 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.42 0.37 0.37
Income C5 0.36 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.24
Self-assessed health (SAH)
Very good SAH 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.32
Good SAH 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.34
Fair SAH 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.13
Poor SAH 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Activity limitations
Some limitations 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.15
Often limitations 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12
Age and sex
male 35-44 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
male 45-64 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18
male 65-74 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
male 75+ 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
female 15-34 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
female 35-44 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.12
female 45-64 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17
female 65-74 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
female 75+ 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Education
Secondary
education 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.28
Post-secondary
education 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.44
Region
Capital city health
region 0.14 0.38 0.26 0.61 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.27
Employment
Retired 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07
Unemployed 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.18
Student 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Employed 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.59
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Appendix 3D. Comparison of ///estim ates with extended needs variables
B.C. Alta. Sask. Man. Ont. Que. N.L. N.B. P.E.l. N.S.
Total number o f GP visits
HI -0.014 -0.021 -0.010 -0.027 -0.010 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.027 -0.012
H I - e x t  -0.009 -0.016 0.000 -0.016 -0.004 0.007 0.011 0.011 -0.018 0.001
Conditional GP visits
HI  -0.022 -0.033 -0.033 -0.045 -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.027 -0.019 -0.019
H I - e x  t -0.017 -0.029 -0.023 -0.035 -0.017 -0.008 -0.014 -0.023 -0.006 -0.009
Probability GP visit
HI  0.008 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.029 -0.007 0.011
H I - e x  t 0.008 0.015 0.024 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.027 0.028 -0.013 0.014
Specialist visits: total visits
HI  0.057 0.026 0.078 0.059 0.047 0.049 0.079 0.040 0.069 0.074
HI - ext 0.057 0.030 0.086 0.054 0.052 0.055 0.089 0.039 0.073 0.072
Conditional specialist
HI  0.014 -0.010 0.047 -0.002 0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.037 0.017
H I - e x  t 0.015 -0.009 0.052 -0.007 0.009 0.010 0.013 -0.001 0.040 0.011
Probability specialist
HI  0.046 0.039 0.035 0.063 0.047 0.048 0.076 0.040 0.036 0.058
H I - e x  t 0.046 0.041 0.035 0.063 0.049 0.050 0.080 0.039 0.042 0.062
Hospital inpatient (total)
HI  0.028 -0.083 -0.026 -0.046 -0.035 -0.046 -0.020 -0.003 -0.072 -0.058
H I - e x  t 0.035 -0.083 -0.017 -0.048 -0.025 -0.038 0.012 -0.010 -0.075 -0.072
conditional inpatient
HI 0.021 -0.069 0.022 0.032 -0.028 -0.003 0.026 0.040 -0.089 0.045
H I - e x t  0.020 -0.076 0.011 0.036 -0.023 0.003 0.054 0.037 -0.081 0.039
probability inpatient
HI  -0.013 -0.032 -0.047 -0.089 -0.028 -0.063 -0.055 -0.083 0.006 -0.105
H I - e x t  -0.013 -0.036 -0.042 -0.090 -0.027 -0.060 -0.030 -0.082 0.001 -0.110
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Appendix 3E. Full OLS utilisation models for Canada-level analysis using CCHS
2.1- GP, Specialist and Hospital Inpatient
Total
GP
Prob Cond Total
Specialist
Prob Cond
Hospital inpatient
Total Prob Cond
Needs
Very Good
SAH 0.411 0.058 0.358 0.114 0.031 0.118 0.025 0.002 0.603
Good SAH 1.141 0.084 1.186 0.308 0.054 0.385 0.122 0.024 0.711
Fair SAH 2.504 0.112 2.536 0.819 0.114 0.905 0.711 0.069 2.454
Poor SAH 5.065 0.111 5.228 1.772 0.150 1.927 2.339 0.175 3.864
Limited some 1.198 0.070 1.136 0.481 0.077 0.538 0.195 0.029 0.775
Limited often 2.850 0.097 2.778 1.150 0.159 1.112 1.172 0.103 3.066
male 35-44 -0.068 0.042 -0.255 -0.105 -0.007 -0.193 -0.109 -0.026 0.672
male 45-64 0.092 0.092 -0.208 0.114 0.114 -0.202 0.025 -0.007 1.186
male 65-74 0.480 0.182 -0.101 0.410 0.235 -0.128 0.496 0.032 2.819
male 75+ 0.754 0.205 0.104 0.385 0.279 -0.311 0.783 0.048 3.232
female 35-44 1.545 0.173 1.290 0.699 0.169 0.665 0.256 0.086 -0.139
female 35-44 0.938 0.166 0.542 0.500 0.152 0.354 0.069 0.019 0.367
female 45-64 0.726 0.179 0.215 0.452 0.201 0.063 -0.093 -0.010 0.045
female 65-74 0.720 0.218 -0.002 0.511 0.293 -0.183 0.245 -0.003 2.747
female 75+ 0.818 0.215 0.054 0.356 0.285 -0.355 0.868 0.036 3.978
Non-need variables
Income
IC 2 0.174 0.000 0.232 -0.138 0.006 -0.301 0.112 -0.007 0.781
IC 3 0.140 0.016 0.112 0.002 0.023 -0.139 0.046 -0.017 0.559
IC 4 0.041 0.027 -0.083 0.095 0.066 -0.132 -0.021 -0.023 0.199
IC 5 -0.054 0.050 -0.287 0.208 0.114 -0.105 -0.013 -0.028 0.472
Education
Secondary -0.027 0.001 -0.061 0.186 0.025 0.210 -0.044 -0.005 -0.149
Post­
secondary 0.042 0.025 -0.074 0.365 0.071 0.353 -0.001 -0.003 0.286
Insurance for
dmgs 0.406 0.060 0.240 0.222 0.077 0.109 0.065 0.006 0.363
Student 0.317 -0.004 0.402 0.006 -0.071 0.284 0.156 0.032 0.758
Employed -0.252 -0.005 -0.293 -0.256 -0.037 -0.308 -0.186 -0.022 -1.095
Province
N.L. 0.907 0.048 0.874 -0.102 -0.012 -0.137 0.298 0.021 1.796
P.E.I. -0.067 0.061 -0.367 0.162 0.016 0.218 0.372 0.035 1.752
N.S. 0.409 0.044 0.272 -0.073 -0.025 -0.033 0.069 0.008 0.134
N.B. -0.206 0.005 -0.288 -0.201 -0.024 -0.266 0.312 0.027 1.163
Ont. -1.031 -0.101 -0.934 -0.013 0.016 -0.095 0.137 0.015 0.440
Man. -0.183 -0.017 -0.176 -0.051 -0.026 -0.004 0.097 0.012 0.319
Sask. 0.451 0.017 0.485 -0.087 0.007 -0.161 0.136 0.020 0.366
Alta. 0.239 0.017 0.230 -0.130 -0.018 -0.159 0.072 0.013 0.032
B.C. 0.517 0.031 0.475 -0.119 -0.054 0.012 -0.021 0.005 -0.640
N 101445 101445 80610 101445 101445 56384 101445 101445 9552
R2 0.182 0.076 0.170 0.1035 0.0802 0.091 0.075 0.0624 0.182
F 203.02 93.56 147.32 109.25 129.15 49.16 42.57 63.16 30.59
Notes: Bold is significant at p<0.05, italics is significant at p<0.10; SAH is self-assessed health;
IC is income category.
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Appendix 3E Continued. Full Utilisation models for Canada-level analysis using 
CCHS 2.1 (2003) -  Dentist visits______________________________
Total
Dentist
Probability Conditional
Needs
age 35-44 0.124 0.042 0.064
age45-64 0.106 0.032 0.063
age 65-74 0.122 0.019 0.121
age 75+ 0.024 -0.006 0.046
Very Good SAOH -0.023 -0.033 0.050
Good SAOH -0.072 -0.105 0.189
Fair SAOH 0.038 -0.145 0.568
Poor SAOH 0.208 -0.180 1.188
Non-need variables
Income
IC 2 -0.087 0.002 -0.244
IC 3 0.090 0.057 -0.092
IC 4 0.286 0.145 -0.055
IC 5 0.471 0.217 0.001
male -0.212 -0.059 -0.141
Secondary education 0.056 0.072 -0.152
Post-secondary education 0.153 0.124 -0.157
Dental insurance 0.489 0.177 0.226
employed 0.019 0.007 0.012
student -0.402 -0.105 -0.263
Province
N.L. -0.092 -0.080 0.095
P.E.I. 0.195 0.069 0.114
N.S. 0.199 0.032 0.228
N.B. 0.015 -0.037 0.163
Ont. 0.266 0.075 0.179
Man. 0.081 0.005 0.117
Sask. -0.114 -0.041 -0.070
Alta. -0.004 -0.002 0.005
B.C. 0.253 0.074 0.164
N 101445 101445 58308
R2 0.0711 0.1528 0.0316
F 133.83 327.89 21.03
Notes: Bold is significant at p<0.05, italics is significant at p<0.10; SAOH is self-assessed oral 
health; IC is income category.
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Appendix 3F. Comparison of indices of inequity with linear versus non-linear utilisation models
B.C. Alta. Sask. Man. Ont. Que. N.L. N.B. P.E.I. N.S.
Total number o f  G P visits 
Linear -0.014 -0.021 -0.010 -0.027 -0.010 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.027 -0.012
Non-linear -0.011 -0.017 -0.003 -0.019 -0.006 0.005 0.008 0.003 -0.027 -0.010
Conditional GP
Linear -0.022 -0.033 -0.033 -0.045 -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.027 -0.019 -0.019
Non-linear -0.019 -0.031 -0.028 -0.042 -0.021 -0.012 -0.018 -0.028 -0.021 -0.018
P robability  G P  
Linear 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.029 -0.007 0.011
Non-linear 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.027 -0.010 0.011
Specialist visits
Total specialist visits
Linear 0.057 0.026 0.078 0.059 0.048 0.049 0.079 0.040 0.069 0.074
Non-linear 0.065 0.028 0.094 0.061 0.054 0.057 0.077 0.042 0.080 0.078
Conditional specialist 
Linear 0.014 -0.010 0.047 -0.002 0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.037 0.017
Non-linear 0.017 -0.009 0.055 -0.004 0.009 0.009 0.002 -0.003 0.039 0.019
P robability  specialist 
Linear 0.046 0.039 0.035 0.063 0.047 0.048 0.076 0.040 0.047 0.058
Non-linear 0.046 0.039 0.035 0.063 0.047 0.047 0.077 0.041 0.037 0.059
Note: Bold is significant at p<0.05, italics significant at p<0.10
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Appendix 3F Continued
B.C. Alta. Sask. Man. Ont. Que. N.L. N.B. P.E.I. N.S.
Total inpatien t days
Linear 0.028 -0.083 -0.026 -0.046 -0.035 -0.046 -0.020 -0.003 -0.072 -0.058
Non-linear 0.064 -0.094 0.042 -0.053 0.006 0.000 0.049 0.034 0.001 0.199
Conditional inpatient
Linear 0.021 -0.069 0.022 0.032 -0.028 -0.003 0.026 0.040 -0.089 0.045
Non-linear 0.016 -0.082 0.037 0.049 -0.034 -0.035 0.049 0.054 -0.091 0.067
P robability  inpatient
Linear 0.006 -0.057 -0.083 -0.055 -0.063 -0.089 -0.047 -0.013 0.008 -0.105
Non-linear -0.003 -0.026 -0.046 -0.093 -0.021 -0.021 -0.042 -0.086 0.012 -0.104
Dentists •
Total dentists
Linear 0.093 0.075 0.073 0.124 0.100 0.105 0.155 0.130 0.043 0.119
Non-linear 0.093 0.076 0.070 0.122 0.099 0.102 0.151 0.129 0.042 0.119
Conditional dentists
Linear 0.015 0.000 -0.001 0.020 0.018 0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.011 0.001
Non-linear 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.021 0.018 0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.011 0.001
P robability  dentist
Linear 0.077 0.074 0.075 0.102 0.080 0.102 0.159 0.121 0.053 0.116
Non-linear 0.077 0.073 0.073 0.101 0.079 0.101 0.150 0.118 0.050 0.115
Note: Bold is significant at p<0.05, italics significant at p<0.10
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Appendix 3G. Decomposition of inequity in specialist visit probability using linear versus non-linear models, Newfoundland
Non-linear Mean Cl ME Contribution Sum Linear Mean Cl ME Contribution Sum
HI 0.085 HI 0.077
Income C2 0.099 -0.732 0.009 -0.001 Income C2 0.099 -0.732 0.010 -0.001
Income C3 0.286 -0.347 -0.011 0.002 Income C3 0.286 -0.347 -0.011 0.002
Income C4 0.347 0.174 0.015 0.002 Income C4 0.347 0.174 0.012 0.001
Income C5 0.230 0.628 0.132 0.037 0.040 Income C5 0.230 0.628 0.121 0.034 0.037
Very good SAH 0.453 0.022 0.096 0.002 Very good SAH 0.453 0.022 0.087 0.002
Good SAH 0.222 -0.060 0.109 -0.003 Good SAH 0.222 -0.060 0.099 -0.003
Fair SAH 0.075 -0.188 0.209 -0.006 Fair SAH 0.075 -0.188 0.203 -0.006
Poor SAH 0.036 -0.403 0.236 -0.007 -0.013 Poor SAH 0.036 -0.403 0.228 -0.006 -0.013
Some limitations 0.123 -0.051 0.116 -0.001 Some limitations 0.123 -0.051 0.109 -0.001
Often limitations 0.106 -0.197 0.181 -0.007 -0.009 Often limitations 0.106 -0.197 0.164 -0.007 -0.008
male 35-44 0.113 0.167 0.035 0.001 male 35-44 0.113 0.167 0.033 0.001
male 45-64 0.188 0.071 0.130 0.003 male 45-64 0.188 0.071 0.121 0.003
male 65-74 0.043 -0.135 0.279 -0.003 male 65-74 0.043 -0.135 0.281 -0.003
male 75+ 0.019 -0.318 0.131 -0.002 0.000 male 75+ 0.019 -0.318 0.116 -0.001 0.000
female 15-34 0.152 -0.032 0.155 -0.001 female 15-34 0.152 -0.032 0.146 -0.001
female 35-44 0.104 0.045 0.174 0.002 female 35-44 0.104 0.045 0.165 0.002
female 45-64 0.178 -0.027 0.265 -0.003 female 45-64 0.178 -0.027 0.253 -0.002
female 65-74 0.038 -0.281 0.226 -0.005 female 65-74 0.038 -0.281 0.221 -0.005
female 75+ 0.024 -0.426 0.143 -0.003 -0.010 female 75+ 0.024 -0.426 0.129 -0.003 -0.010
Secondary education 0.228 -0.009 0.040 0.000 Secondary education 0.228 -0.009 0.034 0.000
Post-sec. education 0.477 0.192 0.083 0.015 0.015 Post-sec. education 0.477 0.192 0.076 0.014 0.014
St John's region 0.374 0.153 0.128 0.014 0.014 St John's region 0.374 0.153 0.118 0.013 0.013
Insurance drugs 0.690 0.097 0.073 0.010 0.010 Insurance drugs 0.690 0.097 0.068 0.009 0.009
Retired 0.066 -0.257 -0.012 0.000 Retired 0.066 -0.257 -0.001 0.000
Unemployed 0.226 -0.282 -0.067 0.008 Unemployed 0.226 -0.282 -0.057 0.007
Student 0.043 0.115 0.055 0.001 Student 0.043 0.115 0.049 0.000
Employed 0.566 0.128 -0.023 -0.003 0.006 Employed 0.566 0.128 -0.018 -0.003 0.005
Error -0.007 Error 0.002
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Appendix 3H. Comparison of income-related inequity in Canada in 2003 (CCHS 
2.1) and 2005 (CCHS 3.1)
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Note: All indices significant at p<0.05 level except that for total GP visits and conditional 
specialist visits.
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Appendix 31. Inequity in Preventive Dental Utilisation
Table 1. Indices of inequity in preventive dental utilisation and its contributing 
factors in Ontario and British Columbia
Ontario British Columbia
Variable Some check-■ups Frequent check­ Some check-ups Frequent check­
ups (>1 per year) ups (>1 per year)
C IUnadj 0.0980 0.1719 0.0981 0.1578
H I 0.1017 0.1664 0.0917 0.1547
N on-need variable 'S
Income 0.0600 0.1108 0.0443 0.0659
Sex -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0028 -0.0047
Education 0.0079 0.0061 0.0075 0.0078
Work status 0.0029 0.0053 0.0001 0.0034
Dental Insurance 0.0154 0.0331 0.0255 0.0547
Capital city 0.0004 0.0012 0.0002 0.0009
Other 0.0047 0.0031 0.0101 0.0055
N eed
Age 0.0036 -0.0055 0.0065 0.0030
Error 0.0060 0.0215 0.0003 0.0182
Note: C lunadj is unadjusted inequality in utilisation by income, and HI is the adjusted horizontal 
inequity index. All indices are significant at p<0.05. “other” variables include marital status, 
race, whether or not the individual is an immigrant, and a smoker.
Figure 1. Concentration curves for dental check-ups in Ontario under different 
specifications
Concentration Curve for Dental Check - Up in Ontario
w
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Source : Canada Community Health Survey 2003
(1) “some” : respondents who report any frequency o f check-up visits (less than once, once or 
more than once a year); (2) “regular” : respondents who report a check-up visit at least once a 
year; (3) “good” : respondents who report more than one check-up visit per year; (4) “proxy” : 
respondents with at least one visit in past twelve months with no extraction (proxy for 
prevention).
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Appendix 3J. Effect of dental insurance on the likelihood of a dentist visit 
(marginal effects from probit model, controlling for all other variables)
Percentage of 
population  with dental 
insurance
M arginal effect of 
dental insurance on the 
likelihood of a dentist 
visit (s tan d a rd  e rro r)
Newfoundland 49.66 0.281 (0.030)
PEI 54.19 0.151 (0.039)
Nova Scotia 59.93 0.232 (0.026)
New Brunswick 60.11 0.214 (0.026)
Quebec 46.45 0.145 (0.013)
Ontario 68.84 0.202 (0.010)
Manitoba 65.68 0.130 (0.028)
Saskatchewan 65.71 0.196 (0.024)
Alberta 71.14 0.214 (0.019)
BC 62.97 0.220 (0.015)
CANADA 61.92 0.185 (0.006)
Note: All coefficients are significant at p<0.05.
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C h a p t e r  4: 4A-4D
Appendix 4A. Non-linear estimations of GP and specialist utilisation
GP Specialist
Probability Conditional Probability Conditional
ME SE Coef SE ME SE C oef SE
Needs
Very good 
SAH 0.038 0.008 0.156 0.025 0.032 0.011 -0.011 0.048
Good SAH 0.041 0.009 0.345 0.027 0.049 0.013 0.087 0.045
Fair SAH 0.071 0.011 0.576 0.039 0.084 0.018 0.317 0.065
Poor SAH 0.114 0.011 0.856 0.053 0.152 0.026 0.800 0.104
Moderate
limitations 0.037 0.009 0.214 0.028 0.104 0.012 0.245 0.045
Severe
limitations 0.075 0.009 0.421 0.032 0.130 0.015 0.502 0.048
Chronic
condition 0.094 0.009 0.362 0.023 0.080 0.011 0.265 0.048
Female 0.063 0.010 0.057 0.025 0.099 0.012 0.042 0.047
Age -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.007
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female 18-
45 0.051 0.011 0.234 0.034 0.030 0.015 0.263 0.054
N on-need variables
Income (In) 0.029 0.007 -0.095 0.019 0.051 0.009 0.093 0.045
Secondary
education 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.030 0.027 0.015 0.144 0.046
Some post­
secondary 
education 0.010 0.014 0.022 0.039 0.091 0.018 0.161 0.052
Post­
secondary
education 0.041 0.010 0.028 0.026 0.095 0.013 0.255 0.038
Urban 0.019 0.008 0.032 0.024 0.001 0.011 0.072 0.036
Employed 0.007 0.009 -0.104 0.027 -0.035 0.012 -0.116 0.041
Student 0.028 0.011 -0.163 0.035 0.081 0.016 -0.009 0.129
Canada bom -0.021 0.008 -0.022 0.022 0.006 0.011 0.084 0.038
Insurance for prescription drugs
Public
insurance 0.043 0.011 0.179 0.034 0.078 0.016 0.093 0.048
Private Ins-
Group 0.049 0.008 0.068 0.026 0.079 0.011 0.037 0.038
Private Ins -
Individual 0.037 0.015 0.132 0.068 0.063 0.023 0.022 0.074
Constant -1.217 0.276 1.753 0.212 -2.039 0.251 -0.874 0.41
Alpha 0.394 0.012 0.546 0.028
Notes: Probit estimations are used for probability models (ME= marginal effects); negative 
binomial regression estimations are used for the models o f conditional number o f  visits. For 
negative binomial models, alpha  is the estimate for over-dispersion. Bold is significant at 
p<0.05.
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Appendix 4B. Effects of drug insurance coverage on the two-part GP and specialist 
models under different specifications (OLS models adjusting for all other 
variables)
probability
GP
conditional
visits
Specialist
probability conditional 
visits
Drug
insurance
coverage
Full specification
N =33161 Public 0.048 0.943 0.074 0.212
Private-Group 0.052 0.267 0.074 0.12
Private-
Individual 0.044 0.56 0.061 0.063
Under 65 population
N=26354 Public 0.038 1.219 0.082 0.322
Private-Group 0.055 0.295 0.079 0.12
Private-
Individual 0.044 0.645 0.056 0.02
Excluding income
N=33161 Public 0.047 0.965 0.072 0.196
Private-Group 0.061 0.136 0.089 0.225
Private-
Individual 0.051 0.454 0.074 0.139
Note: Bold is significant at 5% level, italics is significant at 10% level.
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A ppendix 4C. Effects of d rug  insurance coverage on the tw o-part GP and specialist 
models and  estim ates of inequity w ith alternative income variable (OLS models,
adjusting for all o ther varia bles)
GP Specialist
probability conditional probability conditional
visits visits
Standard imputation
Public 0.048 0.943 0.074 0.212
Private-Group 0.052 0.267 0.074 0.12
Private-
Individual 0.044 0.56 0.061 0.063
Estim ates o f  inequity 0.017 -0.051 0.041 0.045
Alternative imputation
Public 0.048 0.016 0.074 0.214
Private-Group 0.054 0.016 0.078 0.132
Private-
Individual 0.046 0.541 0.064 0.071
Estim ates o f  inequity 0.016 -0.051 0.041 0.047
Note: Bold is significant at 5% level, italics is significant at 10% level.
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Appendix 4D. Details of the public drug programme in Ontario
The public drug programme in the province of Ontario, termed the Ontario Drug 
Benefit Programme, covers different population groups each with different cost sharing 
arrangements. It is funded by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and the 
Ministry of Community and Social Services. Each year the plan covers about 2.8 
million Ontario residents at a cost of about $3.8 billion (Ontario Public Drug Programs, 
2007). The benefits are listed on the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary/Comparative 
Drug Index and include over 3,400 prescription drug products, about 450 limited-use 
drug products, and some nutritional and diabetic testing agents. For drugs that are not 
included in the Formulary, the Ministry of Health’s Individual Clinical Review 
considers their inclusion on a case-by-case basis. It does not cover drugs purchased 
outside Ontario, prescribed by a pharmacist not licensed in Ontario, and the following 
products: syringes and other diabetic supplies such as lancets and glucometers, 
eyeglasses, dentures, hearing aids, or compression stockings.
The following population groups are covered:
■ All Ontario residents 65 years of age and older (no registration is required, cost 
sharing is income-based)
■ Ontario residents on social assistance (Ontario Disability Support Programme
and/or Ontario Works)
■ Residents of homes for special care and long-term care homes
■ Ontario residents receiving professional home care services
■ Ontario residents with high prescription drug costs relative to their income
(covered by the Trillium Drug Programme)
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■ Individuals with certain chronic conditions (covered by the Special Drugs Plan) 
with no deductibles or co-payments. This programme covers specific drugs for 
the treatment of cystic fibrosis and thalassaemia, specific drugs used to treat 
people who are HIV positive, Erythropoietin (EPO) for people with end stage 
renal disease, Cyclosporine for people who have had a solid organ or bone 
marrow transplant, human growth hormone for children with growth failure, 
Clozapine for treatment of schizophrenia, and Alglucerase for people with 
Gaucher's Disease
Cost sharing arrangements for over-65 population
Individuals are classified into either high-income or low-income. High-income seniors 
are defined as: singly seniors with an annual income of $16,018 or more and seniors in 
couples with a combined annual income of $24,175 or more. This category must pay an 
annual deductible of $100.00, and co-payment of up to $6.11 toward the dispensing fee 
each time they fill a prescription (dispensing fees vary across pharmacies). Low income 
seniors are defined as singles with an annual income below $16,018 and seniors in 
couples with combined annual income less than $24,175 may have a co-payment of up 
to $2.00. Upon turning 65 all seniors are automatically enrolled in the high-income 
category. All other categories of eligible groups of the public drug programme have no 
deductible, and may have to pay up to $2.00 co-payment.
The Trillium Drug Program offers coverage for Ontario residents who have a valid 
Ontario Health Card, have high prescription drug costs in relation to their net household 
income, do not have private insurance coverage (or their coverage is not 100%), and do 
not fall into any of the categories above eligible for public coverage. Eligible
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individuals must apply for registration (at a local pharmacy, by phone, or online). The 
cost sharing arrangements are as follows. There is an annual deductible (the year runs 
from August 1 to July 31) that is calculated on the basis of the household income and 
size, and paid quarterly. Co-payments up to $2.00 are then required for every drug 
product purchased. For households with annual net income below $100,000, the 
Ontario Drug Plan calculates the deductible for all possible income and household size 
categories. A single person with a net annual income of $40,000 would face an annual 
deductible of $1411. For households with annual net income above $100,000 the 
deductible is calculated on the basis of the following formula: total household net 
income minus $20,000, multiplied by 0.045 (subtract $100 if the number of people in 
the household is two, $150 if three, and $200 if four or more). For example, a family of 
three with two working parents and one child with a total annual net income of 
$120,000 would pay an annual deductible of: $4350.
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C h a p t e r  5: 5a -5 d
Appendix 5A. Full utilisation models (to calculate residuals)
(1) GP visit
P robability  (probit)
Coef. Std. Err.
T otal N um ber 
(OLS)
Coef. Std. Err.
C onditional N um ber 
(OLS)
Coef. Std. Err.
Needs variables
male 35-44 0.034 0.026 -0.014 0.063 -0.061 0.083
male 45-54 0.150 0.030 -0.124 0.070 -0.323 0.089
male 55-64 0.302 0.033 0.126 0.073 -0.183 0.090
male 65+ 0.572 0.033 0.579 0.081 0.115 0.096
female 18-34 0.513 0.024 1.556 0.059 1.386 0.071
female 35-44 0.389 0.027 0.712 0.070 0.446 0.086
female 45-54 0.469 0.031 0.585 0.076 0.211 0.090
female 55-64 0.528 0.031 0.458 0.071 0.000 0.086
female 65+ 0.644 0.031 0.539 0.076 -0.030 0.091
Very good SAH 0.093 0.018 0.262 0.036 0.270 0.044
Good SAH 0.132 0.020 0.736 0.044 0.840 0.053
Fair SAH 0.208 0.031 1.780 0.092 1.936 0.103
Poor SAH 0.343 0.054 4.303 0.204 4.454 0.212
moderate limitations 0.180 0.022 0.800 0.057 0.764 0.063
severe limitations 0.344 0.028 2.002 0.086 1.908 0.091
chronic condition 0.371 0.016 1.016 0.032 0.942 0.040
chronic (missing) -0.201 0.135 0.211 0.458 0.759 0.687
Worse SAH past year 0.177 0.025 0.854 0.073 0.795 0.080
poor mental SAH 0.081 0.037 0.781 0.121 0.811 0.131
Obese 0.052 0.019 0.389 0.050 0.402 0.058
BMI missing -0.064 0.040 0.446 0.113 0.615 0.133
Socioeconomics an d  provin cia l variables
married 0.088 0.020 0.326 0.051 0.291 0.063
widow 0.046 0.024 0.460 0.068 0.469 0.081
Current smoker -0.120 0.018 -0.046 0.049 0.097 0.059
Past smoker 0.012 0.016 -0.013 0.037 -0.025 0.044
drinks -0.024 0.026 -0.178 0.058 -0.173 0.072
Secondary/some post -
secondary education 0.094 0.022 0.006 0.058 -0.083 0.069
Post-secondary education 0.145 0.020 0.017 0.053 -0.144 0.063
Educ (missing) 0.017 0.053 0.165 0.152 0.202 0.186
2 person household -0.026 0.021 -0.021 0.057 0.005 0.069
3 person household -0.013 0.024 0.099 0.063 0.154 0.077
4 person household 0.037 0.027 0.063 0.072 0.050 0.087
5+ person household -0.028 0.032 0.037 0.081 0.096 0.097
Bom in Canada -0.042 0.021 -0.039 0.049 -0.009 0.057
Bom in Canada (missing) -0.074 0.040 -0.010 0.107 0.076 0.128
Income $15,000-$29,999 0.054 0.031 -0.243 0.093 -0.399 0.111
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.125 0.030 -0.273 0.092 -0.518 0.111
Income $50,000-$79,999 0.164 0.031 -0.351 0.091 -0.663 0.109
Income $80,000+ 0.233 0.032 -0.460 0.091 -0.856 0.110
Income (missing) 0.091 0.033 -0.427 0.096 -0.640 0.114
N.L. 0.165 0.036 0.566 0.096 0.467 0.109
P.E.I. 0.183 0.054 -0.068 0.132 -0.293 0.148
N.S. 0.173 0.035 0.367 0.085 0.219 0.095
N.B. 0.006 0.031 -0.423 0.073 -0.568 0.086
Que. -0.284 0.018 -1.022 0.041 -1.029 0.049
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Probability
Coef. Std. Err.
T otal
Coef. Std. Err.
C onditional
Coef. Std. Err.
Man. 0.029 0.032 -0.102 0.078 -0.173 0.091
Sask. 0.108 0.030 0.240 0.071 0.160 0.081
Alta. 0.015 0.024 0.030 0.063 0.019 0.075
B.C. 0.118 0.022 0.553 0.060 0.530 0.068
Constant -0.141 0.043 1.020 0.114 2.290 0.139
N
W ald chi2(probit)/F  (OLS)
P rob > chi2(probit)/P rob>0 (OLS 
Pseudo R2 (probit)/ R2 (OLS)
116113
4389.06
0
0.0843
116113
223.22
0
0.1949
92364
159.44
0
0.1844
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Appendix 5A Cont’d:
(2) Specialist visits
P robab ility  (probit)
Coef. Std. Err.
Total (OLS)
Coef. Std. Err.
C onditional (OLS)
Coef. Std. Err.
N eeds variables
male 35-44 -0.008 0.025 -0.041 0.034 -0.064 0.068
male 45-54 0.242 0.028 0.060 0.038 -0.205 0.067
male 55-64 0.373 0.029 0.205 0.044 -0.128 0.072
male 65+ 0.766 0.028 0.604 0.043 0.026 0.066
female 18-34 0.440 0.022 0.696 0.033 0.694 0.056
female 35-44 0.378 0.025 0.411 0.036 0.257 0.062
female 45-54 0.490 0.028 0.391 0.042 0.040 0.068
female 55-64 0.563 0.027 0.434 0.045 0.005 0.070
female 65+ 0.813 0.028 0.505 0.040 -0.149 0.062
Very good SAH 0.033 0.016 0.040 0.021 0.030 0.034
Good SAH 0.088 0.018 0.179 0.025 0.198 0.040
Fair SAH 0.208 0.026 0.622 0.051 0.707 0.070
Poor SAH 0.313 0.043 1.449 0.108 1.614 0.128
moderate limitations 0.237 0.018 0.501 0.032 0.496 0.044
severe limitations 0.348 0.022 1.033 0.047 1.070 0.059
chronic condition 0.249 0.015 0.356 0.018 0.379 0.031
chronic (missing) 0.040 0.130 0.112 0.157 0.235 0.302
Worse SAH past year 0.118 0.020 0.200 0.039 0.149 0.052
poor mental SAH -0.011 0.029 0.369 0.071 0.628 0.101
Obese -0.033 0.016 0.011 0.027 0.066 0.041
BMI missing -0.035 0.034 0.229 0.064 0.464 0.094
Socioeconomic and provincia l variables
married -0.017 0.018 0.102 0.029 0.204 0.049
widow -0.044 0.022 0.057 0.038 0.168 0.058
Current smoker -0.160 0.017 -0.150 0.026 -0.035 0.042
Past smoker 0.012 0.014 0.061 0.022 0.083 0.033
drinks -0.040 0.024 -0.099 0.032 -0.145 0.058
Secondary/some post - 
secondary education 0.201 0.019 0.307 0.028 0.252 0.045
Post-secondary education 0.292 0.018 0.422 0.026 0.336 0.040
educ (missing) 0.028 0.047 0.093 0.061 0.114 0.096
2 person household -0.003 0.019 -0.113 0.032 -0.188 0.051
3 person household -0.035 0.022 -0.125 0.036 -0.163 0.058
4 person household -0.037 0.025 -0.168 0.041 -0.236 0.066
5+ person household -0.033 0.029 -0.196 0.045 -0.298 0.072
Bom in Canada 0.070 0.018 0.091 0.028 0.065 0.042
Bom in Canada (missing) 0.040 0.035 0.045 0.048 0.010 0.076
Income $15,000-$29,999 -0.007 0.028 -0.037 0.046 -0.084 0.071
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.069 0.028 0.060 0.046 -0.011 0.070
Income $50,000-$79,999 0.134 0.029 0.152 0.047 0.062 0.072
Income $80,000+ 0.239 0.030 0.215 0.048 0.029 0.074
Income (missing) 0.105 0.030 0.032 0.047 -0.107 0.072
N.L. -0.119 0.031 -0.238 0.044 -0.280 0.075
P.E.I. 0.036 0.042 0.040 0.070 -0.010 0.107
N.S. -0.039 0.030 -0.035 0.048 0.005 0.071
N.B. -0.050 0.028 -0.224 0.041 -0.319 0.063
Que. 0.064 0.016 0.009 0.025 -0.078 0.038
Man. -0.086 0.028 -0.116 0.041 -0.092 0.066
Sask. -0.029 0.025 -0.194 0.037 -0.314 0.058
Alta. -0.076 0.022 -0.224 0.032 -0.290 0.051
B.C. -0.102 0.019 -0.161 0.028 -0.127 0.044
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P robability T otal C onditional
C oef SE C oef SE C oef SE
Constant ■0.871 0.040 -0.034 0.062 1.249 0.100
N 116113 116113 65184
Wald chi2(probit)/F  (OLS)
P rob  > chi2(probit)/P rob>0 (OLS
4719.01 115.63 54.53
0 0 0
Pseudo R2 (probit)/ R2 (OLS) 0.0685 0.1103 0.10
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Appendix 5A Cont’d 
(3) Inpatient admissions
Probability Total Number
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Conditional
Coef. Std. Err.
N eeds variables
male 35-44 -0.239 0.043 -0.077 0.031 0.693 0.575
male 45-54 -0.183 0.043 -0.051 0.042 1.515 0.678
male 55-64 -0.021 0.041 0.053 0.047 1.362 0.552
male 65+ 0.260 0.038 0.559 0.060 2.843 0.539
female 18-34 0.508 0.034 0.221 0.028 0.064 0.392
female 35-44 0.075 0.038 -0.013 0.031 0.020 0.453
female 45-54 -0.101 0.048 -0.102 0.036 0.196 0.517
female 55-64 -0.077 0.043 -0.047 0.041 1.067 0.559
female 65+ 0.133 0.038 0.300 0.054 2.340 0.550
Very good SAH -0.010 0.027 0.016 0.012 0.654 0.186
Good SAH 0.110 0.027 0.109 0.019 1.183 0.218
Fair SAH 0.361 0.034 0.714 0.063 2.797 0.378
Poor SAH 0.693 0.045 2.313 0.179 4.286 0.539
moderate limitations 0.210 0.023 0.205 0.030 0.652 0.251
severe limitations 0.409 0.025 0.854 0.065 2.414 0.319
chronic condition 0.151 0.024 0.054 0.015 0.505 0.197
chronic (missing) -0.040 0.211 -0.004 0.113 0.467 1.957
Worse SAH past year 0.243 0.023 0.402 0.053 0.575 0.269
poor mental SAH -0.052 0.034 -0.089 0.080 0.367 0.446
Obese 0.041 0.021 -0.030 0.031 -0.298 0.248
BMI missing -0.027 0.041 0.010 0.060 0.162 0.450
Socioeconom ic and provincial variables
married 0.282 0.026 0.097 0.028 -1.054 0.306
widow 0.233 0.031 0.157 0.046 -0.347 0.404
Current smoker 0.045 0.024 -0.028 0.028 -0.336 0.274
Past smoker 0.087 0.020 0.052 0.021 -0.175 0.214
drinks 0.062 0.047 -0.021 0.036 -0.612 0.439
Secondary/some post -
secondary education -0.035 0.025 0.000 0.036 0.522 0.296
Post-secondary education -0.021 0.022 0.009 0.034 0.404 0.266
Educ (missing) 0.105 0.063 0.081 0.081 0.135 0.651
2 person household -0.125 0.028 -0.145 0.041 -0.528 0.372
3 person household 0.032 0.031 -0.051 0.042 -0.209 0.408
4 person household -0.034 0.036 -0.072 0.046 -0.244 0.481
5+ person household -0.007 0.042 -0.099 0.046 -0.853 0.483
Bom in Canada 0.103 0.025 0.116 0.027 0.396 0.290
Bom in Canada (missing) 0.044 0.051 0.046 0.053 0.025 0.526
Income $15,000-$29,999 -0.075 0.031 -0.170 0.070 -0.603 0.428
Income $30,000-$49,999 -0.101 0.032 -0.248 0.067 -1.231 0.431
Income $50,000-$79,999 -0.142 0.033 -0.231 0.067 -0.759 0.445
Income $80,000+ -0.163 0.035 -0.255 0.067 -1.205 0.460
Income (missing) -0.152 0.034 -0.205 0.070 -0.396 0.480
N.L. 0.014 0.042 0.029 0.052 -0.164 0.471
P.E.I. 0.181 0.057 0.410 0.144 1.846 0.997
N.S. 0.026 0.037 0.049 0.048 -0.019 0.409
N.B. 0.066 0.035 0.153 0.055 0.329 0.463
Que. 0.118 0.022 0.081 0.027 -0.348 0.262
Man. 0.075 0.039 0.040 0.046 -0.321 0.444
Sask. 0.174 0.035 0.088 0.047 -0.716 0.388
Alta. 0.115 0.030 0.046 0.034 -0.456 0.311
B.C. -0.008 0.026 -0.049 0.029 -0.694 0.315
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Probability T otal N um ber C onditional
Constant -2.073 0.058 0.128 0.074 3.864 0.645
N 116113 116113 11185
W ald chi2(probit)/F  (OLS) 3177.1 41.66 28.25
P rob > chi (probit)/P rob> 0 (OLS 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 (prob it)/ R2 (OLS) 0.0988 0.0691 0.1477
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Appendix 5B. Full OLS models of residual GP, specialist and inpatient utilisation
R esidual GP utilisation  
Prob Cond Total
R esidual specialist 
utilisation  
Prob Cond Total
R esidual inpatient 
utilisation  
Prob Cond
SUN-wait 0.044 0.602 0.666 0.081 0.392 0.473 0.013 -0.361
SUN-barrier -0.024 0.391 0.219 -0.022 -0.021 -0.065 -0.003 0.054
SUN-choice -0.059 -0.254 -0.479 -0.039 -0.090 -0.160 -0.017 -0.007
SUN-other -0.038 0.559 0.293 0.012 0.310 0.231 0.035 0.193
married -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.000
widow -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.003
Current smoker 0.001 -0.028 -0.015 -0.001 -0.014 -0.010 -0.001 0.007
Past smoker 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
drinks 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.002
Secondary/some post 
-secondary education 0.001 -0.014 -0.009 -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
Post-secondary
education 0.001 -0.029 -0.021 -0.002 -0.016 -0.014 0.000 0.014
Education, (missing) 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.024
2 person household 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
3 person household 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
4 person household 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.005
5+ person household 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.008
Bom in Canada 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.001
Bom in Canada 
(missing) 0.000 -0.010 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.028
Income $15,000- 
$29,999 -0.001 0.019 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.004
Income $30,000- 
$49,999 -0.002 0.024 0.014 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.009
Income $50,000- 
$79,999 -0.003 0.029 0.014 -0.001 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.007
Income $80,000+ -0.002 0.032 0.015 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.004
Income (missing) -0.001 0.032 0.016 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.001 0.001
N.L. -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.010
P.E.I. -0.004 -0.014 -0.019 -0.002 -0.011 -0.013 0.000 0.010
N.S. -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.008
N.B. -0.003 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000
Que. -0.001 -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 0.000 0.007
Man. 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.003
Sask. 0.000 0.010 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.005
Alta. -0.001 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.001
B.C. 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003
N 116113 92364 116113 116113 65184 116113 116113 11185
R2 0.0014 0.0023 0.0022 0.0016 0.0023 0.0031 0.0007 0.0002
F 2.22 2.02 2.49 2.79 1.22 11.17 0.78 0.04
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Appendix 5C: Association between ‘preferences’ and SUN - Adjusted odds ratios of reported unmet home care needs and satisfaction with life 
in general and SUN
Any unmet need SUN-
wait
SUN-
barrier
SUN-
choice
SUN-
Other
Mean OR 95%  C l OR 95%  C l OR 95%  C l OR 95%  C l OR 95%  C l
Unmet home care needs
yes 0.017 3.22 (2.78-3.72) 1.99 (1.65-2.39) 3.05 (2.46-3.78) 2.15 (1.68-2.75) 2.43 (1.99-2.98)
Satisfaction with life in general
very satisfied 0.379
satisfied 0.518 1.26 (1.18-1.35) 1.18 (1.08-1.29) 1.35 (1.17-1.56) 1.49 (1.30-1.71) 1.16 (1.00-1.35)
neither satisfied 0.052 2.00 (1.77-2.25) 1.41 (1.19-1.66) 2.53 (2.02-3.16) 2.51 (2.03-3.10) 1.60 (1.25-2.03)
nor dissatisfied
dissatisfied 0.026 2.11 (1.80-2.46) 1.42 (1.15-1.75) 3.11 (2.37-4.08) 2.31 (1.76-3.03) 1.74 (1.34-2.27)
very dissatisfied 0.005 2.66 (2.01-3.52) 1.41 (0.94-2.10) 2.62 (1.75-3.91) 2.63 (1.56-4.43) 2.11 (1.42-3.12)
(missing) 0.020 1.03 (0.80-1.32) 0.86 (0.64-1.16) 1.29 (0.71-2.36) 1.05 (0.66-1.68) 1.50 (0.98-2.31)
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.064 0.094 0.067 0.072
'Jotes: Odds rations (ORs) adjusted for all needs variables; 95% Cl is the 95% confidence interval surrounding the point estimate.
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Appendix 5D. OLS models of residual GP and specialist utilisation after 
incorporating “preference” indicators in the utilisation models to generate 
residuals
Residual GP 
utilisation
Conditional Total
Residual specialist 
utilisation
Conditional Total
SUN-wait 0.573 0.638 0.380 -0.173
SUN-barrier 0.287 0.136 -0.064 0.461
SUN-choice -0.295 -0.505 -0.111 -0.108
SUN-other 0.491 0.237 0.289 0.204
married -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.005
widow -0.003 -0.009 0.000 -0.004
Current smoker -0.024 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009
Past smoker -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
drinks 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.004
Secondary/some post -secondary 
education -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005
Post-secondary education -0.025 -0.019 -0.014 -0.013
Education (missing) -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002
2 person household 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
3 person household -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001
4 person household -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000
5+ person household 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004
Bom in Canada 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.004
Bom in Canada (missing) -0.008 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
Income $15,000-$29,999 0.015 0.006 0.006 0.001
Income $30,000-$49,999 0.019 0.010 0.005 0.002
Income $50,000-$79,999 0.023 0.010 0.007 0.001
Income $80,000+ 0.025 0.010 0.005 0.000
Income (missing) 0.026 0.012 0.008 0.003
N.L. -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004
P.E.I. -0.014 -0.019 -0.011 -0.014
N.S. 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
N.B. 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
Que. -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009
Man. -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
Sask. 0.009 0.012 0.000 0.005
Alta. 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.004
B.C. -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003
N 92364 116113 65184 116113
R2 0.002 0.002 0.2927 0.0029
F 1.72 2 .27 1.12 10.46
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C h a p t e r  6
Appendix 6A. Proposals for national prescription drug plans
Recent policy proposals to address the gaps in coverage for medicines and variations in 
coverage across provinces include the 2002 Commission on the Future of Health Care 
in Canada (known as the “Romanow Commission”; (Canada, 2002a)) and the 2002 
Final Report on the State of the Health Care System in Canada (the “Kirby Report”; 
(Canada, 2002b)). Following these recommendations, in 2003 the First Ministers’ 
Accord on Health Care Renewal stated their support for developing a strategy for 
prescription drugs “to ensure that Canadians, wherever they live, have reasonable access 
to catastrophic drug coverage” (Health Canada 2003), and then restated again in 2004 in 
the ten-year plan to strengthen health care that cited catastrophic drug coverage as a 
priority.
Romanow advocated for a gradual integration of prescription drugs into the health 
system. Initially he proposed the allocation of additional federal funds to support all 
provinces in their provision of catastrophic coverage (with a threshold of $1500) for 
high drug costs as a means of reducing disparities in coverage across the country. 
Additional funds could be used to expand existing programmes in order to reduce cost 
sharing or extend coverage to people not currently included.
The Kirby Report similarly proposed that the federal government should pay 90% of 
prescription drug expenditures in excess of $5000 per person (combining out-of-pocket 
expenses and provincial contributions). This federal cost sharing would be conditional 
on provinces ensuring an annual out-of-pocket maximum per family of 3% of family 
income. This federal contribution would apply to both provincial programmes and 
private drug insurance plans, where for the latter the plans would have to ensure that no
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insured would have to pay more than 3% of family income or $1500, whichever is less. 
Unfortunately following these proposals would leave unchanged many of the current 
impediments to accessing medicines and physicians; though it is acknowledged as a 
first step towards better integration of prescription drugs into the health system 
(Romanow, 2002). This plan would benefit the small percentage of working-age 
individuals who are inadequately covered at present but face very large drug costs 
(Grootendorst & Veall, 2005). However of all cost sharing arrangements, deductibles 
have the strongest potential equity implications since an individual is essentially 
uninsured until they reach a certain threshold. Moreover with deductibles the public 
subsidy of all medicines is zero across all types of medicines (generics and brand-name, 
essential and non-essential alike) giving patients no information or incentives with 
regards to their treatment choices (Morgan & Willison, 2004).
In 2004 the First Ministers established a Ministerial Taskforce to develop and 
implement a National Pharmaceuticals Strategy to address three key themes: access, 
safety effectiveness and appropriate use, and system sustainability. They further laid out 
nine elements in their 10-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care, and these include the 
development of catastrophic pharmaceutical coverage that all Canadians are eligible for, 
is integrated with other public plans, and comparable across the country. Work so far 
has been conducted to identify a catastrophic drug coverage threshold, and calculate the 
relevant costs (private and public) associated with the plans. For example, the threshold 
could either be set as a variable (progressive) percentage of family income or as a fixed 
percentage (4.3%) and could either maintain private payers or not55. The 2006 progress
55 The estimated cost of a variable percentage threshold, mixed public-private payer model would be $7.8 
billion annually, and $10.3 billion without private payers. The estimated cost of a fixed percentage 
threshold plan with private payers would be $6.6 billion and $9.4 billion with public payers. (Current 
public spending is $6.6 billion). All plans reduce the reliance on out-of-pocket payments and increase the 
public role.
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report noted that provincial governments are proceeding to evaluate the cost 
implications of this programme, and there remains widespread support for its 
implementation (F/P/T Ministerial Task Force on the National Pharmaceuticals 
Strategy, 2006).
These recent proposals and subsequent policy action contrast the more comprehensive 
and public national plan recommended by the National Forum on Health in 1997 
including the absorption of the existing private plans by a public system and no 
deductibles.
Because pharmaceuticals are medically necessary and public financing is the only 
reasonable way to promote universal access and to control costs, we believe 
Canada should take the necessary steps to include drugs as part of its publicly 
funded health care system (Canada, 1997).
Arguably such a system would be associated with the greatest equity gains. The 
greatest impediment to the implementation of a national drug plan has been cost 
(Marchildon, 2006). The expected costs of a federal ‘pharmacare’ programme are 
indeed substantial, in the range of 8 billion dollars, if the federal government simply 
replaced the current provincial plans, 12 billion dollars, to provide universal insurance 
with cost sharing at the level of the most generous provincial public plan, to 19 billion 
dollars, to provide universal first-dollar coverage (Marchildon, 2006). However the 
strong evidence base for the efficiency gains associated with single purchasers (such as 
the ability to more effectively manage costs) could extend to a pharmaceutical plan.
The potential for a national plan to reduce provincial inequalities and extend coverage 
to uninsured populations is important. But also important is the potential for improved 
efficiency and cost saving through the formation of a national drug formulary, the
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possibility of bulk buying of medicines, and the monitoring and managing of 
prescribing and utilisation.
